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Abstract
Evacuation modelling technology offers designers and regulators of aircraft new 
opportunities to rigorously test designs and theories. However, before evacuation 
models can be used effectively they need to be understood by the regulatory and 
aviation industry, validated and developed further. This thesis tackles each of these 
aspects.
This thesis provides a detailed review of evacuation modelling with special emphasis 
on aviation evacuation models and the available data upon which models and 
understanding can be based. Of these the airEXODUS model is selected for this 
thesis and it is described in detail and critically evaluated. The evaluation revealed 
three main issues that needed to be addressed in order for aircraft evacuation 
modelling to advance. These issues relate to, (1) the limited quantity of model 
verification, (2) the inability of models to represent crew procedures, and (3) the 
limited behavioural capabilities of these models with regard to simulating real 
accidents as opposed to certification scenarios.
The fundamental accuracy and predictive capability of airEXODUS is evaluated. 
This is followed by a comprehensive investigation of cabin crew and passenger 
behaviour in 90-second certification trials and real emergency evacuations. The 
conclusions from this investigation serve as the basis for the development of new 
algorithms to addresses issues (2) and (3). Behavioural algorithms are developed to 
simulate cabin crew bypass in conjunction with algorithms for passengers exit choice 
and methods for simulated passengers to optimise their chosen route to an exit.
Finally, this thesis concludes by demonstrating the value of evacuation modelling in 
the design of future aircraft, the regulation of current aircraft and in understanding 
some of the contributing factors involved in past evacuation related disasters.
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1 Introduction
Since its initiation the frequency of air travel has greatly increased. Indeedjn a recent 
US report to Congress [1] it was suggested that the number of emplanements each 
year will reach a billion (US) by the year 2010 (a 53% increase from today). Given 
this, it is then reassuring to know that aircraft accidents are rare occurrences. An air 
accident is defined as,
According to NTSB air accident statistics for the period 1982-2001, one accident 
occurs for every 400000 hours that an aircraft is flown. The term 'air accident', 
provided above, is however a broad category and covers accidents of varying severity. 
Indeed, according to the same NTSB report [3], most accidents are not serious (being 
defined as involving fire - pre-crash or postcrash, with at least one serious injury or 
fatality, and either substantial aircraft damage or complete destruction [3]). Indeed 
the NTSB found that for the period 1983-2000 only 26 from 568 (4.6%) of passenger 
flight accidents were classed as serious. In serious accidents they found that some 
76.6%[3] of passengers survived, whilst 14.4% were killed during impact and a 
further 6.6% died from fires.
Given the relatively high survival rates it is apparent that in most serious accidents the 
performance of evacuation/rescue procedures and developments in fire/impact 
protection are factors in limiting the loss of life. Indeed, it is in the context of 
optimizing and understanding the evacuation of aircraft that the mathematical 
modelling of aircraft evacuation has been developed.
In this pursuit it is necessary to define and distinguish between the types of 
applications for which aircraft evacuation models can be used. The distinction 
between these application areas is made early in this thesis as it has an impact on the
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nature of the model used, and the quality and quantity of reliable data required to 
define the model and ultimately validate the model.
Currently there are two main areas of application for aircraft evacuation models. These 
relate to design/certification applications and the simulation of more realistic accident 
scenarios. While design and certification application areas should be considered as two 
separate areas, for all intents and purposes, the design requirement is predominately 
driven by the certification requirements.
In the aviation industry, aircraft regulators attempt to enforce and maintain safety 
standards through a set of essentially prescriptive rules that have evolved over time. In 
the USA the rules are known as the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) [4], while in 
Europe they are know as Joint Aviation Regulations (JAR) [5]. An example of one of 
the rules that has evolved over time relating to aircraft evacuation efficiency is the so- 
called "60-foot" rule. The rule appears in the FAR (i.e. 25.803 (f) (4)) [4], and there is 
an equivalent ruling in the JAR. The FAR rule states;
These prescriptive regulations specify design rules that must be followed in the design 
of all commercial passenger aircraft carrying more than 44 passengers. Compliance 
with these rules can easily be visually checked by inspectors both during design - by 
viewing aircraft scale drawings - and when the first aircraft is produced. In addition to 
these prescriptive rules is a performance based requirement commonly known as the 
'90 second certification test' [12]. Compliance with this rule is demonstrated by 
performing a full-scale evacuation demonstration. The demonstration is performed with 
a representative cross-section of the travelling public (age and gender distribution), in 
darkness and utilizing only half of the exits normally available. Crew and passengers do 
not know before hand which exits will be available. The test involves evacuating all 
passengers and crew to the ground (using slides if they are fitted) within 90 seconds if
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the aircraft is to pass the performance test. A complete video record is made of the 
event including behaviour within the cabin and at the exits. The video recordings of 
the evacuations are a valuable source of data on the performance level achieved during 
these types of certification evacuations. The certification performance test is only 
intended to provide a measure of the performance of the aircraft under an artificial 
benchmark evacuation scenario. It is not intended to predict the performance of the 
aircraft under a realistic accident scenario. However, it allows the performance of 
different aircraft to be compared under a set of identical - if somewhat artificial - 
scenario conditions.
There are several difficulties with the current 90 second trial. There is considerable 
threat of injury to trial participants. Between 1972 and 1991 a total of 378 volunteers 
(or 6% of participants) sustained injuries ranging from cuts and bruises to broken bones 
[1]. In October 1991 during the McDonnell Douglas evacuation certification trial for 
the MD-11, a female volunteer sustained injuries leading to permanent paralysis. 
Another difficulty is the lack of realism inherent in the 90-second evacuation scenario. 
Volunteers are subject neither to trauma nor to the physical ramifications of a real 
emergency situation such as smoke, fire and debris, the certification trial provides little 
useful information regarding the suitability of the cabin layout and design or the cabin 
crew procedures in the event of a real emergency. The Manchester disaster of 1985, in 
which 55 people lost their lives, serves as a tragic example. The last passenger to escape 
from the burning B737 aircraft emerged 5.5 minutes after the aircraft had ceased 
moving, while 15 years earlier in a UK certification trial, the entire load of passengers 
and crew evacuated the aircraft in 75 seconds [10,11]. In the certification trial, while 
passengers are keen to exit as quickly as possible, the behaviour exhibited is essentially 
co-operative, whereas in real accident situations the behaviour may become 
competitive. Even if complex issues of fire etc. are excluded from consideration, other 
relatively simple issues such as exit selection are far from realistic. In the standard 
certification test configuration typically all exits on one side of the aircraft are used. 
This practice bears little resemblance to realistic accident scenarios [6,7].
On a practical level, as only a single evacuation trial is necessary for certification 
requirements, there can be limited confidence that the test truly represents the 
evacuation capability of the aircraft. In addition, from a design point of view, a single
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test does not provide sufficient information to arrange the cabin layout for optimal 
evacuation efficiency, and does not even necessarily match the types of configuration 
flown by all the potential carriers.
Finally, each full-scale evacuation demonstration can be extremely expensive. For 
instance an evacuation trial for a wide-body aircraft costs in the vicinity of $US2 
million [1]. While the cost may be small in comparison to development costs, it 
remains a sizeable expenditure.
A primary driver for the development of aircraft evacuation models is to augment or 
replace the current certification process. In this application the model is intended to 
simply replicate the 'live' certification trial and if possible to address the identified 
problems and shortcomings of the certification process. Looking beyond the role of 
models in satisfying the requirements of the 90-second certification trial, it is necessary 
for models to simulate 'actual' emergency scenarios. The modelling of real emergency 
evacuation is far more complex than certification modelling for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, intrinsic variability in real emergencies leads to a number of different possible 
evacuation scenarios. For example, whereas in one emergency evacuation the aircraft 
fuselage may expose the cabin interior to a life threatening fire [14], in another, the 
cabin may remain intact but passengers may be subjected to a mild threat of smoke 
[15]. The aircraft could be on its landing gear in one scenario [16] but may have partial 
failure in another [15]; the aircraft may be partially immersed in water as in the case of 
a runway overrun [17], etc. Thus the range of human behaviour that needs to be 
modelled is far more extensive than that exhibited by passengers in the 90-second 
certification scenario.
As an aside for readers that are unaware of aircraft cabin layout and terminology; an 
aircraft cabin is comprised of passenger seat belts arranged laterally in rows that are 
punctuated by longitudinal aisles. Aircraft regulations state that any seat must not be 
more than 3 rows away from an aisle measured laterally [4]. Thus in wide cabins - 
typically high capacity aircraft - it is necessary to have more than one longitundial 
passenger aisle (see Figure 1). On wide-bodied aircraft longitudinal aisles may be 
joined by lateral aisles; these are know as cross-aisles. Exits are placed in the cabin 
walls and may have escape slides. The area adjacent to the exit is known as the exit
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vestibule area. Exit vestibule areas are typically linked via cross-aisles. Interersted 
readers are referred to Appendix A for a more detailed description of aircraft cabin 
layouts and features.
exits
aisle
exits
seats
Cross-aisle aisle
Figure 1: Hypothetical examples of a narrow-boided and wide-boided aircraft cabin
Returning to foucs of this work, this thesis examines the use of evacuation modelling to 
explore the issues described above, in order to answer many of the questions relating to 
the use of this technology and its suitability for this task. This work initially involves a 
critical review of the current evacuation models and the data that is available to them. 
This provides an overview of the field and the progress of current evacuation models to 
date. The review highlights potential models that are capable of being used for 
certification and accident analysis. From these the airEXODUS model is highlighted as 
the most developed model within the field and is therefore selected for detailed study in 
the remainder of this work. This is presented in Chapter 2 of the work.
Chapter 3 provides a summary of the current functionality of the airEXODUS model 
and highlights some areas requiring further development. This reveals two key 
questions that need to be answered in order for the model to be considered as a viable 
alternative for simulating the 90-second certification trials. Firstly, 
and secondly 
To answer this question three 
sub-questions are posed: 
and 
Looking beyond the current 90-second certification trial scenario towards the 
simulation of real emergency evacuations the third question asked in this thesis is "/s 
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Chapters 4-8 of this thesis 
systematically address each of these three questions.
Chapter 4 provides an answer to the first question 
In this chapter the capabilities of airEXODUS to 
simulate the current aircraft evacuation performance benchmark - the 90-seconds 
certification trial - is assessed. This involves subjecting the model to a battery of 
qualitative and quantitative tests. In order for the results of the evacuation model to be 
trusted it is crucial that they are comprehensively evaluated and as much as possible 
shown to be accurate. In Chapter 4 the performance of the model is assessed according 
to its underlying accuracy at the results of 90-second certification trails are 
examined and the model's capability when used to the results of 90-second 
certification trials. This analysis highlights the inability of the model to explicitly 
represent cabin crew procedures a failing which is addressed later in this work.
To answer questions 2 and 3 an original investigation of behaviour in 90-second 
certification trials and real emergency evacuations is performed in Chapter 5. A 
finding of this chapter is that that cabin management procedures are nearly always 
employed by cabin crew during certification trials [18, 19] and quite often during real 
emergency evacuation scenarios [14,20,15,21,22]. The investigation in Chapter 5 
indicated that these procedures may involve crew instigated exit by-pass or in more 
severe emergency scenarios passengers' forming their own exit choice. A finding of 
Chapter 5 was the possibility of conflicting goals between passengers and crew - 
crew are generally concerned with maximising exit utilisation and thereby 
reducing the overall evacuation time for the aircraft whereas passengers are 
generally concerned with attempting to reduce their personal (including persons 
with whom they are attached) evacuation times. The investigation in Chapter 5, 
indicates that during certification evacuations, passengers are generally very compliant 
to crew instruction and are thus more likely to follow a crew command and to redirect to 
another exit than in real emergency scenarios especially those involving fire. In 
scenarios that involve fire passengers are more likely to be concerned with their own self 
interest.
_____________________Chapter 1____________________
Based on the findings of Chapter 5 this work suggests new models for crew-passenger 
interactions and develops algorithms to represent this behaviour within the airEXODUS 
evacuation model. Algorithms capable of simulating crew redirection procedures in 90- 
second certification trials are developed in Chapter 6. These are then extended to 
simulate behaviour in real emergency evacuations. This involves developing additional 
algorithms for passenger exit choice.
The investigation in Chapter 5 indicates that both passenger and crew decisions are 
based on the information that is obtained from the environment during the evacuation 
(referred to as dynamic information) and known aspects of their environment (referred 
to as static information). Mechanisms are provided within the models for passengers 
and crew to gather both types of information. Primarily this is achieved through a 
rudimentary implementation of sight and the restrictions that the geometry of the 
structure and the smoke conditions within the cabin impose upon passengers and crew. 
The resulting algorithms are more adaptive and allow passengers to look beyond their 
immediate surrounds and to appreciate the implications of the evolving evacuation 
dynamics within the cabin. This enables more realistic decisions to be made based on 
their available information. The algorithms developed in Chapter 6 are demonstrated 
using various certification and emergency evacuation scenarios.
Chapter 7 extends the behavioural capabilities further through the development of 
new algorithms based on the investigation of human behaviour presented in Chapter 
5. Models to simulate passengers swapping to alternative aisles on wide-bodied and 
blended wing bodied (BWB) aircraft are developed. Again, the underlying behaviour 
is developed using a decision based approach in which passengers use dynamic 
information gathered from the visible environment. Models appropriate for 90- 
second applications and real emergency evacuations are developed.
Finally a new method of representing passenger seat climbing behaviour is developed. 
Prior to this thesis seat climbing behaviour within airEXODUS was reactive to local 
conditions only. Using the techniques developed in this work a more sophisticated 
representation is developed that enables passengers to make decisions based on 
information gathered from their visible environment. This uses some of the visibility 
functionality that is developed in Chapter 6.
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The final chapter (Chapter 8) describes three studies that were performed using the 
methods developed in this thesis. The first undertakes a study of a current aviation 
regulation (the maximum exit separation FAR (i.e. 25.807 (f) (4)) [5]) using 
evacuation modelling techniques. The second study uses the model to examine 
evacuation issues for future aircraft design, such as the A380 or the proposed BWB 
aircraft. The model is used to provide an assessment of various evacuation scenarios. 
The final demonstrations, show how modelling can be used to understand human 
behaviour and predict the outcome of real emergency evacuations involving fire. The 
final chapter provides compelling evidence for the replacement of the current 
certification trial methodology with a more holistic approach.
This thesis represents an extension to the airEXODUS evacuation model. The model 
prior to the development in this thesis is describd in Chapters and should be taken as 
the starting point for this work. This work develops the model further, designing and 
coding new methods and new equations for simulating human behaviour in aircraft 
accidents. These models are based on empirical evidence from aircraft accidents and 
certification trials.
To summarise, evacuation modelling technology is potentially a valuable tool for 
aircraft designers and regulators to assess the evacuation efficiency of aircraft in a 
range of accident scenarios. This thesis undertakes an evaluation of evacuation 
models and their data and in doing so selects the airEXODUS evacuation model for 
detailed investigation. Three key limitations with the model are highlighted and then 
each systematically addressed. This leads to a model that is more capable of 
simulating both the 90-second certification requirement and real emergency 
evacuations. Finally, this thesis makes a compelling argument for wider use of 
evacuation modelling techniques in the design and regulation of passenger aircraft.
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2 A Survey of Aircraft Evacuation Models and Related Data
2.1 Introduction - The main types of evacuation models
This chapter poses and answers the question 
To answer this question a review of evacuation modelling methods is 
presented with a particular focus on models that are designed to simulate evacuation 
from aircraft. This review describes the various methods available to simulate 
evacuation from any enclosure, be it a building or aircraft (see Section 2.2.1), the 
models that are currently available to simulate aircraft evacuation (see Section 2.2.3), 
the data requirements of these models and the sources of this data (see Section 2.4).
Recall that there are currently two main areas of application for aircraft evacuation 
models. These are for design/certification and for accident reconstruction. The 
distinction between the types of application that aircraft evacuation models can be 
used for has already been described in detail in Chapter 1 of this work. The 
distinction between these two areas is however highly important as it has an impact on 
the nature of the model used to service these different areas, and the quantity and quality 
of reliable data required in defining the model and used during its validation. Suffice to 
say that evacuation modelling for accident reconstruction is considerably more 
demanding than certification modelling. Despite this some models have been 
developed that to attempt to simulate real emergency evacuation scenarios and 
certification scenarios. This chapter examines all of the aircraft evacuation models that 
have been developed to date, including certification and accident simulation models.
Before continueing with the discussion it is useful to consider a typical aircraft 
evacuation. Summarising an aircraft evacuation is an extremely difficult task, as the 
dynamics would vary according to the type of scenario, i.e. destruction to the aircraft, 
presence of fire, passenger load, decisions of the crew, etc. That said it is considered 
useful at this stage to consider some of the features of an aircraft evacuation. An 
evacuation scenario is therefore described below for those readers unfamiliar with 
aircraft evacuation to give a flavour of an extremely well orchestrated evacuation 
scenario. Readers should be aware that in reality numerous additional behaviours and
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factors may occur that could influence the sequence of events described below, some of 
which are discussed throughout this thesis.
In an aircraft evacuation passengers would at some point be alerted to the requirement to 
evacuate, this may occur suddenly (i.e. an uncontained engine failure) or passenger may 
have had some time to prepare for the evacuation (i.e. an in-flight fire). In most aircraft 
evacuation scenarios there is little ambiguity in the call and need to evacuate the aircraft. 
That said in some accidents [17] and possibly in future in VLTA and BWB (e.g. super- 
jumbo or flying wing aircraft) some ambiguity may exist.
Operator procedures typically specify that to begin evacuation a clear evacuation 
instruction is transmitted by the flight crew over the Public Address (PA) system, e.g. 
"Evacuate, Left" for an evacuation via the left side exits. The flight crew may specify a 
portion of the aircraft exits that are to be used, i.e. Left or Right, in the event of a fire 
scenario. Subsequent to the evacuation instruction the crew should release their seat 
belts, stand, move to and check that their assigned exit is useable. Useable exits are 
those that will not subject users and/or cabin occupants to the threat of injury, fire and 
smoke ingress. Should they determine that evacuation is possible through their assigned 
exit they would open the exit and if present the escape slide would begin to deploy. If 
the crew determines that the exit is unusable they are required to guard the exit and 
direct passengers towards other useable exits onboard the aircraft. During this period 
passengers will have/be unbuckling their seat belts, standing, attempting to collect carry 
on luggage and evaluating their exit choices. Passengers seated next to small hatch exits 
are required to operate the exit hatch and may have begun doing so.
Once standing passengers typically begin to make their way towards the exits. In 
accident scenarios passengers typically choose their nearest useable exit [102,103] 
whereas in 90-second certification trials passengers are quickly directed by the crew 
towards exits that are optimal for the aircraft. During this period cabin crew at active 
and useable exits should be yelling and cagouling passengers. In making their way to 
the exit passengers would likely experience congestion. Likewise, whilst attempting to 
leave the seating rows and when moving through the aisle they would likely experience 
congestion.
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Cabin crew at aircraft exits play an important part during the evacuation and are 
responsible for ushering passengers onto exit slides in as expeditious a manner as 
possible. In doing so they should command passengers to "jump not sit" and at exits 
with dual lane flows such as Type-A or Type B exits, to "form two lines". Assertive and 
effective cabin crew typically push passengers in the back to speed them on their way. 
Ineffective and non-assertive cabin crew simply command passengers without actually 
handling them. Dedicated Assist Spaces (DAS) are provided to reduce their obstruction 
of the exit whilst performing these duties.
Those cabin crew that are guarding inactive exits or cabin crew with free-roles to roam 
the cabin during the evacuation may start to redirect passengers between exits to speed 
the evacuation. Typically these events occur towards the middle/end of the evacuation. 
On wide-bodied aircraft passengers may elect to switch to empty aisles and in extreme 
evacuations passenger seat climbing behaviour has been reported. Seat climbing 
behaviour involves passengers climbing over seat backs rather than using the aisle. 
Once a cabin crew's area is cleared they may check the cabin visually and then evacuate 
via the exit slide.
Finally, whilst exit openings and slide deployments are required by aircraft regulations to 
fully deploy in seconds (typically 20 seconds), in practice the opening of a damaged exit 
has been known to take minutes. Likewise passengers have been known to take 45+ 
seconds to operate exit hatches. Similarly some passengers maybe able to operate their 
seat belt quickly whereas others may not.
2.2 Computer based evacuation models
The most significant developments in computer based evacuation modelling
technology has occurred in the building industry. This has been the driving force for 
much of the development in evacuation modelling. This is somewhat ironic as one of 
the first computer based evacuation models to appear in the literature was an aircraft 
evacuation model, GPSS [23,24] in the 1970's. This model failed to convince 
engineers and regulatory authorities of the day, perhaps due to the limitations of the 
computers of the time or limitations in its modelling capabilities. As a result the area 
of aircraft evacuation modelling fell dormant for nearly 20 years.
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In the interim, and completely independent of the earlier aircraft developments, the 
building industry saw the potential benefits in evacuation modelling and subsequently 
developed numerous models (EVACNET+ [53,54] and TAKAHASHFs MODEL 
[35], BGRAF [55], DONEGAN'S ENTROPY MODEL [56], EXITT [57,58], 
EGRESS [59,60], E-SCAPE [61], EVACSIM [62,63], EXIT89 [64,65], SIMULEX 
[66-68], MAGNETMODEL [27] PAXPORT [29-30], VEGAS [72,73], EXODUS 
[36-38,40-52], CRISP [74,75], WAYOUT [76]).
The development of these models was partially driven by the desire of architects to 
implement novel concepts in building designs that were beyond the scope of the 
regulatory framework. As these designs challenged the traditional bounds of size and 
space utilisation they also challenged the scope of the traditional prescriptive building 
regulations. Increasingly, engineers and regulatory officials were faced with dilemma 
of demonstrating in some manner that these new concepts in building design were 
safe (or at least offered equivalent levels of safety to previous buildings) and that the 
occupants would be able to efficiently evacuate in the event of an emergency.
Thus, in the building industry, research into quantifying and modelling human 
movement and behaviour has been underway for at least 30 years. This work has 
progressed down two routes, the first is concerned with the movement of people under 
normal non-emergency conditions. The second is concerned with the development of a 
capability to predict the movement of people under emergency conditions such as may 
result from the evacuation of a building subjected to a fire threat.
Some of the earliest work concerned with quantifying the movement of people under 
non-emergency conditions is that of Predtechenskii and Milinksii [25] and Fruin [26]. 
This research into movement capabilities of people in crowded areas and on stairs 
eventually lead to the- development of movement models such as 
PEDROUTE/PAXPORT [29-30]. Evacuation research is somewhat more recent, one 
of the earliest published papers appeared in 1982 and concerns the modelling of 
emergency egress during fires [31].
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In the following section of this document an attempt is made to describe the 
modelling methodologies available to simulate evacuation. This discussion is 
application independent and applies equally to building and aircraft evacuation 
models. Having established the principle methodologies available we go on to 
examine aviation evacuation models. A more detailed discussion of the modelling 
methodologies can be found in the work of Gwynne [33].
2.2.1 A review of the modelling methodologies used to simulate evacuation 
Attempts to simulate evacuation essentially fall into two categories of model, those
which only consider human movement and those which attempt to link movement 
with behaviour.
The first category of model concentrates solely on the carrying capacity of the structure 
and its various components. This type of model is often referred to as a "ball-bearing" 
model (also referred to as environmental determinism [34]) as individuals are treated as 
unthinking objects that automatically respond to external stimuli. In such a model, 
people are assumed to evacuate the structure, immediately ceasing any other activity. 
Furthermore, the direction and speed of egress is determined by physical considerations 
only (e.g. population densities, exit capacity, etc.). An extreme example of this type of 
model is one which ignores the population's individuality altogether and treats their 
egress en mass [35].
The second category of model takes into account not only the physical characteristics 
of the enclosure but treats the individual as an active agent taking into consideration 
his response to stimuli such as the various fire hazards and individual behaviour such 
as personal reaction times, exit preference etc.
A variety of different modelling methodologies are available by which to represent 
these different categories of evacuation model. Within the modelling methodologies 
adopted, there are also a number of ways in which to represent the enclosure, 
population and the behaviour of the population. The myriad approaches that are 
available led to the development of some 22 different building evacuation models and 
some 6 aircraft evacuation models. These models have been categorised [33] 
according to the underlying methodologies used to represent:
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  Nature of model application,
  Enclosure representation,
  Population perspective, and
  Behavioural perspective.
2.2.1.1 Nature of model application
Broadly speaking, models that simulate evacuation tackle this problem in three 
fundamentally different manners: that of OPTIMISATION, SIMULATION, and RISK 
ASSESSMENT. The underlying principles associated with each of these approaches 
influences the models' capabilities.
Generally termed as optimisation models are models that assume occupants evacuate in 
as efficient a manner as possible, ignoring peripheral and non-evacuation activities. 
The evacuation paths taken are considered optima, as are the flow characteristics of 
people and exits. These tend to be models which cater for a large number of people or 
who treat the occupants as a homogenous ensemble, therefore not recognising 
individual behaviour. Simulation models attempt to represent the behaviour and 
movement observed in evacuations, not only to achieve accurate results, but to 
realistically represent the paths and decisions taken during an evacuation. Risk 
assessment models attempt to identify hazards associated with evacuation resulting 
from a fire or related incident and attempt to quantify risk. By performing many 
repeated runs, statistically significant variations associated with changes to the 
compartment designs or fire protection measures, can be assessed.
Whichever approach is adopted, it is essential that the enclosure, geometry and 
population behaviour be represented. Each of these aspects can be modelled using one 
of several approaches.
2.2.1.2 Enclosure representation
The method that a model utilises in representing the enclosure is an important 
characteristic of a model, as it is a key determinant of the level of detail that the 
model can ultimately provide. Two methods are usually used to represent the 
enclosure: FINE and COARSE NETWORKS. In each case, space is descretised into
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sub-regions, and each sub-region is connected to its neighbours. The resolution of this 
subdivision distinguishes the two approaches.
Using the fine network approach space is subdivided into a series of nodes or tiles. Each 
node/tile represents an area of the space that may typically be occupied by one person. 
Connectivity between the nodes/tiles is represented via arcs, which the simulated 
people traverse when moving between spatial nodes/tiles. Thus, with a fine network 
model people move from location to location within compartments. The location of 
people within each compartment is exactly known. Large geometries generally 
comprise of thousands of nodes. Coordinate based systems are an extreme 
manifestation of the fine network paradigm in which the node size is reduced to very 
small sizes and people occupying many nodes at once.
In the coarse network approach space is subdivided into compartments or large 
logically consistent regions. In buildings these may represent rooms, stairwells, etc, 
whereas in aircraft they may represent aisles, seat rows, exit passageways, and so forth. 
The connectivity between these compartments is represented via arcs. People move 
between compartments via the connecting arcs. Knowledge of peoples' location within 
compartments is not exactly known, however it may be approximated via queuing 
algorithms. This approach presents difficulties when incorporating local movement and 
navigation including overtaking, the resolution of local conflicts, and obstacle 
avoidance. This is because the exact location of an individual is not represented, and 
therefore detailed calculations of individual movement and the interaction between 
individuals cannot be made. This limitation should be kept in mind when examining the 
behavioural models. The main benefit of this approach is that it reduces the amount of 
computer processing, memory and ultimately the simulation time that is required. 
However, this approximation is not necessary for small problem domains, such as 
aircraft cabins, given the large processing power of modern desktop computers.
2.2.1.3 Population perspective
Another important feature of evacuation models is the method they employ in 
representing people within the enclosure. This aspect of evacuation models is referred 
to as the population perspective. The population perspective of evacuation models are 
categorised as being either INDIVIDAUL or GLOBALLY based.
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Models that have an INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE represent each member of the 
population individually and track their progress throughout the simulation. Each 
member of the population can be assigned individual attributes, such as age, gender, 
movement rates, etc. Whilst these types of models treat each individual within the 
simulation as unique, they do not preclude the formation of groups.
Evacuation models that have a GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE do not recognise the 
individual, but delineate a population as a homogenous ensemble (or a grouping), 
without different identities. These models represent evacuation details not on the basis 
of which individual escaped, but on the numbers of occupants who escaped. This 
approach may be beneficial in both the management and the speed of the models, but 
lacks much of the detail available to the individual perspective. When employing a 
global perspective is impossible to model the effects of events on individual occupants 
(the effect of toxic fire gases, for instance). In this example, only a distributed or 
average - perhaps indicating the proportion of the population that had been effected - 
could be established throughout the population. This deficiency may not be considered 
serious in simple, homogenous populations, but in more realistic situations, it would 
seriously hinder an accurate understanding of the behaviour of the population.
2.2.1.4 Behavioural perspective
To represent the decision-making process employed by the occupants, the model must 
incorporate an appropriate method for determining occupant behaviour. The 
behavioural perspective adopted is influenced by the population and geometry 
approaches taken, and as such is the most complex of all the defining aspects. Using 
current modelling techniques there are five commonly used and sometimes mutually 
inclusive approaches to represent behaviour within evacuation models; FUNCTIONAL 
ANALOGY BEHAVIOUR, IMPLICIT BEHAVIOUR, RULE BASED 
BEHAVIOUR, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE based behaviour and NO 
BEHAVIOURAL COMPONENT.
FUNCTIONAL ANALOGY MODELS apply an equation, or set of equations, derived 
from a non-evacuation related discipline (e.g. the functions which drive a Magnetic 
based model were taken from Physics), to the entire population, which then completely 
governs the population's response. All the individuals will be affected in the same way
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by this fnnrtinn anH thpimfnm will r^act in a deterministic manner to its influences, 
und
Some evacuation models have NO BEHAVIOURAL RULES at all. These models 
simply simulate the physical movement of the people. Peoples' decisions are formed 
on the basis of physical influences, rather than through simulating more complex 
human decision processes.
IMPLICIT MODELS do not represent the behaviour explicitly but make use of 
secondary data to represent their affects. These types of models are highly dependant 
upon the availability, reliability and validity of the data used.
Models which explicitly recognise the behavioural traits of individual occupants, 
usually make use of a RULE BASED system. These models have a set of rules, or 
heuristics, that govern the behaviour of simulated people within the model. These rules 
can be triggered in specific circumstances, and in such circumstances, have an effect. A 
problem with this style of decision-making process is that in simplistic methods the 
same decisions are taken under the same circumstances, in a deterministic fashion. In 
such instances the possible natural variations in outcomes through repetitions are not 
modelled. Most of the rule based models overcome this problem by introducing a 
stochastic component to the decision making process. This topic is discussed in more 
detail later (see Section 2.4).
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE based models utilise methods from artificial 
intelligence to mimic human intelligence in simulated people. Whilst this approach can 
yield realistic behaviour the level of user control is somewhat reduced.
2.2.2 Building and Aircraft evacuation models
As already mentioned, evacuation modelling for the built environment is more highly
developed than evacuation modelling in the aviation industry. As a result there are 
many more models available for simulating evacuation from the built environment than 
from aviation environments. It should be noted at this stage that building evacuation 
models cannot easily and reliably be used for aviation applications. This is due in part 
to the unique behaviour exhibited by passengers and crew in aircraft evacuations and
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key structural features that differentiate aircraft from buildings. For example, 
behaviours, such as seat jumping, and cabin crew re-direction and structural features 
such as exits with slides make it difficult to simply apply a building evacuation model 
to an aircraft evacuation situation. Occasionally, building models have been used to 
simulate the evacuation of aircraft [59]. Not surprisingly the model predictions were 
poor. It is for these reasons that specialised aircraft evacuation models have been 
developed.
2.2.3 A review of aircraft evacuation models
Over the past 30 years only seven aviation evacuation models have been reported in
the open literature. In chronological order they are:
1970 to 1980 General Purpose Simulation System (GPSS) developed by the FAA, 
1987 to 1992 Gourary Associates (GA) model developed by Gourary Associates, 
1990 to 1994 AIREVAC/ARCEVAC developed by Aviation Research Corporation 
1994 to 1996 Macey's Risk Assessment Model developed by Cranfield University 
1996 to 1996 The Oklahoma Object Orientated (OOO) model 
1989 to now EXODUS developed by the Fire Safety Engineering Group of the
University of Greenwich 
2001 to now Robbin's Discrete Element Method (DEM) developed by Department
of Mathematics at The University of Strathclyde
Of these, it appears that development of three models, namely, GPSS [23,24], GA [70] 
and ARCEVAC [69] has now been abandoned, whilst the OOO [79] model was a 
theoretical framework, never actually implemented. An earlier review of aircraft 
evacuation models was undertaken by Jeff Marcus of CAM! (Civil Aero-Medical 
Institute) in 1994 [80]. The review presented here brings this earlier review up to date.
2.2.3.1 General Features
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1.1, models have previously been categorised as being 
developed for use as either risk assessment, optimisation and/or simulation tools [33]. 
All of the aircraft evacuation models to date have been SIMULATION models (a 
possible exception is the MACEY [77] model). While the model as a whole is a risk 
assessment model, it relies on an simulation model to determine evacuation. We will
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therefore consider this component of the MACEY model to be a simulation 
evacuation model.
In Section 2.1 it was also stated that there are essentially two types of aviation 
application, the simulation of the 90 second trial and the simulation of real accident 
scenarios. Three aircraft evacuation models have been developed primarily to simulate 
REAL EMERGENCY evacuations (ARCEVAC [69] and GOURARY [70]), one 
model has been developed to simulate 90-SECOND certification evacuations (GPSS 
[23,24]) and three models have been developed specifically to simulate both 90 second 
certification trials and real emergency evacuations (EXODUS [36-38,40-52], MACEY 
[77] and DEM [71]).
If the model is intended to simulate real accident scenarios it will need the capability 
to represent fire scenarios. This can be accomplished through the incorporation of a 
hazard sub-model. The hazard sub-model is intended to represent the spatial and 
temporal distribution of fire hazards such as smoke, heat and toxic gases. The method 
of representing fire hazards is in some part dependent upon the nature of the enclosure 
representation. Models that utilise a coarse network approach to represent space will 
be forced to simplify the representation of fire hazards. In such cases, the hazard 
distribution would be represented as a uniform distribution within the defined spatial 
zone. Models utilising a fine spatial network to represent space can also represent the 
hazards as a uniform distribution over a predefined region of space (or zone) (e.g. 
GOURARY [70] and ARCEVAC [69]) or elect to represent a unique hazard value at 
each node/tile location within the geometry (e.g. EXODUS [36-38,40-52] and 
MACEY [77]). Models such as EXODUS can utilise either approach.
Determining hazard values to use in such calculations is discussed in Section 2.4.3.3. 
It is sufficient now to know that they can be obtained either via fire test experiments 
[81,82] and/or rough estimates, or via computer based fire simulation models such as 
Zone models [83,] or Computational Fire Dynamics (CFD) [87] models
Models that represent fire hazards should also have a representation of its affects on 
the simulated passengers. Human exposure to a thermo-toxic hazard would affect 
passenger's behaviour and their physiology. The behaviour model employed
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determines the behavioural response. However; a toxicity model is required to 
represent the passengers' physiological response.
To some extent the approach used to represent the population determines the maximum 
sophistication of the toxicity model that can be employed. Models that have an 
individual population perspective could simulate the response of each unique individual 
to fire hazard exposure, with each individual having unique tolerance limits.
A model with a simplistic representation of toxicity (e.g. GOURARY [70]), typically 
assigns passengers with an arbitrary endurance or stamina attribute that represents the 
individuals threshold to thermo-toxic exposure. The attribute is decreased by 
cumulative exposure until either incapacitation and/or expiry occurs. Unfortunately, 
the arbitrary nature of this attribute makes reliable predictions of human response to fire 
hazards difficult.
By contrast some models (e.g. EXODUS [36-38,40-52] and MACEY [77]) make use of 
complex fractional effective dose models (i.e. FED models) to predict the physiological 
response of passengers to fire hazard exposure (see Section 2.4.3.3). 
Incapacitation/expiry is determined via an empirically determined cumulative fractional 
effect that is determined according to actual exposure during the simulation.
Other models may completely ignore the thermo-toxic affects of real emergency 
environments (e.g. ARCEVAC [69] and DEM [71]). However, its presence may affect 
the behaviour of passengers (ARCEVAC [69]).
Another major feature of aviation evacuation models is their ability to represent the 
interaction of passengers with cabin crew where actions of cabin crew are highly 
influential on the evolving dynamics of the aircraft evacuation. For instance, cabin 
crewmembers prepare exits for use, redirect passengers and assist passengers at exits. 
These actions must be represented within the aircraft evacuation model in some way. 
Methods of representing cabin crew within aircraft evacuation models are categorised 
as being IMPLICIT, EXPLICIT, USER DRIVEN or NONE.
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Some models completely ignore cabin crewmembers (e.g. MACEY [77]). Thus cabin 
crewmember tasks, such as exit preparation, is performed by passengers. Models with 
an IMPLICIT representation of cabin crew (e.g. GPSS [23,24] and DEM [71]), do not 
physically represent cabin crew within the simulation, although their actions are 
represented. For example, the affect of having an implicit assertive cabin crewmember 
adjacent to an exit may lead to a faster exit hesitations distribution being utilised. 
Likewise, crew could be represented through the assignment of relatively low times for 
exit preparation.
Models that have an EXPLICIT representation of cabin crew (e.g. ARCEVAC [69]), 
physically model the cabin crew as an individual within the simulation. The model 
determines events, such as the length of time required to prepare exits for use. Using 
exit preparation time as an example, the model would move the crewmember to the exit 
then the crewmember would open the exit and deploy the escape slide. Other actions 
such as crew redirection can also be represented explicitly. Some models are capable 
of both IMPLICIT and EXPLICIT representation of cabin crew (e.g. EXODUS [36- 
38,40-52]).
Finally, some models require user intervention in order to simulate the redirection of 
passengers (e.g. GOURARY [70]). These types of models require the user to monitor 
the unfolding evacuation and determine from the model output when redirection is 
required.
A key feature of aircraft evacuation models, and one that distinguishes them from 
building models, is the need to represent the behaviour of passengers when using 
aviation specific components, such as exit dimensions, shapes or escape slides. Some 
models use empirical data (GPSS [23,24] and EXODUS [36-38,40-52]) to specify 
realistic delays appropriate to the aircraft components, i.e. Type-I, Type-El exits etc. 
Such data is derived from analysis of experimental studies and 90-second certification 
trials. Through the use of this empirical data these models predict realistic flow rates 
through the exit. Some models (GOURARY [70], ARCEVAC [69], MACEY [77] and 
DEM [71] models) use a probability of exiting as a function of exit size and cabin 
crewmember proximity (GOURARY [70]), other models tend to assume an arbitrary 
cap on exit capability such as only allowing one passenger to occupy an escape slide at
_ . _
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any one time (DEM [71]). Essentially, these approaches impose a flow rate upon the 
exit. The models parameters are then altered until something approaching the desired 
flow rates is generated.
2.2.3.2 FAA GPSS model
The FAA model was developed in the 1970' s and was intended to simulate 90-second 
certification scenarios. The model was designed to run on the massive mainframe 
computers of the day. The software was written using IBM's General Purpose 
Simulation System (GPSS) language.
Aircraft geometries were created within the GPSS programming language. The model 
did not have a user interface but was operated via the programming language itself. 
Alternative geometries and populations were created via reprogramming the model to 
represent the desired aircraft geometry.
Space within the model was represented using a coarse network interconnected with 
arcs. Thus, the aircraft was divided into components such as aisles, exit passageways, 
seat blocks, etc. GPSS identified the individual location of each of the passengers, so 
theoretically each passenger could be tracked throughout the simulation. However, 
passenger model parameters were assigned uniform values within the model, as the 
authors could not empirically define individual parameters and their likely affects.
The behaviour of passengers within the model was rule based. There were, for example 
specific rules that allowed passengers to redirect to shorter exit queues as well as rules 
governing the movement of passengers between aircraft components, such as seats and
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Figure 2: An example of the results from the GPSS model [23,24]
aisles. An assumption 
used in their redirection 
algorithm was that the 
passenger reached the 
alternative exit queue 
before a gap in the flow 
emerged. In addition to 
the behavioural rules, 
the model made use of
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empirically determined data in generating a random delay as passengers passed through 
an exit. The exit probability delay functions were calculated using data from CAMI 
(see Section 2.4.3.1) for various different exit types. A further assumption of the model 
was that only three passengers could occupy each lane of an escape slide at any one 
time. A Type-A escape slide could therefore have a maximum passenger load of six 
passengers. Finally, exit preparation times were assigned to individual exits. These 
were also determined from previous experimental trials at CAMI. A consequence of 
the exit delay probabilities was that the model was stochastic.
No hazard or toxicity model was required as the GPSS model was designed only to 
simulate 90-second certification trial evacuations. The model output was numerical. 
As output, the model calculated the times that passengers hesitated at the exits, the gap 
between passenger arrivals at the exit and the time spent on the slide for four 
gender/age groups. In addition the total evacuation time for the aircraft and the time of 
the last person out, continuous and non-continuous flow rates for each exit were output. 
An example of the results of the GPSS model output can be seen in Figure 2.
The GPSS model was validated using the four-certification trial cases shown in Table 1. 
It can be seen that the average total evacuation time of the model was only within 10% 
of the certification trial in one of the cases (L-1011 with redirection). The disparity in 
the remaining cases was attributed to variability in the performance of passengers and 
crew during the 90-second certification trial. It was thus concluded that more data was 
required from experimental trials in order to better represent motivation levels during 
emergency evacuations.
Table 1: GPSS validation history (reproduced from [80])
Type of Aircraft
B747
L1011
L1011
L1011
Passenger Load
527
356
356
411
Certification Time 
(sec)
66.2
101.1
82.0
89.7
Average Simulated 
Time (sec)
84.0
93.5
54.9
79.6
Redirection
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
2.2.3.3 The GA Model
Gourary Associates (GA) of the USA developed a model through part FAA and 
commercial funding during the late 1980's and early 1990's. The primary intention of 
the GA model was to simulate realistic emergency scenarios rather than the 90-second 
certification scenario. The GA model used a fine network method of representing space
24
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allowing one or more passengers to occupy each spatial node/tile. The population was 
represented as a collection of individual passengers, who were assigned individual 
attributes such as, Endurance, Agility, Sex, Age and Wakeup time, i.e. response time. 
The progress of each passenger was tracked throughout the evacuation.
The model was limited to 38 seat rows with up to six passengers within each seat row. 
The model allowed six exits. These exits could be positioned anywhere in the 
geometry. The model had a graphical user interface and ran in near real time. Edited 
geometries could be saved for later use.
Movement speeds were not empirically determined and attributed to each passenger as 
a parameter. Instead, each passenger had a probability of moving to an adjacent cell, 
based on the cells occupancy level, i.e. empty, occupied or full, the proximity of cabin 
crew and the type of cell being traversed. For example, the probability of a passenger 
moving between cells was higher in aisle nodes than in seat cells. Thus, different 
passenger speeds were modelled for specific terrain. In addition to this, the occupancy 
level of the targeted cell affected the probability of movement. For example, there was 
a higher probability of movement to unoccupied cells rather than those that were 
already occupied by a person. If a cell was full, i.e. containing two active people, then 
the probability of movement was impossible, i.e. zero.
Expired passengers were counted as occupying cells. This could lead to the model 
"jamming". An algorithm was included that enabled passengers to "bypass" cells that 
were occupied by expired passengers.
The probabilistic movement approach was also applied to passenger exiting. Once a 
passenger reached the exit they had a probability of exiting the aircraft. More effective 
exits would be modelled via increased probabilities. The proximity of cabin 
crewmember(s) at the exit increased the probability of exiting still further. Given the 
probabilistic nature of the movement sub-model, the GA model would have to be 
considered as stochastic in nature.
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This model contained little further passenger behaviour from that already discussed. 
Indeed, the only notable other behaviour within the GA model, was passenger 
redirection.
Prior to running the model each passenger was assigned an exit. However, they could 
be diverted to other exits during the evacuation. Within GA this was accomplished 
without using computerised rules, but through user intervention via the keyboard whilst 
the simulation run. Firstly the user had to select an exit using the function keys F1-F6. 
This had the effect of placing a cabin crewmember at the exit. Having placed the 
crewmember at an exit the user pressed the arrow keys to divert passengers to the 
nearest exit in the selected direction. The drawback with this approach was that only 
one cabin crewmember could be modelled at any one time. A potential solution to this 
was provided via the ability to redirect every passenger in the simulation. This was 
accomplished by pressing <CONTROL+D> during the simulation.
Since GA was intended to simulate real emergency evacuations, hazard and toxicity 
models were required. Indeed, GA had a rudimentary representation of fire hazards 
and toxicity. GA had an environmental hostility value which decreased passengers 
endurance attribute until it had fully expired, at which point they died. The model 
allowed for two different hazard zones, with each having its own severity. However, 
the distribution of hazards throughout the aircraft cabin and their affect on passengers 
was completely arbitrary.
Indeed, the main failing of the GA model was that the parameters that it required were 
not empirically determined [80]. The user was required to manually set all model 
parameters, such as exiting probability, passenger endurance and the toxicity of the 
environment. The arbitrary parameters would then be highly influential on the outcome 
of any simulations. In addition, whilst it is stated in its literature that validation was 
performed, its results were not published [70, 80].
2.2.3.4 AIREVAC/ARCEVAC
In the late 1980's the South West Research Institute (SWRI) through Air Transport 
Association (ATA) funding began developing a model called AIREVAC. Later, in the
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early 1990's AIREVAC, became known as ARCEVAC and its development was taken 
over by Aviation Research Corporation of Canada as a commercial venture.
The ARCEVAC model was designed to simulate real emergency evacuation scenarios. 
ARCEVAC employed a fine network spatial representation, with space being 
descretised according to a user specific grid size. With a suitable small grid size the 
model functioned as a coordinate based scheme. As such passengers were assigned 
cross-sectional widths to represent the girth of their bodies.
Without rewriting the code, the model was limited to simulating the evacuations from 
the B727. At the time, the model ran considerably slower than real time. ARCEVAC 
had a user-friendly graphical user interface (see Figure 3) to allow the model to be 
configured. Simulation and geometry files could be saved for later use. The model was 
capable of outputting charts and data on the performance of the aircraft as a whole or 
individual exits (see Figure 4).
t Son 
g Propert; j ac 
if Enitial
Figure 3: Graphic of screen output from the ARCEVAC model
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The population perspective of this model was individually based, tracking each 
individual passenger throughout the evacuation. Indeed, passengers and crew within 
ARCEVAC contained numerous individual parameters, such as Sex, Age, Constitution,
Weight, Height, Cross Sectional 
Area, Agility, Selfishness and Group 
"1 Selfishness. Not only were 
-I passengers attributed with individual
Scenario; Left Front and Left Back Exits 
Eidts:24
rO JS
10 3D <0 5D SO JO g» ' ?0 100 UD IM
TIME SINCE START OF SIMULATION ({*«)
physical attributes, but they also 
have physiological and social 
attributes such as state-of-mind and 
selfishness.
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Figure 4: Example output from the ARCEVAC model To assist in defining populations
within the model a randomiser was
provided. The randomiser generated populations according to specified minimum and 
maximum values for different groups. Within these groups and for the purposes of 
representing group bonding, peoples' relationship with each other could be specified as 
being either, business colleagues, friends or family members.
ARCEVAC had a rule-base representation of passenger behaviour. The defining 
passenger parameters were used in conjunction with the behaviour rules to determine 
the response of each passenger to specific events during the evacuation. Indeed the 
behaviour within ARCEVAC was fairly sophisticated for its time. ARCEVAC 
contained the fundamental rules governing movement between nodes and exiting 
behaviour. Details of these aspects were not available in published literature.
ARCEVAC attempted to model group behaviour through user specified relationships 
and a group selfishness attribute. In addition ARCEVAC attempted to model the 
psychological state of mind of passengers during their evacuation. A numerical 
attribute represented the following states: and 
The state-of-mind modified both passenger movement and their response to 
specific stimuli.
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Within the model, passengers followed normal crew behaviour and were capable 
of changing directions to other exits without crossing seating. passengers would 
choose the best evacuation route and were able to cross seating. crewmembers 
gained a level. passengers would choose the best exit but would 
not redirect from their chosen exit without crew intervention. They were able to cross 
seating. crew would drop two levels of passengers 
would choose any path to any exit so long as a threat is not present. They would not 
redirect themselves. crew would attempt to evacuate themselves. 
passengers would move randomly around the cabin space.
ARCEVAC had extensive capabilities with respect to simulating the actions of cabin 
crew. Cabin crew were modelled explicitly and are assigned specific "missions". 
Missions ranged from searching seats, stairs or aisles for immobilised passengers, to 
rescue/aid and general evacuation management. Assigning the mission of searching 
seats, stairs and aisles would make the cabin crewmember search these aircraft 
components for immobilised passengers. The aid mission would initiate an attempt at 
rescuing these passengers. The assist in evacuation mission would allow the cabin 
crewmember to redirect passengers to alternative exits or to assist in the flow of 
passengers through exits or monuments. Benefit to passengers from cabin crewmember 
missions was derived from a calmer state of mind attribute, increased agility attribute 
and more efficient exit choice.
Combinations of missions could be specified in order of priority. For example, the 
cabin crewmembers main priority could be to improve the flow rate of passengers 
through exits with the secondary mission of helping immobilised passengers.
Specific attributes, such as valour and performance, were assigned to cabin crew and 
influenced their ability to perform their tasks. The valour attribute was used in 
determining the point at which the cabin crewmember would abandon their mission in 
favour of their own survival. The performance level of the cabin crewmembers was 
specified through a series of probabilities and attribute modifiers. For example, the 
crewmembers' ability at assisting passengers during evacuation was determined via an 
agility modifier attribute. Probabilities were specified to represent the assertiveness of 
cabin crewmembers in issuing commands and the subservience of passengers to them.
29
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The final performance attribute was the check interval. This was used to represents the 
speed that the cabin crewmembers could perform their tasks, i.e. the frequency of their 
actions.
Since ARCEVAC was designed to simulate real emergency evacuations hazard and 
toxicity models were required. Whilst ARCEVAC contained a grid-based hazard 
model, it did not contain a toxicity model. Consequently the presence of hazards only 
affected the behaviour of passengers, for example increasing the passengers' state-of- 
mind attributes, rather than leading to incapacitation through thermo-toxic exposure. 
For example, explosions and or smoke would increase the state-of-mind of the 
passengers and crewmembers, i.e. it may move from being Alert to Nervous.
Like GA, ARCEVAC suffers from the arbitrary nature of its model parameters. This 
deficiency was even more acute given the vast number of parameters that were used in 
the model. In short, the model contained too many arbitrary parameters. Indeed, even 
the qualitative nature of most of the physiological variables are open to dispute.
ARCEVAC was validated against the evacuation of a Canadair Regional B727 Jet that 
underwent certification in 1993. The result of ARCEVAC was an evacuation time 
under 60 seconds. Due to its proprietary nature the results of the certification trial were 
not made public. However, during the validation exercise ARCEVAC generated 
graphs showing the number of passengers out as a function of time for individual exits 
as well as the aircraft as a whole. The validation exercise also considered different 
combinations of exit choice whilst maintaining an exit from each exit pair.
2.2.3.5 airEXODUS
The EXODUS software is developed by the University of Greenwich (UoG) Fire Safety 
Engineering Group (FSEG). EXODUS is a suite of software tools designed to simulate 
the evacuation of large numbers of individuals from complex structures. Development 
on EXODUS began in 1989. EXODUS was originally designed for use with aircraft, 
however, its modular format makes it ideally suited for adaptation to other types of 
environment. As a result its range of application has grown, as has the number of 
specific EXODUS products. The family of models consists of buildingEXODUS [37- 
40,50-52], maritimeEXODUS [41,42] and airEXODUS [36,44-49] for the built
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environment, marine/off-shore industries and aviation applications respectively. 
airEXODUS is designed for applications in the aviation industry including, aircraft 
design, compliance with 90 second certification requirements, crew training, 
development of crew procedures, resolution of operational issues and accident 
investigation.
f
Figure 5: airEXODUS Submodel Interaction
EXODUS comprises five core interacting sub-models: the Occupant, Movement, 
Behaviour, Toxicity and Hazard sub-models (see Figure 5). The software describing 
these sub-models is rule-based, the progressive motion and behaviour of each 
individual being determined by a set of heuristics or rules. The spatial and temporal 
dimensions within EXODUS are spanned by a two-dimensional spatial grid and a 
simulation clock (SC). The spatial grid maps out the geometry of the structure, 
locating exits, internal compartments, obstacles, etc (see Figure 6). Geometries can 
involve multiple decks, connected by staircases. The structure layout can be specified 
using either a DXF file produced by a CAD package, or the interactive tools provided. 
The grid is made up of nodes and arcs with each node representing a small region of 
space and each arc representing the distance between each node. Individuals travel 
from node to node along the arcs.
The Population Sub-model allows the nature of the passenger population to be 
specified. The population can consist of a range of people with different movement 
abilities, reflecting age, gender and physical disabilities as well as different levels of 
knowledge of the structural layout of their environment, response times etc. 
airEXODUS assigns passengers with over 20 defining attributes, such as Gender, Age,
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Weight, Height, Agility, Drive, six different movement speeds (for different types of 
motion and terrain), Response Times, Patience and Social Genes.
Figure 6: Cabin layout in airEXODUS. View depicted represents the interactive graphics component 
within airEXODUS. Aircraft depicted has five pairs of exits. The node structure showing seats, aisles
and cross-aisles is clearly depicted.
On the basis of an individual's personal attributes, the Behaviour Sub-model determines 
the occupant's response to the current situation, and passes its decision on to the 
Movement Sub-model. The Behaviour Sub-model functions on two levels. These 
levels are known as Global and Local behaviour. Global behaviour involves 
implementing an escape strategy that may lead an occupant to exit via their nearest 
serviceable exit or most familiar exit. The desired global behaviour is set by the user, 
but may be modified or overridden through the dictates of local behaviour, which 
includes such considerations as determining the occupants initial response, conflict 
resolution, overtaking and the selection of possible detouring routes. In addition a 
number of localised decision-making processes are available to each individual 
according to the conditions in which they find themselves and the information available 
to them. This includes the ability to customise their egress route according to the levels 
of congestion around them, the environmental conditions and the social relationships 
within the population. Social relationships, group behaviour and hierarchical structures 
are modelled through the use of a 'gene' concept [52], where group members are 
identified through the sharing of social "genes". Passengers are able to adapt their 
evacuation strategy according to a rational use of the information available to them, 
i.e. they may wish to communicate information to other passengers, identified as a 
group member.
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Figure 7: vrEXODUS generated scene from an airEXODUS evacuation simulation 
The Toxicity submodel determines the physiological impact of the environment upon 
the occupant. To determine the effect of the fire hazards on occupants, airEXODUS 
uses a Fractional Effective Dose (FED) toxicity model [88,89] (see 2.4.3.3 for more 
details). This model considers the toxic and physical hazards associated with elevated 
temperature, thermal radiation, HCN, CO, CO2 and low O2 and estimates the time to 
incapacitation. In addition to this behaviour, the passengers are able to respond to the 
environmental conditions by adjusting their behaviour. The thermal and toxic 
environment is determined by the Hazard submodel. airEXODUS does not predict 
these hazards but can accept experimental data or numerical data from other models 
including a direct software link to the CFAST fire zone model [84,85]. airEXODUS 
produces a range of outputs, both graphical and textual. Interactive two-dimensional 
animated graphics are generated as the software is running that allows the user to 
observe the evacuation as it takes place. The graphics are interactive allowing the user 
to interrogate occupants and events. In addition, a data output file is produced 
containing all the relevant information generated by the simulation, including a copy 
of the input data. To aid in the interpretation of results, a post-processor virtual-reality 
graphics environment known as vrEXODUS has been developed, providing an 
animated three-dimensional representation of the evacuation (see Figure 7).
airEXODUS makes use of 90-second certification data [90] to specify certain model 
parameters. One of the most important parameters for representing aircraft style exits 
is the Passenger Exit Delay Time. This time represents two stages of the exiting 
process, the exit hesitation time and the exit negotiation time. In virtually all cases, 
the passengers exhibit a hesitation at the exit, before negotiating it. Typically, this
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starts when an out-stretched hand first touches the exit. The latter time considers the 
amount of time taken to pass through the exit.
In general, the exit hesitation time is due in main to passengers either waiting at the exit 
for the path to clear and/or contemplating how to negotiate the exit. In either case, the 
exit negotiation stage does not usually start until there is space for it to commence. 
Furthermore, the process of passing through the exit and travelling from the exit to the 
ground are considered as separate events that can occur in parallel.
Within airEXODUS the exit delay time distribution is segmented into subintervals 
described by uniform distributions. The technique is dependent on the user having a 
good representation of the actual delay time distribution. In the current version of the 
software this data is extracted from past certification trials [90,91]. For example, 
consider main deck Type-A exits with assertive cabin crew. Data from 11 previous 
certification tests involving Type-A exits with assertive cabin crew was available. The 
data was derived from the following aircraft: A310 (255 passenger), A310 (280 
passenger), B747, B747-300, B747-SR, B767-300, B767-346, B777-200 (420 
passenger), B777-200 (440 passenger), DC10 and MD11 [90,91]. In total, passenger 
exit delay time data from 20 exits representing some 2078 passengers is used to define 
the passenger exit delay time distribution.
airEXODUS and the EXODUS software in general has undergone a significant amount 
of validation. airEXODUS has been used to simulate evacuation trials conducted at 
Cranfield University in their B737 cabin simulator [45,92]. In addition, a more 
challenging validation exercise was requested by the UK CAA, requiring airEXODUS 
to predict the performance of a modified Boeing B767 aircraft, (designated the B767- 
304ER), prior to the actual test, in order to establish the predictive capabilities of 
airEXODUS for 90 second certification trials. A confidential report [93] containing 
details of the model formulation and results of the simulations was produced by FSEG 
and distributed to the UK CAA and US FAA prior to the trial, and Boeing after the 
trial. A description of some of the results of the airEXODUS predictions may be found 
published literature [45].
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The DEM (Discrete Element Method) model was developed in the UK by the 
University of Strathclyde in 2000 [71]. The model is intended to simulate 90-second 
certification style evacuations and real emergency evacuations. The model has a 
graphical user interface that shows the position of each passenger during the 
simulation. The model has been demonstrated using the B737-300 aircraft (see 
Figure 8), although presumably other models could be specified.
The model uses a coordinate based fine network spatial representation and tracks the 
movement of each passenger during their evacuation. Additionally, each passenger 
has limited defining attributes, such as and Thus, 
the population perspective of this model is individual based.
The movement model employed by DEM is a functional analogy based on differential 
equations that govern the motion of Newtonian soft sphere grains. A consequence of 
this approach is that the passenger shape is circular. In addition, physical forces such as 
friction, torque and inertia are all variables within the Newtonian laws of motion and 
are thus model parameters. Another by-product of the functional analogy is that 
collisions between passengers result in them temporarily contracting and if the collision 
is side-on, then some amount of spin is imparted that causes passengers to rotate. 
Motion towards exits is achieved via artificial external forces that pull the soft sphere 
grains towards exits. The artificial attractive force that is exerted by the exits can be 
targeted at specific soft sphere grains within the model, thus different passengers can be 
made to use different exits. All of these parameters - which are a by-product of the 
functional analogy approach - have not in themselves been proven to be analogous to 
human behaviour.
There is no mention of exit preparation delays or passenger response times within 
published literature for this model [71]. Exit flow rates are governed by the supply to 
the exits and a rule imposed by the model designers that only one passenger may 
occupy an escape slide at any one time. An additional delay was specified to represent 
that incurred by passengers negotiating Type-HI exits. The delay was represented by 
the imposition of a uniform 2-second delay to passengers at the exit. Indeed, this delay
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exemplifies a maior failing nf this model. Namely, that the model parameter 
spe ary.
Whilst, the movement model is a functional analogy, some movement rules exist in 
order to avoid blockages and to simulate passenger redirection. The dominance 
attribute is used to avoid blockages in contested areas such as aisles. The DEM model 
does not represent cabin crewmembers either explicitly or implicitly. However, 
passengers may redirect themselves to alternative exits if the 
[71]. In addition, at the date of writing, none of 
the published literature relating to this model indicates that there is a representation of 
either hazards or their thermo-toxic effects.
(a) (b)
Figure 8: Screen shot from the DEM model
The model was validated against the evacuation of the B737-300. As the model is 
deterministic, only one result was generated (81 seconds) which the authors stated 
compares well with 75 seconds achieved during the 90-second certification trial. As a 
further example of the model, the B737-300 DEM model exit availability was 
configured as in the Manchester air crash [10]. The resultant evacuation time of 117 
seconds was 44% higher than the certification case. The model did not attempt to 
simulate the affects of fire or the delays in preparing the over wing exit for use that 
occurred in the actual accident. These validation cases are rather meaningless when the 
completely arbitrary nature of the model parameters is considered. Any agreement with 
actual results should be considered fortuitous rather than by design.
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During the 1990's as part of a PhD thesis, Macey et al developed a risk assessment 
model at Cranfield University. The model was intended to analyse real and 
certification evacuations.
The model was designed for risk assessment purposes and was intended to simulate the 
total set of evacuation scenarios. To facilitate this, the probabilities of specific 
scenarios occurring were determined from a comprehensive analysis of over 200 
previous airliner accidents. Event trees were formulated from this analysis specifically 
for use within the risk assessment model. Probabilities such as the likelihood of the 
scenario involving impact, cabin burn through, internal and/or external fires were 
determined. In accidents involving fuselage breaks, a probability distribution of the 
break location was also determined. Additional probabilistic data was supplied 
regarding the likely cabin layout, weather conditions, phase of flight, airport distance, 
availability of emergency services, impact effects, fuselage split, fuel spills, jammed 
exits and impact injuries.
The risk assessment model comprised of fire, toxicity and evacuation sub-models. The 
fire scenarios were "empirically" determined from the supplied probabilities. The 
model would then randomly choose a scenario according to the supplied probabilities. 
For example, from the analysis of past accidents it was determined that 90% of the fire 
scenarios involved burn-through and external fire scenarios. Thus, it is quite likely that 
the model would choose to simulate a fire scenario that involved either burn-through 
and/or an external fire. Whilst recognising the need for an internal model of fires they 
were not represented within the risk assessment model. The likely location of the fire 
was determined from probabilities derived from analysis of 72 past accidents.
Having selected a scenario it was then modelled in 2-dimensions. The consequence of 
the 2-dimensional fire model is that common effects such as smoke/gas layering or 
stratification were not represented. The height of the fire was taken as being head 
height, i.e. 1.5 metres from the floor. The fire growth, smoke and toxic gases were 
modelled using differential equations. These simplifications are considered a 
significant weakness of the model as they cannot accurately represent fire development 
which is inherently three-dimensional.
Chapter 2
A 2-dimensional airflow sub-model was used to simulate the spread of fire and smoke 
taking into account the scenario and aircraft configuration, i.e. the presence of fuselage 
ruptures and combinations of open exits. The thermo-toxic affects of the fire were 
modelled using 'standard' FED models.
The evacuation sub-model was a fine network model with a graphical user interface 
capable of outputting the evacuation (see Figure 9). In total 80 different aircraft layouts 
were supplied with the model. It was stated that these include 
Additional layouts could be generated using a 
syntax driven specification tool.
Figure 9: Screen shot of the output from Macey's model. Left is the airflow model, centre is the thermo-toxic
model, and right is the evacuation model
It was recommended that the cell size within the model was set to 0.15 by 0.2m. Since 
passengers' dimensions are often larger than this, it was necessary for passengers to 
occupy more than one cell. Within the model each passenger could be tracked 
throughout the entire evacuation. In addition the passengers had "expandable" 
individual attributes such as reaction time, movement speed, narcosis and irritant levels. 
The population perspective was therefore individually based.
The behavioural basis of this model was rule driven. The basic passenger behaviour 
was that they moved towards their nearest exit. The nearest exits could however; 
become less attractive should there be a large number of users or the exit inactive.
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Passengers were able to switch exits to adjacent active exits should their queues 
become smaller.
The published literature did not state that empirical data was used to determine the 
delay that passengers experienced in traversing exits. Instead exits were calibrated so 
that they generated flow rates that were equivalent to those generated during 90-second 
certification trials. Exit flow rates were not an output for the model but were imposed. 
It was recognised that these flow rates were not appropriate to real emergency scenarios 
in which cabin conditions and passenger motivation is very different.
Since cabin sections could rupture it may also have been necessary to supply data on the 
length of time required for passengers to traverse the ruptures. However, no data was 
supplied. Finally, a crash severity attribute was specified as part of the scenario 
definition. The crash severity value was used to degrade passenger movement rates 
through specific sections of the cabin.
This model had neither an explicit nor implicit representation of cabin crewmembers. 
Indeed they were not modelled at all. A consequence of this was that passengers were 
required to open the aircraft's exits.
The fire and toxicity sub-models were linked to the evacuation model so that individual 
thermo-toxic affects could be calculated for every passenger in the evacuation.
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As mentioned previously the 
model was designed to 
simulate a range of empirically 
determined scenarios in order 
to ascertain a level of risk for a 
particular configuration. In 
order to validate the models, 
the designers contrived 
probabilities so that a scenario 
was selected that was 
equivalent to the 90-second certification trial. Using a certification trial configuration,
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Figure 10: an example graph generated by Macey's model
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four different aircraft were modelled. Two of these were compared to the results of 90- 
second certification trials. In both cases the model predicated an evacuation time that 
was within 10% of the certification trial (see Table 2). In addition in both cases the 
results of the model were higher than that of the certification trial. The model designers 
stated that the over estimation by the model was due to passengers having to open the 
exits and exit overcrowding. The lack of cabin crewmember redirection led to sub- 
optimal evacuations that caused the overcrowding at some exits. In addition, from the 
validation results (see Table 2) it is apparent that only one time was presented for the 
validation results.
Table 2: The validation history of Macey's Risk Assessment Model (reproduced from [77])
In the mid 1990's Mary Court from Oklahoma University and Jeff Marcus from CAMI 
published a design specification for an Object Orientated evacuation model. Whilst the 
model itself was never actually developed, the design is described in this section.
The proposed model was for a (fine network based) simulation model with an 
individual population perspective and rule based behaviour. The model was intended to 
be able to simulate both real emergency evacuations and 90-second certification trials. 
It was the designers wish that the model ran in real time (if possible), that the model 
generates output suitable for detailed analysis and animations for the purposes of 
presentations.
Required features were that the model was able to simulate group relationships, i.e. 
families and work colleagues, cabin crewmembers and associated passenger 
management issues, that the behaviour of passengers and crew adapted during the 
evacuation and to a dynamic thermo-toxic environment, that the thermo-toxic 
environment affected behaviour and also the physiology of the passengers and crew.
From these requirements an Object Oriented (OO) design was created (see Figure 11). 
The design contained three modules. The passenger scenario module allowed the user 
to build the passengers within the scenario. Within this module personal attributes such
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as, age, sex, height, weight, etc. relationships could be specified for passengers and 
cabin crewmembers. The layout module was used to construct the cabin geometry. 
Using this model seats, monuments and exits could be specified. In addition passengers 
could be assigned to specific exits within the model. The cabin environment module 
allowed the thermo-toxic environment within the cabin to be generated.
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Figure 11: The proposed OOO model design [79]
The OO model was comprised of 13 classes (objects or copied objects within Figure 
11). The SYNCHRONIZER class was the controlling class that coordinated all of the 
other classes/objects within the simulation. Many instances of the PASSENGER and 
CREW classes were generated according to the desired number within the scenario. 
They would each have their own defining attributes and relationships with other 
passengers. The COORDINATE object distributed the aircraft geometry to other 
objects, i.e. to passengers, crew, fire, smoke and toxicity whilst sharing data with 
others: NAVIGATE, ADVANCEMENT, PATH and BLOCK. The BLOCK class 
contained information about obstacles such as seats, walls, other passengers and crew in
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addition to environmental obstacles such as smoke and fire. The NAVIGATE class was 
responsible for choosing the headings for actors, i.e. passengers and/or crew. This was 
affected by their cognitive and physical abilities. The PATH class would assess 
available paths/routes that passengers and crew could take during an evacuation. This 
would be affected by the geometry, their location within the cabin, fire, smoke, toxicity 
and their cognitive abilities. The ADVANCEMENT object was responsible for moving 
passengers between locations within the simulation. Information regarding the FIRE, 
SMOKE and TOXICITY classes was not provided. Presumably, they would manage 
the growth of these hazards. Depending upon the type of scenario, some of the classes 
would not be required. For example, in a 90-second scenario the fire, smoke, toxicity 
and panic classes would not be required.
The RESPONSIBILITY class allowed information sharing between objects. For 
example, cabin crewmembers were given access to some of the attributes of passengers 
and greater knowledge of the cabin layout. Related passengers may be assigned 
responsibilities, such as parent and child relationships. Finally, the PANIC class would 
affect the actors' ability to reason, i.e. they may make poorer decisions if they were 
panicked.
The model design did not specify how the behaviour of passengers was affected when 
using exits or escape slides or how they would be modelled. Furthermore, no indication 
was given on how model parameters would be determined. Finally, as the model was 
never developed no validation was performed. As such the model's abilities are 
unknown.
2.3 A critical evaluation of aviation evacuation models
Having discussed evacuation models and their data, this section critically evaluates the
aviation evacuation models. The key characteristics of the aircraft evacuation models 
are summarised in Table 3 and Table 4.
Table 3: Summary of Aviation Evacuation Model Methodologies
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Table 4: Summary of Aviation Evacuation Model Features, Validation History and Parameter Basis
+results of the certification trial was only known for two of the four validation exercises
As mentioned previously, evacuation models are only as good as the data that is used in
their formation. The methodology that a model uses in specifying key parameters is 
therefore of critical importance.
Some models, such as DEM, GA, ARCEVAC and MACEY use essentially 
ARBITRARY estimates to determine values for model parameters. For example, GA 
and ARCEVAC use an arbitrary probability of a passenger passing through an exit to 
determine the exit hesitation delay. Whereas, DEM specifies this delay indirectly 
through allowing only one passenger to descend each escape slide at any one time. 
MACEY's model is somewhat unusual in that empirical data is extensively used in 
determining the likely scenario (see Section 2.2.3.7), however little empirical data is 
used in the evacuation sub-model itself. Gaining confidence in models that have 
arbitrary parameters is difficult, as their results have no real world basis. For example, 
what does it mean in GA when a passenger dies having been exposed for 40 seconds to 
a 120 toxic hazard exposure?
GPSS and EXODUS make use of EMPERICAL data in specifying model parameters. 
In both models Exit Hesitation Delays are specified from analysis of the actual event. 
Within EXODUS numerous parameters are empirically determined, such as exit 
preparation time, passenger response time, passenger movement speeds, etc. As such, 
greater confidence can be gained in the results of the model as it is fundamentally based 
on empirical studies, i.e. reality.
Confidence in any model is gained through its accuracy at reconstructing or predicting
what happens in reality. Thus a convincing record of verification/validation is
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essential. Indeed, software validation should be considered as an on-going activity. For 
any complex simulation software, validation is not a 'once and forget' task, but should 
be considered as an integral part of the life cycle of the software.
The verification/validation of evacuation software is no exception. Indeed, the lack of a 
large battery of convincing data for the verification of evacuation software has meant 
that a rigorous procedure needed to be established for the validation/verification of 
evacuation software. Such a procedure has been outlined by Galea [96], and 
adopted by the building and maritime industries [97, 98]. This procedure can be readily 
adapted for use in the aviation industry and is outlined here.
There are at least four forms of validation/verification that evacuation models should 
undergo. These are COMPONENT, FUNCTIONAL, QUALITATIVE AND 
QUANTITATIVE verification.
Component verification involves checking that various components of the software 
perform as intended whilst functional verification involves checking that the model 
possesses the ability to exhibit the range of capabilities required to perform the desired 
simulations. The third form of model verification concerns comparing the nature of 
predicted human behaviour with informed expectations. While this is only a qualitative 
form of validation, it is nevertheless important as it demonstrates that the behavioural 
capabilities built into the model are capable of producing realistic behaviours. 
Quantitative verification involves comparing model predictions with reliable data 
generated from an evacuation demonstration. At least two types of quantitative 
verification may be performed. The first involves the use of historic data. In this case 
the user performing the verification has complete knowledge of the experimental 
results. The second type involves using the model to perform predictive simulations 
prior to having sight of the experimental results, a so-called "blind" prediction.
In practice, quantitative verification of aircraft evacuation models is accomplished by 
comparing model predictions with results of real world events, such as 
EXPERIMENTS (EX), 90-SECOND TRIAL (90S) or REAL EMERGENCY (RE) 
evacuation situations.
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The most confidence can be gained through comparing models against the results of 
carefully controlled experiments that are repeated a number of times. The second most 
effective data source for validation is the 90-second certification trial. However, as 
mentioned previously they are not ideal as they generate only one data point on a 
hypothetical distribution of probable results (see Section 2.4.1). Even greater 
confidence can be gained through performing 'blind' simulations (B). In other words 
running the model before the results of the trial are known. Finally, real emergency 
evacuations are extremely difficult to use for quantitative verification as not only do 
they generate only one data point, but the precise conditions of the emergency are never 
known to the level required by the modeller to establish correct starting or 
environmental conditions and the actual evacuation times are seldom known to the 
degree of precision required.
The GPSS software has been subjected to four quantitative validation exercises. In 
these cases four blind 90-second certification trial (4-B90S) evacuations were used. In 
three cases (LlOlla, LlOllb and LlOllc) it predicted the result of the trials with what 
was deemed by the authors as However, in one case (the 
B747) it performed poorly. This was attributed to variation in the performance level of 
passengers and crew during this trial.
The only verification of the GA model that is known concerns the qualitative 
verification using three real emergency evacuations (3-RE) the, DC-8 at Denver in 
1961, B-727 Salt Lake City in 1965, and the DC-9 Denver 1976. These verifications 
are considered qualitative, as reliable times for the actual emergency evacuations 
cannot be established, nor precise starting conditions. Furthermore, the results of this 
exercise were not published.
Quantitative verification of the ARCEVAC model was performed using a single 
certification trial of Canadair Regional Jet (CL-65) after the trial had taken place (1- 
90S). Due to the proprietary nature of the actual certification trial data the model 
developers could not cite the total evacuation time for the trial. They merely state that 
their model generated an evacuation under 60 seconds.
_____________________Chapter 2_____________________
The results from a single quantitative verification trial of the DEM have been published. 
This involved an evacuation analysis of the 90 second certification trial of a B737 
aircraft (1-90S). In this case, DEM predicted a single evacuation time of 81 seconds, 
which was within 6 seconds of the time generated by the actual 90-second certification 
trial [94,71].
Quantitative verification of the MACEY model has been accomplished using four 
certification trials (4-90S) of which the results of two are known. In both of these cases 
the model predicted a single evacuation time that was within 10% of the actual time 
generated by the trial. Furthermore, in both cases the model over estimated the time 
generated by the certification trials.
EXODUS has a published verification history that incorporates all four validation 
components. Quantitative verification has been achieved using the results of 2 
experiments (2-EX) [45] and 1 blind prediction for a wide-bodied aircraft [45] (2-EX, 
1-B90S) [49]. These validation tests have shown the model to correlate well with 
reality. However more validation is required to increase confidence in future model 
predictions.
Finally, it should be noted that it is extremely difficult to make any sense of validation 
performance when models use arbitrary data sets. As the data is arbitrary, it can be 
artificially changed from one simulation to another. The results should therefore be 
presented with a description of the changes made to the parameters.
Originally designed in the 1970's, GPSS is now very dated in terms of platform (Large
mainframe computers) and capabilities. It contains little human behaviour with the 
result that passengers behave like mindless ball bearings [95]. Whilst making use of 
empirically determined exit delay distributions, they were cited by the authors as being 
inadequate by its validation exercise. Finally, the model was only validated against 
four certification trials, of which one showed poor correlation.
DEM assumes passenger movement to be analogous to Newtonian soft spheres. As 
such passengers shape is assumed to be round. This model treats the movement of
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passengers much like ball bearings, an approach that is now considered dated [95]. In 
addition, some of the assumptions on which the model is based undermine its ability to 
reflect reality accurately. For example, one of the assumptions is that only one 
passenger may use an escape slide at any one time. This is not necessarily the case, as 
more than one person can occupy slides simultaneously. In addition the logical 
consequence of this approach is that for much of the simulation the length of the slide 
determines the flow rate through the exit. The rationale for this is unclear. Firstly, the 
relationship between slide length and flow rate has not been shown. In addition 
numerous passengers frequently occupy a slide at a time. This assumption alone 
undermines the results of the model. This casts serious doubts on the usefulness of the 
validation exercise presented in support of the model.
The GA model demonstrated many of the qualitative behavioural features of real 
emergency evacuations. In terms of qualitative features it included a more 
comprehensive representation of the behaviour than either GPSS or DEM. In addition 
the GA model had a rudimentary toxicity and hazard model. However, the main 
criticisms of the GA model are that their model parameters were not empirically 
determined and that their hazard and toxicity models were completely arbitrary. As 
such it is difficult to derive meaning from the results. Another failing was that cabin 
directed bypass was performed via the manual operation of the keyboard during a 
simulation. Finally, the model was only capable of simulating the evacuation of 
narrow-bodied aircraft. These failings were compounded by the lack of validation 
performed on the model.
ARCEVAC contained numerous complex behavioural features that distinguished itself 
from other evacuation models of the time. ARCEVAC, provided an explicit 
representation of cabin crewmembers that were capable of performing complex 
procedures (such as checking aisles or seats) whilst the simulation ran. In addition 
ARCEVAC offered a mechanism of representing the state of mind of simulated 
passengers, via a state attribute, and contained 'social attributes', such as dominance, 
selfishness, etc. Whilst containing numerous behavioural capabilities it may be 
criticised, as its behaviours were not based on empirical evidence from experiments or 
air accidents. In addition, the model was limited to simulating the B727 aircraft,
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although other aircraft may have been possible if the code was rewritten. Finally, the 
ARCEVAC model was only validated once and the results were unclear.
EXODUS contains a large number of behavioural features and capabilities. However 
its behaviour set does not fully represent everything that could happen in an emergency 
evacuation or indeed a certification trial. With respect to simulating 90-second 
certification trials, its model parameters are based on comprehensive research [90] 
relating to previous certification trials. It is arguable whether all of the human 
performance data generated from certification trials is relevant to accident applications. 
The model attempts to use such data in addition to data derived from accident 
investigations and laboratory based experimental trials for accident related scenarios. 
EXODUS has been validated against numerous certification trials and experiments, two 
of which were performed blind. EXODUS is capable of simulating the evacuation of 
narrow-bodied (NB), wide-bodied (WB), double deck (DD) and blended wing bodied 
(BWB) aircraft. This model treats each person within the simulation as an individual 
allowing them to follow and adapt their individual evacuation strategies. Whilst, the 
behaviour within EXODUS is comparatively comprehensive, it does not cover the full 
range of behaviours that may be found in actual accidents. This is mainly due to the 
lack of reliable data upon which models can be formulated. Future development should 
be focused on a range of activities including the study and development of behaviour 
exhibited in real accidents, the quantification of behaviour during real emergency 
evacuations and the further development of the models capabilities to simulate 90 
second certification scenarios.
Like many other evacuation models, MACEY's risk assessment model suffers from 
arbitrary parameter assignment. Whilst a wealth of empirical data was used in setting 
the scenario, very little empirical data was used within the evacuation sub-model. As 
such, the performance of components such as exits were imposed on the model rather 
than generated by the model as results. In addition, whilst the model was capable of 
simulating evacuation via aircraft fuselage ruptures no data was employed in 
representing the delays that passengers were likely to experience in negotiating them. 
As the designers conceded the exit flow rates would not be appropriate in real 
emergency accidents. Furthermore the model completely ignored cabin crewmembers. 
Consequently, passengers prepared exits for use. During the validation exercise, this
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was cited as a possible reason for the model continually over estimating evacuation 
times. Finally, the Macey model makes use of two-dimensional fire and airflow sub- 
models. These are extremely simplistic and are incapable of reproducing important fire 
effects such as smoke layering.
2.4 Data for Evacuation Models
Associated with the development of computer based evacuation models is the need for
comprehensive data collection/generation related to human performance under 
evacuation conditions. The nature of the particular type of scenario to be simulated 
will dictate the type of data required and the capabilities the model will require. 
Factual data regarding the evacuation process is essential to the development of 
computer evacuation models. Evacuation models have a high reliance on factual data 
regarding the evacuation process in order to:
(a) Identify the physical, physiological and psychological processes that 
contribute to, and influence the evacuation process and hence inform the 
formulation of appropriate models (examples of relevant processes 
include seat jumping, aisle swapping, family group coherence, movement 
in smoke, incapacitation due to inhalation of toxic products etc.)
(b) Quantify attributes/variables associated with the identified processes.
(c) Provide data for model validation purposes.
Three forms of data are useful in providing the required information. Accident reports 
containing interviews with accident survivors, video footage from 90 second 
certification trials and data generated from full-scale and component experimentation. 
Each of these data sources provides useful information for modelling.
Accident investigation reports that contain human factors analysis and survivor 
interview accounts are vital in providing information to identify the human element (i.e. 
item (a) above) that needs to be simulated if the model is to be used in performing 
simulations of realistic accident scenarios. Equally, data from 90 second certification 
trial videos can provide similar information suitable for models intending to simulate 
certification trials.
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Once identified, the behaviours and performance attributes must be quantified (i.e. item 
(b) above). For models intended to simulate real incidents a useful form of data is 
derived from full-scale and component tests. This is necessary as reliable quantitative 
data from real emergency evacuations does not exist - there are no cameras positioned 
to record proceedings. In these circumstances, experiments must be contrived to 
replicate accident type situations without putting participants at risk of injury. The 
quantification of the identified attributes may involve collating probabilities of specific 
actions, such as seat jumping, measuring the time taken to perform specific actions, 
such as exit openings, passenger exit hesitation, etc. When undertaking 
experimentation, it is essential to ensure that a representative population is used for data 
collection. Often in performing evacuation experimentation specialist sub-populations 
such as students or military/police personnel or single gender groups are used. The 
results generated from such experiments are not likely to reflect the performance 
capabilities of the intended target population and as such are of questionable value.
For models intended to simulate 90 second certification trials, detailed analysis of video 
footage from trials can be used to quantify the identified attributes (i.e. item (b) above).
Finally, data is necessary to validate the predictions of evacuation simulations. 
Ultimately, the worth of a model is gauged against its ability to realistically and 
accurately reconstruct and/or predict the real world. Again, data from 90-second 
certification trials and contrived experimentation can be used to validate models.
By detailed study of video recordings from 90 second certification trials, both
qualitative and quantitative data can be generated relating to passenger behaviour. 
From the analysis of videos of 90-second certification trials it is possible to establish 
various behavioural traits common to certification trials. For example, passengers 
spend an insignificant amount of time in releasing seat belts, very little aisle swapping 
occurs, passengers are very compliant to crew instructions, seat jumping is extremely 
rare, passengers hesitate at slide exits prior to committing to jump, etc. It is important 
to note that while these behaviours are extremely relevant to certification trials they 
may be completely irrelevant in real accident situations. In addition, it is possible to 
quantify passenger attributes identified in the 90 second trials. For example, the flow
50
_____________________Chapter 2_____________________
rates and movement velocities of passengers in aisles, the passenger exit hesitation time 
for various exits types, time to traverse slides, time to open an exit, etc. This type of 
data is essential if models are faithfully to reproduce the type of behaviour seen in 
certification trials.
It is however extremely difficult to obtain access to this type of data as the aircraft 
manufacturers that produce the data consider it to be valuable proprietary information 
that would provide advantage to their competitors. However, FSEG of the University 
of Greenwich with sponsorship of the UK Civil Aviation Authority and through strict 
confidentiality agreements with all the major manufacturers (i.e. Airbus Industries, 
Boeing Commercial Airplane, British Aerospace, and Douglas Aircraft Company Inc 
(McDonnell-Douglas (MDC) Corporation) has access to all the 90 second data video 
footage that exist. This information has been analysed by FSEG and forms an integral 
part of the airEXODUS model [90,91]. While the regulatory authorities have access to 
this data it is not generally available to other model developers.
In total some 30 evacuation trials of 24 aircraft have been analysed, that cover the 
period 1969 to 1996 and include commuter, single aisle, dual aisle and double deck 
aircraft. The data represents the evacuation of 68 Flight Crew, 194 Cabin Crew and 
8865 passenger participants.
The data extracted concerns exiting behaviour of the passengers and crew on an aircraft 
by aircraft and an exit by exit basis. From the data the following information was 
collated: Cabin Crew Response Times, Exit Opening Times, Slide Inflation Times, Exit 
Ready Times, Passenger Exit Use, Passenger Exit Hesitation Times, Passenger Escape 
slide / Wing Use v Off Time', Flow Rates, efficiency measures and Type-A Exit Lane 
Usage. This data has been presented in tabular form for each aircraft investigated.
Furthermore, the data provides a means to validate models designed to simulate 90 
second certification trials. This is enabled by a thorough knowledge of; the starting 
conditions for each evacuation, the end times for each exit, the number of people to use 
each exit, the location of bottlenecks, flow rates through exits, etc.
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Whilst these video records do provide much of the data required for the development 
and testing of models intended for the simulation of certification trials, the data is not 
perfect. Two main shortcomings are apparent.
Firstly, data generated for certification trials were not intended for computer model 
development. Thus, they are not carried out in the controlled experimental manner that 
would be most desirable for model development. Consequently, there is very little 
control over variables examined in the trials and modellers have to contend with "gaps" 
in the data. For instance, there may be insufficient data available covering all possible 
combinations of cabin crew assertiveness and exit type.
Unlike certification evacuations, in real emergency evacuations passengers are
subjected to very real psychological, physiological and physical threats that may 
engender competitive behaviour (as opposed to the co-operative behaviour seen in 
certification trials - see section 2). Consequently, the modelling of actual behaviour 
and events during real aircraft accidents is far more challenging than the simulation of 
certification trials. It also means that the collection of data describing and quantifying 
this behaviour is also much more challenging - unlike 90-second certification trials and 
experiments, in real aircraft accidents there are no cameras positioned to record 
proceedings!
Given the fact that the 90-second certification trial is not an accurate measure of 
evacuation performance during real emergency evacuations [1] (see Section 2.4.1) it is 
necessary to identify potential sources of data describing and quantifying behaviour in 
real emergency evacuations. A source of information concerning human behaviour in 
aircraft accidents is provided through aircraft accident human factors reports produced 
by organisations such as the NTSB of the USA and AAIB of the UK. These reports 
contain a wealth of information in the form of interviews with survivors (crew and 
passengers). The information is collected and documented to aid in the investigation of 
the accident. However in themselves, individual accident investigation reports do not 
provide a means to extract reliable generalities concerning actual human behaviour in a 
range of evacuation situations.
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In developing evacuation models capable of simulating real accidents, it is vital to 
understand the phenomena that are to be modelled and to take a scientific approach to 
its understanding. One of the first relevant systematic studies was undertaken in 1970 
by Snow in which they analysed four air accidents to highlight common factors 
that influence survival [99]. This paper concluded that configuration, procedures, the 
environment and passenger behaviour were vital in understanding survival. This work 
was the first attempt at building an empirical understanding of the dynamics of real 
emergency evacuations, and is an approach that is widely used today.
While several systematic studies [100] and databases [101] concerning aircraft 
accidents have been developed, these have concentrated on the details of the accident 
rather than on the nature of the resulting human behaviour. To date there have been 
two detailed studies into human behaviour over a range of accidents, one, an on-going 
study by FSEG of the UK known as the AASK database [102,103,6,7] and another by 
the NTSB of the USA covering a number of recent accidents and pre-cautionary 
evacuations [3].
The information available in these studies is based on air accident investigation reports 
and the passenger and crew testimonies that they contain. This data tends to take the 
form of anecdotal evidence, sometimes with third party corroboration. Using this data 
insight into the behaviour of passengers and crew during real emergency evacuations 
can be gained and appropriate behaviours and/or modifications to existing behaviours 
made within evacuation models. Thus, a model that is more realistic to real emergency 
evacuation can be developed.
The AASK database has been developed by FSEG of the University of Greenwich with 
financial support from the UK CAA. This is an on-going project with work 
commencing in 1993. The AASK database is a repository of survivor accounts from 
aviation accidents. Its main purpose is to store observational and anecdotal data from 
the actual interviews of the occupants involved in aircraft accidents. With support from 
the UK CAA, the AASK concept has evolved into an on-line prototype system 
available over the internet to selected users. The current release of AASK is V3.0.
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Data contained within A ASK V3.0 consists of information derived from both passenger 
and cabin crew interviews, information concerning fatalities and basic accident details. 
The cabin crew component has become a significant aspect of the database providing 
insight into cabin conditions and passenger behaviour as seen from professionally 
trained cabin specialists. The fatalities component holds data for all fatalities 
documented in the accident reports while the Seat Plan Viewer graphically displays the 
starting locations of all the passengers - both survivors and fatalities - as well as the 
exits used by the survivors.
Data entered into the AASK database was extracted from the transcripts supplied by the 
Air Accident Investigation Branch in the UK and the National Transportation Safety 
Board in the US. The quality and quantity of the data was very variable ranging from 
short summary reports of the accidents to boxes of individual accounts from 
passengers, crew and investigators. Data imported into AASK V3.0 comprises 
information from accidents that occurred between 4/4/77 and 8/3/98. This consists of:
  55 accidents,
  1295 individual passenger records from survivors,
  110 records referring to cabin crew interview transcripts, and
  329 records of fatalities (passenger and crew).
The US National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) has completed a recent data 
collection exercise from September 1997 to June 1999 involving 46 evacuations, 2,651 
passengers and 18 different types of aircraft.
The study examined a range of evacuation aspects. Evacuees (passengers and crew) 
were surveyed in order to ascertain their views on the evacuations and to answer 
specific questions concerning the evacuation performance. The study investigated the 
following issues concerning exits and evacuation issues in general: access to the exits, 
emergency lighting, Type-El over wing exits, exit row passenger tasks, flight 
crewmember exit assignment, evacuation slides, exit height from the ground. In
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addition evacuation procedures were examined specifically those for planned 
evacuations, exit selection, slide commands, aircraft familiarisation, and guidance on 
when to evacuate. Finally the report examined communication issues between 
crewmembers, passengers and crewmembers.
This report contains some useful data for evacuation modellers. Firstly, information 
concerning the nature of probable types of evacuation scenario is presented. Data of 
this kind is essential in developing a holistic approach to certification, i.e. one that takes 
a performance-based approach considering the evacuation performance of the aircraft 
under representative scenarios. For example, of the emergency situations utilising 
escape slides, 37% of the cases experienced problems with at least one escape slide. In 
addition, the report states that in 3 of the 13 evacuations that utilised Type-El exits, 
passengers experienced difficulty. Furthermore in one of the three cases, an elderly 
passenger was unable to operate the exit at all.
Secondly, the report contains useful qualitative data on evacuations. For example, of 
those passengers that carried baggage onto the aircraft, nearly 50% of passengers 
reported attempting to evacuate with at least one item of their luggage. This is quite 
significant as some 66% of the interviewed cabin crew cited carry-on luggage as an 
obstruction and 37% of passengers thought that carry-on luggage slowed their 
evacuation. During 90-second certification trials passengers have no carry on luggage 
although some luggage is distributed within the cabin to simulate accident debris. 
Thus, in 90-second certification trials these sorts of delays do not manifest.
Whilst, anecdotal data from real aircraft accidents - be it from the AASK database or 
from passenger testimonies themselves - are useful for the identification of behaviours 
and to some extent their quantification, this type of data has limited scope for 
quantifying time-scales of events and for the validation of evacuation models in 
general.
Deriving definite time-scales of events during real emergency evacuations is difficult. 
Instead, temporal data takes the form of rough estimates from the testimonies of 
surviving participants, rescue workers and, depending upon the location of the crash,
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accounts from spectators with timing facilities such as airport towers or other flight 
crew as in the Manchester air crash [10].
As a consequence, vitally important pieces of data such as the length of time taken to 
open exits, unbuckle seat belts, etc is extremely difficult to obtain with certainty. 
Whilst it is extremely difficult to obtain accurate time-scales, it is not as difficult to gain 
an understanding of the likely occurrence of specific events, i.e. behaviours and events, 
through the frequency of their citation within testimonies and corroboration from others 
involved. However, in this context anecdotal evidence, in the form of personal 
testimonies, is only available from surviving passengers. Consequently, the behaviour 
of passengers that perished in the incident is limited to second hand observation from 
survivors. The data is therefore skewed towards the successful or survival behaviours.
As a result, full-scale and component experiments have been performed to better 
understand and quantify the performance of simulated real emergency scenarios.
Due to the inherent limitations of certification trials and accident analysis, large-scale
experiments and component tests offer an alternative source of data for model 
development. While a number of evacuation experiments have been carried out, to 
date, their primary purpose has been to address operational or regulatory issues. As 
their primary purpose was not to collect data to assist in the development of evacuation 
models, the data generated is often less than ideal for modelling purposes.
Nevertheless, this data can and is being used in the development of computer models. 
Depending on the nature of the experiment, this data can be used in the development of 
certification applications and for real accident applications. The data can also be used 
for all three components of model development identified in Section 4.
There are currently two major facilities capable of undertaking large scale or full-scale 
aircraft evacuation tests on a regular basis. These are located at the Civil Aero Medical 
Institute (CAMI) in the USA and Cranfield University in the UK.
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CAMI led the world in developing a reusable large scale test facility for evacuation 
analysis. The CAMI cabin simulator - developed in the 1960's - consists of a C124 
fuselage section, 12 feet wide and 77 feet long, mounted on hydraulically controlled 
platforms so that various pitch and roll conditions can be simulated [105,106]. This test 
facility has been extensively utilised in the last 30 years "answering questions 
concerning seating density, exit size and location, passenger flow rates through exits, 
and flight attendant behaviour" [106].
CAMI hope to replace this test facility with a "Flexible Cabin Simulator" (PCS) [107]. 
The proposed simulator will be mounted on hydraulics, so as to simulate various door 
and sill heights, the PCS will be capable of simulating Wide-Bodied (WB), Narrow- 
Bodied (NB), Blended Wing Bodied (BWB), Double Deck (DD) and Mega Bodied 
(MB) evacuations onto land or sea, via a purpose built water tank.
Cranfield University currently has two active cabin simulators. The first is a B737 
capable of simulating NB aircraft evacuations and the second, the Very Large 
Evacuation Simulator (VLES) funded by the UK CAA, is of flexible modular design 
and is capable of simulating WB, BWB, DD and MB evacuations [108]. The VLES 
opened on the 12th of July 2001 and is 36 feet wide (11 metres), 82 feet long (25 
metres) and 32.8 feet (10 metres) high and is the first of its kind. In addition 
Cranfield had previously used a Trident Three aircraft cabin section to simulate 
narrow-bodied aircraft evacuations. The Trident Three evacuation simulator has now 
been decommissioned following the construction of the B737 test simulator.
These facilities have been used to perform numerous experiments to better understand 
human performance in evacuation situations. Some trials have been performed under 
non-competitive behaviour and so are similar in nature to the certification trial while 
other trials have been performed under competitive behaviour - a technique pioneered 
by Cranfield University - in an attempt to simulate the conditions of real evacuation 
situations. A brief summary of these experiments is outlined in this section.
There has been much research carried out using the CAMI cabin simulator. Since the 
Manchester air disaster of 1985, this facility has investigated topics such as effects of
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exit size, passenger abilities, platforms and exit approach configurations of Type-in 
exits on evacuation performance [109,111-120]. These trials have included techniques 
to simulate competitive behaviour pioneered at Cranfield (see Section 2.4.3.1). Before 
discussing these more recent trials - that make use of the variations of the Cranfield 
methodology - the early work of CAMI will be discussed.
(a) Early attempts at simulating emergency conditions
In 1966, Garner and Blethrow of the FAA undertook the first evacuation exercise under 
simulated 'emergency' conditions [121]. The cabin section that was utilised was a 
Lockheed Constellation L-1649 fuselage that had recently crashed. The aircraft had 
crashed on a hill and had split into three pieces. Following the crash the wreckage was 
restored to "a practical and safe specimen" [121] for use in evacuation experiments.
The experiment that was conducted made use of emergency lighting, dense white non- 
toxic smoke, outside flashing strobe lights at the rear of the aircraft and prior to the 
evacuation some simulated engine noise. The evacuation scenario also involved cabin 
crew, simulated injured passengers that needed rescue and ropes at over wing exits. The 
aircraft also had an uneven orientation. To a passenger moving forward the pitch of the 
front section was six degrees downwards and the mid-section and aft section were 20 
degrees and thirty-two degrees upwards respectively. For safety reasons, only half of 
the middle and all of the aft sections were used in the experiment.
This experiment was of qualitative value in revealing a multitude of human behaviour 
that may occur in real evacuation situations.
(b) The effects of aircraft attitude
Using their test facility CAMI in 1978 analysed the impact of landing gear failure upon 
evacuation performance [105]. This was achieved using the hydraulic capability of the 
CAMI facility to achieve various combinations of pitch and roll. The analysis was 
performed in order to ease concern over the performance of B747 style staircases 
during emergency evacuation. In total CAMI performed 210 trials, with subjects 
evacuating through spiral and straight-segmented staircases, passageways with seats on 
one side and without seats on both sides, both with and without simulated smoke via 
light obscuring goggles.
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During these experiments a different subject population, typically between 23-26 
(depending upon attendance), was obtained each of the seven trial days. Each 
population performed 30 trials on each of the days. Each sub-population was subjected 
to a different series of scenarios on each day.
The trials were conducted under non-competitive conditions. Thus, while the 
behavioural regime is similar to a certification trial, the actual scenario investigated i.e. 
uneven floor, is more akin to real accident situations.
Their findings provide useful information with respect to the qualitative performance of 
passengers during these trials. However, in their experiments volunteers were required 
to traverse the experimental apparatus in both directions, i.e. up and down the stairs and 
forward and aft of the passageway. Unfortunately, in the published report [105], flow 
rates are presented for the combination of both movement directions. As such the data 
is of little use to evacuation modellers, as information cannot be extracted for motion in 
a single direction.
This information is of vital importance to the simulation of real accident scenarios and it 
is hoped that these experiments will be repeated and data useful for model development 
generated.
(c) Evacuation performance of disabled passengers
The FAR 28.803 emergency demonstration does not require the inclusion of passengers 
with movement disabilities. As such, no information regarding the evacuation of 
disabled passengers is available from 90-second certification trials. While some 
information is available on the performance of disabled passengers in accident reports, 
this information provides no quantitative data on movement rates.
In 1977, CAMI performed a series of trial evacuations using various different categories 
of disabled passengers. In total 153 subjects were used of which 129 had some form of 
disability. Disabilities included quadriplegics, blindness, partially sighted, cerebral 
palsy, elderly, deafness, mental deficiency, leg casts, obesity, multiple sclerosis, polio, 
arthritis, birth defects, paraplegic and via anthropomorphic dummies the non-ambulant.
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Useful quantitative data was generated concerning the extended response times of the 
disabled passengers, their slower movement speeds through aisles and seat rows and 
large exit hesitation delays. In addition, qualitative trends such as the requirement for 
cabin crew and/or carer assistance during the evacuation and the propensity for 'sub- 
queues' [118,36] to form behind slow moving passengers were revealed as well as 
fatigue effects [118]. This data is of great importance to modellers attempting to 
simulate real evacuation situations.
Following the Manchester air disaster of 1985 and as part of a UK CAA funded 
research programme, Prof Helen Muir and others from Cranfield University pioneered 
a new technique to simulate 'competitive behaviour' of the type reported in emergency 
evacuations [92,122,124]. The technique involved giving £5 bonus payments to the 
first 50% (later increased to 75% in some experiments) of passengers to evacuate a 
Trident aircraft fuselage used as a full-scale cabin simulator. Muir later concluded that 
the technique was successful, stating that,
Using these techniques Muir went on to investigate the effects of bulkhead widths [122- 
124,128], seating configuration [122-126,128] and cabin crew motivation [92,127,128] 
adjacent to exits. Results of this work indicated that, contrary to the prevailing theories 
of the time, the flow rate of passengers through constricted areas of the cabin was lower 
when the passengers behaved competitively, i.e. similar to real emergency, than when 
they behaved in an orderly manner, as in 90-second certification trials. This hypothesis 
was also found to be true in the presence of non-toxic theatrical smoke. From the 
modelling perspective this data serves as a useful indication of the likely performance 
during real emergency evacuations.
In addition, Muir also found that the presence and motivation of assertive cabin crew 
tended to increase the flow rate of passengers through floor level aircraft exits [92,
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127,128], The Cranfield analysis was restricted to Type-I exits as this was the only 
floor level exit with crew support. This result is similar to the FSEG finding 
concerning passenger exit hesitation times based on the analysis of 90-second 
certification data for Type-I and Type-A exits [90,91].
Research still needs to be undertaken to compare passenger exit hesitation times 
generated from competitive experimental trials and 90 second certification trials. This 
is of importance as it may be possible to use certification data concerning exit hesitation 
times for real accident applications.
Subsequent to the Manchester air disaster of 1985, numerous experiments have been 
conducted both at CAMI and at Cranfield University during the period 1989-2000 
concerning Type-in exits. Some of the relevant findings are briefly summarised in 
chronological order below.
Initially in 1989, Rasmussen et al based at CAMI attempted to determine the effects of 
seating configuration adjacent to Type-in exits on the exit hatch removal and egress 
[109]. Of the configurations examined it was concluded that the dual 6" passageway 
was significantly faster than the single 6" (p<0.005) and 10" (p<0.01) passageway 
configurations. Another finding of this work was that exit hatch removal and disposal 
was not greatly affected by passageway configurations. From an evacuation modelling 
perspective these experiments provide some useful quantitative and qualitative 
information on exit preparations and likely exit flow rates against which evacuation 
models could be validated. However, the data was not presented in a form useful for 
evacuation modellers. If video footage of these trials were made available, exit 
hesitation delays could be extracted as could passenger movement rates and movement 
behaviour appropriate for the exit configuration.
McLean et al followed these experiments in 1989 with an investigation of the effects of 
wearing smoke hoods on evacuations through type-IH and Type-IV exits in smoke and 
clear air [110]. This study found that evacuation through the Type-III exit was faster 
than through the Type-IV exit (p<0.005). It was found that wearing smoke hoods 
increased the egress time through both types of exits (p<0.05). Furthermore, other
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factors such as size of the exit and smoke hood and passenger learning influenced 
individual evacuation times. In its current form, this work provides useful qualitative 
information and some quantitative information, in the form of a performance 
decrement, on passenger evacuation through these types of exits. Here again, video 
footage of these evacuations would assist model developers in assessing exit hesitation 
curves for evacuations in the presence of non-toxic smoke, both with and without 
smoke hoods.
In 1989, Muir et al first utilised the monetary payment technique and investigated the 
effects of passenger motivation on egress through different bulkhead apertures and 
different passageway configurations leading to Type-in exits [122]. This research 
demonstrated that high motivation, induced by financial rewards, led to significant 
(p<0.01) differences in performance to that observed under 'normal' experimental 
motivation levels. This study indicated that findings from experiments using 'normal' 
motivation levels were likely to be different from those using 'high' motivation levels. 
It was also found that human factors effects, such as age, gender, evacuation strategy 
planning were highly influential on the experimental results. In its current from this 
work has provided useful qualitative data during 'high' motivation conditions. In 
addition some quantitative information was generated, that could indicate suitable 
performance decrements that could be applied to simulate 'high' 
motivation/competitive conditions.
In 1990, Muir et al examined low passenger motivation in theatrical smoke conditions 
[123]. This work was useful in that it generated further data concerning passenger 
behaviour under theatrical smoke conditions. This work indicated no significant 
differences between the Type-IE passageway arrangements in smoke conditions 
(optical density of 0.5 per foot). However, significant differences (p<0.01) were noted 
in the non-competitive trials with and without smoke. From a modelling perspective it 
provides useful qualitative information on Type-IH component performance levels 
under smoke conditions. It is for example, noteworthy that the configurational impact 
adjacent to the Type-in exit is less significant in the presence of smoke. Qualitatively, 
some data exists to validate models of non-competitive smoke evacuations.
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Continuing this work, in 1992 Muir analysed the impact of 'high' motivation when 
evacuating through bulkhead passageways and Type-EH exits in smoke with different 
exit passageway widths [124]. This analysis further revealed that evacuation 
performance was significantly linked to passageway configurations. In addition, gender 
was found to significantly (p<0.05) effect egress time. However, other human factors 
such as height, weight and age did not appear to contribute to egress times. In its 
published form, some of this qualitative data is of use for evacuation modelling in that 
it provides insight into human behaviour that may need to be represented in evacuation 
models. For example, in the 13" and 18" passageway configurations, it was suggested 
that these configurations might have been perceived by the participants as affording 
more space than actually existed. As a result, multiple passengers attempted to access 
the passageway simultaneously. This led, on occasions to passengers vying for access 
to the passageway. From a qualitative perspective, this type of insight into the 
behaviour of passengers around these type of exit configurations is essential if the 
correct behavioural response is to be modelled. In addition, some quantitative 
information was generated regarding the affect of age on egress times. In particular it 
was shown that the older the participant the longer the egress time through certain 
passageway configurations. If sufficient data of this type were available to model 
developers a relationship between age and exiting capability/speed could be developed.
In 1992, McLean et al examined specific dual and triple seating configurations adjacent 
to single and dual Type-in exits focusing on hatch removal and rates of egress under 
'normal' experimental motivation conditions [113]. Again this study revealed 
significant differences between egress times associated with different exit passageway 
configurations. This provoked interest in specific passageway arrangements that were 
explored in more detail in later experiments. Additional information was generated 
regarding exit hatch removal and disposal times. Evacuation models could use this 
data to set exit preparation times, i.e. hatch operation time and disposal time, and to 
better understand the likely effects of various passageway configurations.
Fennell et al investigated Type-IE exit configuration in 1993 under 'normal' 
experimental motivation conditions [125]. This concerned the effects of exit hatch 
weight and seat configuration on Type-IE exit operation and resulting evacuation times. 
Through the use of anthropomorphic dummies, they also simulated the impact of dead
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passengers situated immediately adjacent to these exits on evacuation times. They 
found some differences in exit hatch removal and disposal at specific passageway 
widths. In addition exit plug weight, passenger gender and passageway configuration 
were all found to have significant effects (p<0.001) on exit opening times. This 
resulted in numerous findings regarding exit hatch operation and disposal according to 
gender, age and hatch weight. Indeed in some experiments the weight of the hatch was 
too great for the operator and the experiments were abandoned. The presence of the 
anthropomorphic dummy (simulating an incapacitated/dead passenger) revealed useful 
qualitative data on passenger behaviour. In some cases passengers attempted to move 
the dummy whereas in other cases they did not. Additional delays in exit operation 
were incurred on account of the dummies awkwardness and it being located in the out 
board seat. In its published form, this research has generated useful data for evacuation 
models on likely human behaviours and some quantitative data on exit opening times.
In 1995, McLean et al published the first of two investigations on evacuation through 
Type-Hi exits under 'high' motivation conditions [111]. This study examined seat 
placement effects on evacuations through the Type-in exits. The primary aim was to 
provide more definitive answers to the questions raised in previous studies. Indeed the 
results of this study supported much of the findings of previous work. The effects of 
passageway widths were again shown to exert significant influences on evacuation 
performance. The second part of the study examined the effect that individual 
passenger differences / human factors had upon the experiments [112]. It was found 
that height did not have a significant impact on egress time but that age, weight, waist 
size and gender did. Further findings were presented describing effects from a 
combination of human physical factors. From an evacuation modelling perspective this 
research is important as it provides qualitative information into the relationship between 
human physical factors and exiting capabilities. If sufficient data were collected it may 
provide the basis for establishing the quantitative relationship between these factors and 
exit capabilities.
In 1996 Muir et al, published additional results from experiments on the 3", 13", 18", 
25", 34" and 6" OBR (Out Board seat Removed) exit passageways leading to Type-in 
exits under 'normal' and 'high' motivation conditions [126]. Again this study found 
that the Type-Hi exit passageway width had a significant effect on evacuation
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efficiency. Learning effects were also noted to influence trial results, highlighting 
potential problems in comparisons with dissimilar pervious experimental designs. This 
experiment generated similar qualitative data to previous studies in terms of exit 
preparation times, the behaviour of passengers using specific passageway 
configurations and exit flow rates. In addition, some quantitative data concerning exit 
flow rates for Type-El exits was generated that could be used to calibrate model exit 
flow rates. It may also be possible to extract from these studies raw data relating to exit 
hesitation time distributions.
Finally, in 1999 McLean et al, presented results of experiments into the effects of 
passenger densities (either 30 or 50 passengers) through the 13" Type-IH exit 
passageway [114] with and without cabin crew. For the trials with cabin crew, three 
different seating locations were investigated. Mclean noted that cabin crew location 
resulted in insignificant differences in the average egress times. However, the time for 
the fifth to thirtieth passenger to evacuate through the Type-in exit showed a significant 
(p<0.001) hyper-additive increase in the high-density case and a significant (p<0.002) 
decrease when cabin crew were present. Furthermore, the high-density configuration 
without cabin crew was by far the slowest case examined. This research has 
highlighted numerous qualitative factors that could be factored into evacuation models, 
such as the improved exit flow rates resulting from the presence of cabin crew. 
However, to be of value quantitative data relating to the impact of crew on exit flow 
rates should be derived from this experiment. Unfortunately, results from this research 
are not available in open literature.
These studies represent a huge investment of resource and effort that produced much 
data on the behaviour of passengers at Type-in exits. Numerous factors were each 
investigated such as: passageway width, seat encroachment on the Type-in exit 
aperture, hatch weight, passenger instructions on hatch operation, the method of hatch 
disposal, the age, weight, height and girth of passengers, the presence of cabin crew, the 
density of the passenger distribution within the cabin section, etc. Whilst generating 
much useful data for regulations and the resolution of operational matters, the published 
results are not always in a form that is of maximum use to evacuation model 
developers. In order to maximise the benefit for evacuation model development, the 
video footage from these trials should be made available for further analysis.
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It is suggested that future trails should include the involvement of evacuation model 
specialists to ensure that maximum benefit is derived from such trials and that the data 
is presented in such a way so as to be of use to model developers. Furthermore, while 
much work has been done and a considerable amount of data has been collected, before 
definitive relationships are established for use in computer models it must be 
established whether or not this data is consistent.
In a recent analysis of this research [114], McLean was forced to conclude that results 
from these experiments are limited. As McLean stated, the experiments listed above 
have generally resulted in,
In addition to McLean's critique, a recent study by the NTSB concluded that the 
experiments performed by CAMI that involved Type-Ill exits contained 
[3]. For example, within the CAMI studies 
that were performed in 1995, each subject performed some 30 evacuations. The NTSB 
were concerned that significant learning would have occurred over the course of these 
trials that severely limits the usefulness of these particular studies.
While McLean's confidence in the results of these experiments is low, we have little 
alternative but to make the best of this data until his reservations are corroborated and 
more suitable data is made available. Until then, this data is useful in that they have 
highlighted numerous qualitative trends that evacuation models should include and the 
quantification of various important human behaviours.
Indeed in a bid to answer some of the questions raised by these studies CAMI have 
recently completed the most extensive series of aviation evacuation experiments to date
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[116,117]. This involved the experimental phase of a new evacuation study of the 
Type-in exits. This study represents the largest study of these exit types. The 
experimental phase involved 2544 volunteers split into groups of 55 with each group 
performing 4 evacuations each, thus producing a total of 10000 exit crossings and 48 
naive evacuations.
The purpose of this study was primarily to investigate passageway configuration (6" 
OBR dual, 20", 13", 10"), hatch location (discarded inside or outside of the exit), 
subject group density and subject group location. Half of the evacuations used the 
'high' motivation technique and half used 'normal' experimental motivation. As each 
subject performed four evacuations these experiments will be able to analyse the impact 
of learning. Similar to the CAM! experiments performed in 1995 and 1999, cabin crew 
marshalled passengers towards the exits from the forward and aft extremities of the 
cabin. The results of this study are not yet published however they should provide 
more qualitative and quantitative data for evacuation models.
The results of the research at CAMI and Cranfield University are of interest to 
evacuation modellers as they identify and quantify numerous relevant factors that 
influence evacuation. Whilst useful in their own rights, the information is limited as 
model developers must make use of the data that is published in the format that is 
published. While addressing important factors, this information may not be in a form 
suitable for model developers. Ideally, the video records of the experiments should be 
made available to model developers and model developers should be included in the 
team designing and analysing experimental results.
Analysis of factors affecting exit performance has not been limited to Type-in exits. 
Indeed, both Cranfield and CAMI have performed research using Type-I exit types.
As part of the aforementioned Type-in studies, in 1989 Muir et al published the results 
of experiments into cabin configuration adjacent at exits using the Trident cabin 
simulator at Cranfield University (Section 2.4.3.1) [122]. These experiments involved 
2262 volunteers in groups of 60 taking part in over 134 evacuations of which 80 were 
through Type-I exits and 54 through Type-Hi over wing exits. The results of this 
work indicated that high motivation and low bulkhead aisle widths adjacent to exits
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were detrimental to evacuation efficiency. This was closely followed by two more 
studies from Cranfield using the same equipment. The first was in 1990 and examined 
the effect that theatrical smoke had upon performance under 'normal' experimental 
motivation conditions [123]. This followed in 1992 by the results of using 'high' 
motivation techniques [124]. From a modelling perspective, this research has provided 
quantitative data on the flow rates of passengers through aisles and bulkheads. This 
data could be used for the validation of model predictions for these aircraft components 
under 'high' motivation, 'normal' experimental motivation both with and without non- 
toxic smoke.
In 1996, Muir et al published a report detailing the importance of the number of cabin 
crew and performance at Type-I exits using the B737 cabin simulator (see Section 
2.4.3.1) [127]. In this series of experiments, a total of 1307 volunteers participated in 4 
trials in groups of 60. Evacuations, using one active door and two active doors were 
carried out under 'normal' and 'high' motivation experimental conditions. This 
research has provided useful qualitative information on influential factors that 
determine the performance of floor level exits. In addition, this research has provided 
useful data on the flow rates of exits against which model predictions can be validated.
In 1995 [119] and 1999 [120], McLean et al published the results of a research study 
investigating the affects of using platforms in place of escape slides during 90-second 
certification trials. This research was prompted primarily by concern over the validity 
of recent use of platforms during a 90-second certification trial, e.g. the MD-11 in 1992 
[130,131]. Trials of this aircraft were permitted to use slides due to safety concerns 
following the paralysis of a volunteer during the original certification of the MD-11 in 
1991. Whilst the use of platforms had previously been permitted at exits that are not 
required by FAR to have escape slides, such as over-wing exits on the B737-300, 
B737-400 and DC-9-80 [90,11,132,133], the use of platforms in place of escape slides 
was unknown. This research was not just of interest to 90-second certification 
demonstrations, but also to research in general as previous studies performed at 
Cranfield had utilised platforms in place of escape slides [122-124,127].
The first study involved a total of 239 adults in groups of 59-60 performing 4 trials 
each under 'normal' and 'high' motivation experimental conditions and in clear air
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and smoke. This research concluded that the 
and that 
[119].
The second study investigated the impact the exit size and egress means had on 
evacuation performance. This study involved a total of 174 volunteers divided into 
five groups of between 34-36 with each performing six evacuations. The 
experimental trials involved combinations of 'normal' and 'high' motivation in smoke 
or clear air onto either platforms or escape slides. The conclusions of this study were 
that 
[120], In addition the report stated, 
[120].
In addition to experiments performed at the CAMI/Cranfield facilities, manufacturers 
frequently test new components of aircraft, such as slides, exit configurations, signage 
designs, etc. Whilst numerous tests are performed throughout the world the data that 
they generate is difficult to obtain, as typically it is commercially sensitive and 
proprietary. However this data if made available could be of great importance to 
model developers. If the tests are done under appropriate conditions, the data they 
generate could be useful for both 90-second certification trial scenarios and real 
accident analysis. A further discussion of these tests and the role they can have in 
modelling for certification can be found in Section 2.4.1.
Present in many real emergencies is a thermal and toxic hazard that is capable of 
hindering evacuation and/or causing loss of life. As such, evacuation models that 
attempt to simulate real emergency evacuations require a representation of both the 
affects that they have upon passenger behaviour and the possible loss of 
consciousness and ultimately life. The FA A has been investigating the effects of 
pooled fires on aircraft cabins and its toxicological impact upon passengers for many 
years. Their work and its appropriateness for the purposes of evacuation modelling is 
summarised in this section.
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Firstly, it is necessary to define the principle type of fires that are likely in an 
emergency aircraft evacuation. Fires may take the form of internal fires, possibly 
originating from damaged or defective aircraft systems, or an external pooled kerosene 
fire. The majority of research by the FAA has been focused on the external pooled 
kerosene scenario.
The FAA C133 fire test facility subjected a mock aircraft cabin to a pooled kerosene 
fire. The pooled fire originated from an external tray measuring 10 feet by 8 feet which 
contained 50 US Gallons of kerosene fuel and was positioned at the sill height of a 
Type-A sized exit opening. The size of the opening was supposed to be representative 
of a rupture in the cabin fuselage, thus passenger seating was situated directly adjacent 
to the Type-A sized opening.
The size of the tray was determined through tests of various tray sizes in order to 
reproduce the radiant flux of an "infinitely" large pooled kerosene fire [82]. The data 
for an "infinitely" large pooled fire was obtained through subjecting a real DC-7 aircraft 
[135] to an external pool fire of 30 feet in diameter through a similar sized opening. 
The resulting radiant flux when measured at the centre line of the cabin fuselage during 
the DC-7 test was only marginally higher (20%) than the radiant heat flux from the 
C133 fire test model.
The result of their experiments was that their test aircraft cabin section consistently 
flashed over at approximately minutes. This finding was explicitly stated by the 
FAA technical report:
In a bid to ascertain the validity of the C133 test model's findings, Trimble [134] 
reviewed 10 aircraft accidents with fires, for the occurrences of flashover, smoke 
and/or gas induced debilitation/collapse before completing egress and he also 
examined the time-scale of the evacuations. The cases Trimble investigated are 
summarised below:
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  United Airlines DC-8 at Denver on 11.7.1961
  United Airlines Boeing 727 at Salt Lake City on 11.11.1965
  Varig Boeing 707 near Paris Orly on 11.7.1973
  Saudi Arabian Airlines L1011 at Riyadh on 19.8.1980
  Spantax DC-10 at Malaga on 13.9.1980
  Air Canada DC-9 at Cincinnati on 2.6.1983
  Pacific Western Airlines Boeing 737 at Calgary on 22.3.1984
  British Airtours Boeing 737 at Manchester 22.8.1985
  Delta Airlines Boeing 727 at Dallas on 31.8.1988
  US Air Boeing 737 at Los Angeles on 31.8.1988
With respect to flashover, Trimble found that in two of the cases (6 and 8) flashover 
was completely discounted by their air accident investigations. The remaining 8 cases 
investigated had no mention of flashover although smaller flash-fires were mentioned 
in some air accident reports. His analysis of gas induced debilitation collapse revealed 
that for the majority of passengers incapacitation occurred as a result toxic gas 
inhalation. Additionally, Trimble found that an average evacuation time-scale from 9 
accidents was 3 minutes and 50 seconds.
Trimble's conclusions were that, whilst the FAA C133 test model certainly does 
represent an aircraft fire scenario, the test model should not be assumed as the general 
pattern for real aircraft pooled fire scenarios [134]. Indeed, Trimble argues that the 
testimonies of passengers and the pathological evidence from real aircraft accidents 
indicates that toxic gases are the principle source of incapacitation not excessive 
exposure to thermal radiation, as indicated by the C133 test model. As such, Trimble 
questions the validity of extrapolating from the test model to real aircraft fires. As 
Trimble stated during his Thesis:
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[134, ppl 10]
From an evacuation modelling perspective the results of these tests provide some useful 
data on a possible thermo-toxic scenario during a real emergency evacuation. In 
addition these experiments have been useful in highlighting and quantifying the types 
of gases that are released from the pyrolysis of an aircraft cabin and its furnishings. 
Using these data, evacuation models can be configured to represent the experimental 
fire. However, the data generated from these test fires cannot be assumed to be the 
only or most representative fire scenario for aircraft accidents. Indeed, according to the 
work of Trimble, the toxic data generated in these test fires is unrepresentative of the 
most challenging aircraft fires that occur.
In addition to using data from fire tests, computer fire models can be used to generate 
the fire atmosphere that passengers are subjected to. Computer models to simulate fire 
are generally categorised as being either Zone [83] or Computational Field Dynamics 
(CFD) [87] based. Zone models generate an average heat, gas and smoke 
concentration for both upper and lower layers in each zone with the output for each 
zone being an average. CFD based models subdivide each compartment or zone into 
thousands of small three-dimensional cells. The physical properties, i.e. gas, heat and 
smoke concentrations are then calculated for each cell. As finer meshes are employed 
within CFD models, they can more accurately predict velocity and temperature fields. 
Whilst generating more detailed results the approach is computationally expensive. 
With respect to simulating fire spread through an aircraft cabin, the size of the mesh 
elements is of importance, as it would affect the results of the model. Of the two 
approaches, CFD would generate the most accurate results however at relatively high 
computational expense.
Much research has been carried out to ascertain human tolerances to thermal and toxic 
hazards. This research has primarily been performed using rats, mice and monkeys as 
human surrogates [136-145]. The toxic gases that required investigations have been
72
_____________________Chapter 2_____________________
determined through the pyrolysis of aircraft cabins and furnishings as well as through 
the pathological analysis of accident victims [134,81,82,99]. Thus, human tolerance 
experiments have analysed tolerance to specific toxic products and toxic 
combinations [136-145].
The concept of Fractional Effective Dose (FED) has been utilised to model the time 
taken to incapacitation from various different toxic threats, such as Heat, Radiation, 
Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN), Hydrogen Fluoride (HF), Hydrogen Chloride (HC1), 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) and Carbon Monoxide (CO). The FED is numerical and is 
therefore ideally suited to computer models. The FED model has been described 
numerous times previously [88,89], and so will not be described in detail here. 
Suffice to say that the FED assumes the effects of its components to be additive and is 
reliant upon having good quality data when specifying its parameters. Originally the 
FED model was only able to indicate the time to incapacitation from asphyxiant 
gases.
The effects of asphyxiant gases are that, in sufficient quantities they affect ones ability 
to breath and to remain conscious. As Purser states they 
[89]. Common asphyxiant fire gases include 
CO, HCN, CO2 and (low) O2 [89]. A common exposure profile is that 
[89].
Later, Purser expanded the FED model to include the effects of irritants [89]. Irritants 
are not just highly irritant but also potentially depilating gases, such as HC1, HF, 
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2), Nitrous Oxides (NOX) and Acrolein (HCHO), that are nearly 
always present in aircraft fires [134,89]. In sufficient quantities these irritant gases 
can cause severe discomfort and agitation, such that passenger's ability to escape is 
annihilated to 
[89]. Even in small quantities 
irritant gases can cause [89]. 
However, Purser recognises that quantifying their effects for any one individual is
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difficult as 
[89].
The net result of this research is an empirically based mathematical model of human 
tolerances to toxic and thermal assault. The FED model not only models time to 
incapacitation but also time to irritation. Furthermore, being numerical, the model is 
ideally suited to integration into computer evacuation models. However, like any 
model, it is only as good as the data upon which it is based.
In recent years, human behaviour experiments in smoke have been limited to non- 
irritant toxic theatrical smoke [128, 124]. Experiments in aircraft have been conducted 
both at Cranfield [123,124] and CAMI [109,110]. However, some years ago, 
experiments were performed using irritant smoke and human volunteers [146,81] in 
non-aircraft enclosures [146].
The primary impact of smoke is that particulate in the atmosphere obscures the 
amount of light that is transmitted, thus leading to a decreases in visibility. During an 
emergency evacuation this has the effect of limiting passenger visibility creating 
disorientation. In addition, passenger movement is also affected. Passengers may 
decide to crawl so as to avoid contact with the upper hot and dark smoke layer. In 
very dense smoke, passenger vision is completely annihilated and positional 
awareness is limited to tactile information.
The FAA conducted some tests into the effects of smoke on cabin visibility 
[81,149,150]. In these experiments passengers were required to read letters signs 
through various concentrations of smoke. The effects of cabin and sign luminescence, 
and letter spacing were examined using white [149] and black smoke [150]. 
Passengers were not subjected directly to the smoke in these experiments. However, in 
earlier experiments this had been shown that the ability to read signs was reduced in 
irritant smoke conditions when compared against non-irritant conditions. This was 
attributed to discomfort and eye lacrymation. Similar affects have been reported in real 
aircraft accidents [10].
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Jin subjected volunteers to irritant and non-irritant smoke whilst performing a 
complex action and walking through a corridor [146]. In this work, Jin showed that 
human performance both in terms of movement ability and performing their task were 
reduced in irritant smoke.
The results of this research are that it is possible for computer models to have some 
representation of human behaviour in smoke environments. However, the work of Jin 
was performed in a corridor not an aircraft cabin. Consequently it is not of direct 
relevance to behaviour in aircraft, as it is likely that a different range of behaviours 
would be exhibited when moving through smoke within an aircraft cabin. As such 
more research is needed in order to better understand the behaviour during smoke 
environments. Ideally, video footage of subsequent trials involving smoke would be 
made publicly available for the benefit of evacuation modellers. Furthermore, the 
work that has been done in aircraft enclosures [123,124] have not controlled or 
quantified the concentration of smoke the passengers have been subjected to. It is not 
possible to determine the impact of smoke concentration on human performance in 
these experiments and therefore it would be desirable to conduct a range of experiments 
within aircraft environments in which the smoke concentration was controlled.
2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided the answer to the question "Are there currently evacuation
models appropriate for certification and accident applications. If so what are they and 
what are they lacking?" In doing so all six of the aviation evacuation models that 
have been developed to date were described. Of these only one (airEXODUS) is still 
being funded and developed.
A main critisicm of evacuation models was that most failed to use empirical data to 
determine model parameters. Indeed, of the six models that were found only GPSS 
and airEXODUS use real evacuation data within their models. The complexity and 
completeness of each of the models behavioural sets were discussed in detail. In this 
context airEXODUS and AIREVAC contained the most complete set of human 
behaviours. It should be noted that whilst modelling many of the common behaviours 
found in evacuation the parameters used in AIREVAC were completely arbirary. 
Finally, whilst most models' validation studies have been positive, in general the
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validation history of aviation evacuation models is rather limited. 90-second 
certification trials offer an available and abundant source of data against which 
evacuation models could be validated. These should be utilised in future model 
development. A further finding of this chapter is the importance of experimental data 
and data from real accidents in understanding and specifying behaviours within 
evacuation models. In this respect the A ASK database offers a wealth of information 
on human behaviour in real aircraft accidents. This tool makes it an ideal source for 
the a) verification and b) development of future, behaviours in evacuation models.
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3.1 Introduction
The primary aim of this thesis is to advance aircraft evacuation modelling technology
towards viable tools for use in the certification and design of passenger aircraft. One 
method of achieving this would be to code an entirely new model and validate it to a 
sufficient level to meet the objectives. However, given that current aircraft evacuation 
modelling technology has already reached a certain level of maturity this approach 
would waste valuable time that could be devoted to extending an existing model. Thus, 
the approach taken by this thesis is to develop an existing aircraft evacuation modelling 
platform.
The previous chapter provided and discussed the history and methodologies behind 
evacuation modelling and the research and data that are available to them. From those 
discussed it is apparent that the airEXODUS evacuation model sits at the forefront of 
evacuation modelling technology and is therefore an ideal platform for this thesis. This 
chapter provides a detailed view of its current mechanics and capabilities and helps to 
explain what the airEXODUS model - and aircraft evacuation modelling technology - 
is lacking.
Model overview
Detailed literature describing the airEXODUS model is available in the public domain
and so it will not be exhaustively discussed in this thesis [36-38,40-52]. However, an 
overview and understanding of the current state of airEXODUS development will be 
presented. This section is based on airEXODUS V3.0 functionality.
airEXODUS is designed for applications in the aviation industry including, aircraft 
design, compliance with 90 second certification requirements, crew training, 
development of crew procedures, resolution of operational issues and accident 
investigation.
EXODUS comprises five core interacting sub-models (see Figure 5) they are the 
Passenger, Movement, Behaviour, Toxicity and Hazard models.
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The software describing these sub-models is rule-based, with the progressive motion 
and behaviour of each individual being determined by a set of heuristics or rules. The 
spatial and temporal dimensions within EXODUS are spanned by a two-dimensional 
spatial grid and a simulation clock (SC). The simulation clock increments at 1/12 
second intervals.
3.3 The geometry sub-model: Spatial definition with airEXODUS
Within airEXODUS the aircraft geometry is divided into a series of discrete spaces
referred to as nodes connected by a series of arcs. An arc connection between two 
nodes defines a travel path between the two nodes. The connection of a nodal mesh in 
such a manner enables complex geometries to be specified within the model (see Figure 
12 and Figure 13).
A node represents a region of space that has dimensions of 0.5 metres by 0.5 metres. 
Within the model, dimensions are represented via setting the length of non-diagonal 
connecting arcs to 0.5 metres and diagonal arcs to 0.707 metres. In practice these 
dimensions are rarely used as the constricted geometry of passenger aircraft requires 
smaller or occasionally larger node sizes. For example, an exit passageway with a 
width of 0.95 metres would be modelled with two nodes with a width of 0.425 metres.
Figure 12: Example representation of a forward cabin section
Within aisles the size of nodes is typically set differently to reflect a) the orientation of 
the passengers' body and b) observations from 90-second certification trials in which 
two passengers can occupy the length of a seat when in the aisle. The general method 
when defining space in aisles is for two aisle nodes to be provided per passenger seat. 
The front aisle node being connected to the passenger seat (see Figure 12(b)).
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Figure 13: Cabin layout in airEXODUS. View depicted represents the interactive graphics component 
within airEXODUS. Aircraft depicted has five pairs of exits. The node structure showing seats, aisles
and cross-aisles is clearly depicted.
Each node has a set of attributes defining its terrain type and environmental state.
Within airEXODUS nodes are assigned types reflecting different terrain. Terrain types 
are AISLEs, SEATs, EXITs and STAIRs. The terrain type affects the movement speed 
of passenger when traversing the node. Likewise arcs can be assigned obstacle values 
to reflect the obstacle over a specific path. The obstacle value of arcs affects both travel
speed and may also require a certain amount of 
agility for the passenger to travel the arc. 
Through arc obstacle values the relative ease of 
lateral movement through seating is modelled 
via low arc obstacle values whereas longitudinal
Table 5: Movement rates according to 
terrain type
movement over seat backs is modelled with high arc obstacle values.
Environmental attributes include the, concentration of HCN (ppm), CO (ppm), CO2 
(%), oxygen depletion (%), smoke (1/m) and temperature (°C). For each of these 
variables, two values are stored, representing the value at head height (1.7m) and near 
floor level (0.5m). In addition each node is assigned a potential value which is 
explained in more detail later.
3.4 The movement sub-model within airEXODUS
Within airEXODUS movement is generally determined via the potential values of
nodes calculated through a potential map also known as a potential well. The potential 
map is a mechanism by which the relative merit of each node is determined and is 
calculated according to the attractiveness of each door as supplied by the user. Prior to 
simulation it is necessary for the user to supply potential values to each exit - the values
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represent the attractiveness of the exit. airEXODUS then increments the potential value 
and assigns it to all adjacent nodes. This process is repeated until there are no more 
adjacent nodes (see Figure 14(a)). Should more than one exit be active the process is 
repeated assigning nodes the lowest potential value for each exit (see Figure 14(b)).
Figure 15: Movement of a passenger with (a) one active exit and (b) two active exits
Using this method nodes are assigned increasingly higher potential values representing 
their distance, as measured by nodes, from the exit. Within the model passenger 
movement is simplistically determined via seeking nodes with lower potential scores 
than the current node. Should all lower nodes be occupied passengers may choose 
nodes with equal potential values. Furthermore, when a passenger has been waiting on 
a node for a length of time that is greater than their patience attribute they may move to 
nodes with increased potential values until a node of lower or equal potential is found. 
Using this scheme when two active exits are available the exit choice of passengers' is 
simplistically determined by the number of nodes that lie between the passenger and the 
exit and the initial potential values of the exits (see Figure 14(b)).
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Figure 16: Revised movement pattern avoiding 
another passenger
This mechanism alone is unable to 
generate the required movement pattern in 
complex aircraft geometries especially 
those involving cross aisles. To remedy 
this ATTRACTOR/DISCHARGE nodes 
are used within the model. These special 
node types allow the user to impose 
specific potential values on nodes. The value at the attractor is used as the seed 
potential for adjacent nodes except for discharge nodes, which are used to segregate 
areas to be effected.
An example application of attractor / discharge to a hypothetical cabin section is shown 
in Figure 17. In Figure 17 only the top left door is active therefore the potential map 
would be generated for the cabin as shown in Figure 17(a) and (b). This does not 
reflect a likely movement pattern as passengers may in reality choose to use the cross- 
aisle rather than cutting through seating. Thus, two sets of attractor/discharge nodes are 
deployed (see Figure 17(c)) and would alter the potential map accordingly. It can be 
seen that the use of attractors generates the desired behaviour and passengers would use 
the cross-aisle rather than cutting through the seating (see Figure 17(d)).
When used for the redirection of individuals to specific exits the standard potential 
well system and use of attractor/discharge nodes was found to be too cumbersome to 
allow some of the more complex movement patterns that were required in later 
chapters of this work. Thus, some small but significant modifications to the standard 
potential well system as deployed in V3.0 of the software were made. Whilst 
inappropriate to mention in this section the alterations are relevant to some of the later 
model developments in this thesis. As such they have been included as Appendix B.
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Figure 17: Example application of ATTRACTOR/DISCHARGE nodes within the model
3.5 The hazard sub-model
Within airEXODUS fire hazards can be defined to act over one or more nodes during
one or more time periods during the evacuation. Within airEXODUS a hazard consists 
of growth equations for O, CO, CO2, HCN, Smoke, Radiative Flux and Temperature. 
Many hazards can be defined for each node within the model although only one hazard 
can affect a node at any given time. Within the model large transformations in ambient 
conditions are modelled through two or more hazards that affect the node(s) at different 
times during the simulation.
Hazards can be specified by the user in the form of growth equations or generated 
automatically from CFAST [84]. User specified growth equations require manual input 
although the equations could be derived from experiments, research or hypothetical 
data. Automatic faculties are provided to allow the direct import of data from CFAST.
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When CFAST is employed the nodes that the hazard affects has to directly correspond 
to the compartments within the zone model.
3.6 The toxicity Sub-model
airEXODUS makes uses of the fractional effective dose model for determining the
affects of hazards upon passengers. As such it is necessary to record individual 
measures of toxic exposure and its cumulative effects. Within airEXODUS the 
following individual physiological parameters are used: PID, FIH, FICN, FIO, VCO2 
and FIN. The personal incapacitation dose (PID) is a measure of the 
carboxyhaemoglobin (COHb) concentration necessary to cause incapacitation as 
determined via the FED model. FICO measures the passenger's cumulative exposure 
to carbon monoxide (CO). FICN attribute measures the passenger's cumulative 
exposure to hydrogen cyanide (HCN). The FIO attribute measures the passenger's 
cumulative exposure to low oxygen (02). VCO2 attribute is an estimate of the 
hyperventilation effect caused by the passenger's exposure to carbon dioxide gas (CO2). 
The FIN attribute measures the passenger's combined cumulative exposure to low 02, 
HCN, CO and CO2.
Within EXODUS Pursur's FED [16-19] is utilised which estimates the time to 
incapacitation and considers the physical and toxic hazards associated with HCN, CO, 
CO2, elevated temperature and low O2-
In each of the following expressions, t is the exposure time (minutes). The fractional 
incapacitating dose (FID) for each of the agents is calculated as follows:
CO (measured in ppm):
3.317 *10~5 * CO 1
where RMV is the Respiratory Minute Volume (litres/minute) and PID is the Personal 
Incapacitation Dose (%). Equation 1 is however unreliable for small adults and 
children and that CO is immediately converted to COHb.
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(ii) HCN (measured in ppm):
220
Equation 2 is however is unreliable outside the range 80 - 180 ppm HCN. 
(iii) Low (measured in %):
(8.13-0.54*(20.9-02 )) 
o
(iv) C02 (measured in %):
____- 4(6.1623-0.5189*C02 )
Another effect that COz has is to increase an exposed person's RMV and thus increase 
their rate of uptake of other toxic gases.
The FED model considers the combined effect of these agents in the following way,
* 5
where,
is a multiplicative factor which measures the increased uptake of CO and HCN due to 
CO2- induced hyperventilation.
The final considered is due to heat. There are two contributions to this 
relationship, convective heat (i.e. elevated temperature) and radiative flux,
(v) Convected Heat:
F/#c =r*2.0*10~8 *r34 7
where T is the temperature (°C). 
(i) Radiative Heat:
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1.33
*r*60.0 8
where q is the radiative flux (kW/m2) and Dr is the radiative denominator. Dr is the 
Dose of radiation required to cause the desired effect and has units of [s(kW/m2)4/3]. 
Within EXODUS two values for Dr are provided, these represent the critical value for 
"pain threshold" Dr = 80 and the critical value for "incapacitation", Dr = 1000. Both 
values are subjective and depend on many variables such as age of the passenger, state 
of health, amount and type of clothing worn, amount of skin exposed etc. As a result 
these values are only intended to be indicative.
The FED model considers the combined effect of these agents in the following way,
When FIN or FICO2 or FIH equal or exceed 1.0, the affected passenger is assumed to 
be incapacitated. The EXODUS model considers fire hazard data located at two 
heights, head and near floor height.
While the Purser model is typical of FED models, other formulations have been 
suggested, Speitel [26,27] for example has developed an alternative model. In addition 
to the quantities specified in the Purser model, Speitel considers the gases, HCL, HF, 
HBr, Acrolein and NO2- Furthermore, expressions for the CO and Heat contribution to 
the FED calculation are significantly different from that specified in the Purser model.
In Pursers model the FIHc acquired each minute (equation 7) is based on data using 
subjects with exposed skin, whereas in the Speitel model the FIH calculation, is based 
on data using clothed subjects.
10"09 *(r°C)361 10
The Purser model predicts incapacitation at significantly lower temperatures than the 
Speitel model. For example, according to equation 7, a one-minute exposure to 185°C 
results in incapacitation, whereas using equation 10 temperatures in excess of 240°C are 
required to produce the same result. A possible deficiency in both models concerns the
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exclusion of the thermal effects due to humid rather than dry air. The incapacitating 
effects of air with a high water vapour content are more severe than dry air as it reduces 
heat loss through sweat and delivers more heat to exposed skin. Furthermore, due to its 
higher heat capacity, inhaled hot air with a high water vapour content can cause more 
severe damage to the respiratory tract than dry air at the same temperature [23].
Both the Purser and Speitel models incorporate a factor that takes into account the 
increased respiration rate that results from the presence of CO2- The hyperventilation 
factor, VCO2 (see equation 8), is used in the Purser model to represent the increase in 
uptake of CO and HCN and in the Speitel model it serves a similar function for CO, 
HCN, HCL, HF, HBr, NO2 and Acrolein. Using equation 8, a 5% atmosphere of CO2 
will increase the RMV by a factor of 2.72. This will have a significant effect on the 
FIN calculation in both models.
The final parameters which can be accessed through the toxicity submodel are called 
the TRIGGERING TEMPERATURE and TRIGGERING SMOKE 
CONCENTRATION. These parameters apply to the entire population. They represent 
the critical temperature and smoke concentrations at which a passenger's response time 
attribute is overridden.
3.7 The passenger sub-model
Within airEXODUS passengers each have individual defining characteristics that are
typically determined according to age/gender/weight from various empirical source and 
experimental sources. Generally, attributes can be categorised as being physical, 
psychological and physiological.
These attributes cover the physical characteristics of the passengers of which some are
fixed and others change throughout the evacuation. Fixed physical attributes within 
airEXODUS are gender, age, weight, maximum travel speeds, maximum agility and 
normal RMV. In addition six travel speeds are provided in airEXODUS to represent 
different modes of travel and speed over various terrain/obstacles. Travel speeds are: 
crawling, climbing seating, running, walking and climbing/descending stairs. The 
travel speed is determined by the terrain that is being traversed and the action being 
undertaken. Normal RMV is determined according to weight, gender and age.
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Current agility and travel speeds are dynamic attributes that are affected by a mobility 
attribute which is determined according to the condition of the individual. Toxic gases, 
high/low CO/O and injury all affect passenger mobility which in turn impacts upon 
passengers' agility and travel speeds. RMV is affected by the level of work, i.e. the 
travel speed and the action being performed.
The narcotic affects of smoke and narcotic gases affect passenger mobility. The impact 
that smoke has upon mobility is determined via the work of Jin [146] (see Figure 18 
and Table 6 and Table 7). Where FIN and smoke combine to reduce mobility the 
greater factor is assumed.
1 -
B 0.6 -
Figure 18: The impact of smoke upon occupant 
mobility derived from the work of Jin [146]
Table 6: Relationship between
smoke and mobility derived from
the work of Jin [146]
Table 7: Relationship
between FIN and occupant
Mobility attribute
In addition to physical attributes some psychological attributes are provided that are
used in determining the passenger's response to situations. In airEXODUS V3.0 three 
psychological attributes are used: Drive, Patience and Response Time.
Drive is used to resolve conflicts for space and is determined according to gender and 
age as indicated by competitive evacuation trials involving financial payments to
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evacuees who are amongst the first few to successfully evacuate [22,23]. Patience is a 
measure of how likely the passenger is to wait in a queue rather than to seek a method 
of circumventing the queue, through extreme behaviour.
The response time attribute reflects the time required to recognise the need to evacuate, 
unbuckle seat belts and stand. This attribute represents the psychological responses to 
the alarm as well as the physical unbuckling seat belts and standing actions. These 
values were determined from previous analysis of 90-second certification trials and are 
set according to gender and age.
Crew share the above attributes but are provided with an additional task list of actions
that they have to perform. In airEXODUS V3.0 tasks are rather limited and cover 
simple behaviour such as, move to a location, wait at a location, open/close a door and 
check whether catchment area of an exit is empty. Crew can be assigned any number 
of tasks and complete them sequentially.
3.8 The behaviour sub-model
The global behavioural pattern has already been described (see Section 3.4) and
involves passengers following the potential well to the exit with the lowest potential. 
Within airEXODUS another layer of behaviour exists called, Local Behaviour.
Local behaviour covers, A) people-people interactions, B) environmental affects, and 
C) terrain movement adjustments. These behaviours are strongly affected by the 
individual characteristics of passengers and the scenario in which they are present.
Generally passenger behaviour is categorised as being either EXTREME or NORMAL. 
Normal behaviour sees passengers follow the potential map in an orderly manner. 
Extreme behaviour is activated when passengers' exceed their patience threshold. 
Extreme behaviour allows passengers to occupy nodes with higher potential values than 
their current node. In addition and agility permitting, passengers may travel over 
seating when in EXTREME mode. Passengers may sometimes leave an aisle and then 
climb over seating in this mode of behaviour. In this instance the behaviour results 
from two rules A) being allowed to increase their potential and thus move away from
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the aisle, and then B) climb over seating, i.e. occupy the node with the lowest potential 
excluding the previous node.
Within the model passengers are forbidden to move into EXTREME mode when they 
are within close proximity to an active exit, usually set to 2 metres within the model. 
This override stops passengers from moving away from an active exit due to temporary 
obstructions or blockages.
Conflicts for space are resolved using the Drive attribute of each passenger. Where 
more than one passenger vies for the same node, the Drive attributes are consulted with 
the passenger with the higher Drive winning the conflict. Specific time penalties are 
attached to winning and losing conflicts. Reduced travel speeds during periods of 
congestion emerge from the frequency of conflicts that are generated.
Direction changes generally occur when new exits become available and the potential 
well is recalculated. Over taking behaviour is implicit in the potential well movement 
system. The terrain that is being traversed also affects the current movement speeds of 
the passenger.
Finally, airEXODUS contains limited environmental behaviour effects. If the upper 
hazard layer reaches excessive levels of smoke or heat passengers begin to crawl so as 
to avoid contacting the hazard. This affects their movement speed. In addition 
toxicological affects as calculated via the FED model affect passenger travel speeds, 
mobility and consequently agility.
It is apparent from this description that passengers have no knowledge of the exit that 
they are going to use within airEXODUS and merely know the next best node to 
occupy. In essence passenger movement is determined solely on a local basis, with 
passenger essentially looking at their feet as they walk.
3.9 Certification data used in airEXODUS
airEXODUS makes use of 90-second certification data [158] to specify certain model
parameters [46]. In the work presented here, the most important parameter is the 
Passenger Exit Delay Time. This time represents two stages of the exiting process, the
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exit hesitation time and the exit negotiation time. In virtually all cases, the passengers 
exhibit a hesitation at the exit, before negotiating it. Typically, this starts when an out- 
stretched hand first touches the exit. The latter time considers the amount of time taken 
to pass through the exit.
In general, the exit hesitation time is due in main to passengers either waiting at the exit 
for the path to clear and/or contemplating how to negotiate the exit. In either case, the 
exit negotiation stage does not usually start until there is space for it to commence. 
Furthermore, the process of passing through the exit and travelling from the exit to the 
ground are considered as separate events that can occur in parallel.
Within airEXODUS the exit delay time distribution is segmented into subintervals 
described by uniform distributions. The technique is dependent on the user having a 
good representation of the actual delay time distribution. This representation used 
within airEXODUS is discussed in more detail later.
a*
Figure 19: Passenger Exit Delay Time distribution for main deck Type-A exits with assertive crew.
The main deck Type-A exits (a description of the different type of aircraft exits may be 
found in Appendix A) with assertive cabin crew serves as a typical example of the 
analysis that has been conducted on passenger behaviour at exits. For this exit, 
assertive cabin crew were taken to be crew who displayed a vocal and physical 
assertiveness during the majority of the passenger flow through their exit. Vocal 
assertiveness is taken to mean crew members who continuously yelled clear
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instructions to the passengers and physical assertiveness is represented by crew 
members who made physical contact with the passengers.
From the FSEG analysis, suitable data from 11 previous certification tests involving 
Type-A exits with assertive cabin crew were found. The aircraft meeting these selection 
requirements were drawn from Boeing, Airbus and Douglas aircraft. It is also worth 
noting that three of these aircraft failed to meet the FAR part 25.803 certification 
requirements. In total, passenger exit delay time data from 20 exits representing some 
2078 passengers were used to determine the passenger exit distribution. For each exit 
meeting the selection criteria (i.e. Type-A, main deck, assertive crew) a frequency 
distribution curve of passenger exit delay time can be generated. The shape of these 
distributions are remarkably similar, resembling an exponential/Poisson distribution 
that peaks at the low end of the delay time distribution and tails off towards the higher 
end of the distribution. This suggests that the majority of the passengers display a short 
delay time (associated with a rapid jump onto the slide) while a sizeable number of 
passengers have a relatively long delay time (associated with passengers that sit on the 
exit sill when using escape slides). On the whole, the slowest passengers exit delay 
times are associated with personal attributes of being elderly and being female. From 
this data we note that the minimum delay time is approximately 0.2 seconds and the 
maximum delay time is 4.7 seconds. The typical distribution of delay times for main 
deck Type-A exits with assertive crew is depicted in Figure 19. The shape of the curve 
for unassertive crew is similar to that shown in Figure 19 with the fastest times being 
unaffected but with more passengers displaying the slower times.
For each exit type, generalised passenger Exit Delay Time distributions have been 
determined and categorised according to the performance of the cabin crew at the exit 
[158]. The number of exits which comprise each of the Exit Delay Time settings is 
shown in Table 8.
From the collection of 22 video recordings of 90-second certification trials available to 
FSEG, no evacuation involving unassertive cabin crew positioned at exits of Type-C 
dimensions have been witnessed. This category is therefore empty (see Table 8). 
Furthermore, there were insufficient evacuations through Type-I exits to support being
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split into ASSERTIVE, INBETWEEN and UNASSERTIVE tiers. Thus for this exit 
type, an assertiveness category has not been defined for the curve that has been formed 
representing exit delays across the spectrum of crew assertiveness (see Table 8).
In addition during the development of passenger Exit Hesitation Delay distributions it 
was decided that cabin crew did no exert a significant affect on the exit hestiations 
delays experienced by passengers at canted Type-A exits. Thus, a single category of 
passenger exit hesitation delays was extracted (see Table 8). Likewise, cabin crew do 
not generally assist passengers at Type-in exits due to the narrow width of Type-in 
through-seating exit passageway(s). Instead, they tend to stand in or near the aisle and 
usher passengers into the exit seating row(s). As such, categorisation of exit hesitation 
delays by cabin crew assertion was considered irrelevant for this type of exit and only a 
single passenger exit hesitation delay was developed (see Table 8).
Table 8: Data used in forming the generalised parameter settings
Another key parameter in airEXODUS is the Exit Ready Time. This attribute 
represents the time required by a crewmember or passenger to render the exit escape 
system ready for use. This attribute represents a slightly different series of events 
depending upon the specific procedures of a particular exit type.
For the Type-A exit escape systems the Exit Ready Time attribute represents the time 
for the cabin crew member to react to the call to evacuate, get out of their seat, move to 
the exit, contact the exit, open the exit and fully deploy the exit slide.
The Exit Ready Time parameter for canted Type-A, Type-B, Type-C and Type-I exits 
all represent a similar series of events. However, the Exit Ready Time parameter for 
the Type-III over wing exits represents a slightly different chain of events. It represents
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the time required for a passenger/crew member to react to the call to evacuate, get out 
of their seat, move to the exit, contact the exit, open the exit and dispose of the hatch.
3.10 Repeat simulations
airEXODUS is stochastic in nature. This means that every time a simulation is
repeated a slightly different evacuation time will result, as the individual passengers 
are unlikely to exactly repeat their actions. In addition, as the passenger Exit Delay 
Time is randomly attributed according to the specified distribution, passengers will 
not necessarily incur the same Exit Delay Time on exiting the aircraft in subsequent 
simulations. For this reason, it is necessary to repeat a simulation numerous times in 
order to generate a distribution of results.
3.11 Validation history
Of all the aviation evacuation models, EXODUS appears to have the most extensive
published verification history that incorporates all four validation components. 
Quantitative verification has been achieved using the results of 2 experiments (2-EX) 
[45], one blind wide-bodied analysis [45]. All of these validation tests have shown the 
model to correlate well with reality.
3.12 Relevant airEXODUS Parameters
Several airEXODUS parameters will be frequently referred to when describing the
results of the model. These are; Personal Elapsed Time (PET), Total Evacuation 
Time (TET), Cumulative Wait Time (CWT), Distance, Response Time, Exit Ready 
Time, OPS, Flowrates and the Off-Time (see [36-38,40-52] for details).
The TET is a measure of the evacuation time for the aircraft. It is measured from the 
start of the evacuation to when the last passenger exits the aircraft. A single TET is 
determined for each evacuation simulation. Perhaps of more interest to an individual 
passenger is the PET. It is measured from the start of the evacuation to when the 
passenger has exited the aircraft. A PET is determined for each passenger in the 
evacuation simulation. The Response Time is the time a passenger takes to respond to 
the call to evacuate, release their seat restraint and stand. The Response Time is an 
attribute assigned to each passenger as part of the scenario definition.
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The CWT measures the total amount of time a passenger has spent in congestion. 
This is measured after the passenger has completed their Response Time to when the 
passenger has exited the aircraft. This can include time spent in the seat row 
attempting to get into the aisle, time spent stationary in the aisle and time spent 
queuing at the exit. A CWT is determined for each passenger in the evacuation 
simulation.
The Exit Ready Time is the time required for the exit to be opened and made ready for 
use. The Exit Ready Time is an attribute assigned to each exit as part of the scenario 
definition. In these scenarios, the Exit Ready Time is set to 10.7 seconds so as to 
remove the Exit Ready Time variable. This time has been derived from the analysis 
of certification data (see Section 3.9).
The Off-Time is the time required for the passenger to reach the ground once they 
have mounted the slide. Like the passenger Exit Delay Time, this is derived from 
certification data. However, in this thesis off-times are always taken as zero. If on- 
ground times are desired, a suitable slide time can be added to the TET.
The Flow Rate parameter calculates the number of passengers that would evacuate 
within one minute of flow (see Equation (11)). The total number of passengers that 
have evacuated (PAX) is divided by the total flow time (TFT) for each exit (/). This 
yields the average number of passengers that evacuate for each second of the total 
flow time. This is multiplied by sixty to convert the measure to passengers/minute.
PAX, 
Flow rate (pa$isengers/minute)= 
lr 1 i 
TFTi= Total Flow Time for exit 
Number of passengers that evacuated via exit 
The flow rate calculation reflects an average flow rate calculated from the total flow 
time of the exit. It does not provide information regarding the quality of the flow 
during specific periods, but merely forms an average for the total period of flow. 
Thus two very different patterns of flow could yield the same flow rate. It is therefore 
important to consider the pattern of flow in conjunction with the flow rate calculation.
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In aircraft which have more than one exit available for evacuation, the total 
evacuation time will typically be reduced if the flow through each exit terminates at 
the same time. In optimal evacuation situations exit flows will be completed at 
approximately the same time. Sub-optimal cases occur when one or more exits 
exhaust their supply of paxs before the remaining exits.
As a measure of optimal performance FSEG have developed a statistic known as the 
OPS or Optimal Performance Statistic. The OPS measure has been described in detail 
in previous papers [37]. The OPS can be calculated for each evacuation, providing a 
measure of the degree of performance. The OPS is defined as follows,
(n-l)*TET
number of exits used in the evacuation,
Exit Evacuation Time (time last pax out) of Exit (seconds),
Total Evacuation Time (seconds) i.e. 
While it is unlikely that an aircraft will achieve an OPS = 0, near optimal performance 
will be marked by very low values of OPS. Selecting an acceptable value for OPS is 
somewhat arbitrary. For the purposes of this report we will consider OPS values of 
0.1 or less as being optimal.
It is informative to plot the total evacuation time for an evacuation trial (or evacuation 
simulation) against the OPS, producing a plot similar to Figure 20.
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Figure 20: The four quadrants of evacuation time and performance level
The graph can be segmented into four quadrants linking the efficiency with which the 
aircraft evacuation was accomplished with the time required for the evacuation. 
These quadrants represent:
Quadrant 1, Bottom left: 
Quadrant 2, Top left: 
Quadrant 3, Bottom right: 
Quadrant 4, Top right:
Optimal evacuation with TET below 90 seconds 
Optimal evacuation with TET above 90 seconds 
Sub-optimal evacuation with TET below 90 seconds 
Sub-optimal evacuation with TET above 90 seconds
Depending on where the data point falls, various conclusions can be drawn 
concerning the performance of the aircraft. If the evacuation is repeated many times a 
scatter plot can be created. Whilst it is interesting to note where the bulk of the 
evacuations are positioned it is also useful to note the location of outliers.
An aircraft that repeatedly produces data points that are and 
(Quadrant 2) suggests that even when an evacuation is performed in an optimal 
manner the aircraft cannot achieve a TET of less than 90-seconds. In such aircraft, 
the evacuation procedures appear to be working as the passengers are well distributed 
between exits, yet the evacuation time is excessive. This would suggest that there is a 
fundamental design problem with the configuration of the aircraft.
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At the opposite end of the spectrum are aircraft that produce evacuation times that are 
yet the TET is (Quadrant 4). These aircraft are capable 
of generating acceptable evacuation times even when the evacuation is sub-optimal. 
Aircraft with the majority of evacuations within this quadrant demonstrate the 
desirable quality of being robust, as they are able to pass the 90-second criteria even 
when the evacuation efficiency is relatively low. This is a desirable property as it 
suggests that even when things go wrong with the crew procedures, it may still be 
possible to produce fast evacuation times. Furthermore, aircraft displaying this 
property are capable of producing improved evacuation times through procedural 
improvements such as the introduction of better passenger management procedures or 
better trained crew or configurationally through the introduction of an improved 
passenger distribution within the cabin.
An aircraft that generates evacuation times that are and 
(Quadrant 3), while failing the 90-second criteria may still have the potential to 
improve its performance without requiring a major change to the configuration of the 
cabin. This suggests that the introduction of improved procedures or better trained 
crew may result in a reduction in evacuation times. However, this also suggests that 
the aircraft evacuation time is susceptible to suboptimal crew performance. If the 
crew perform in a suboptimal manner the evacuation time may become excessive. It 
should be noted that it is not recommended that complex and elaborate crew 
procedures be introduced simply to pass the 90 second criteria. It is also essential that 
the crew procedures are viable under actual emergency situations possibly involving 
fire.
Evacuation times that fall within the Quadrant 1 are both and have TETs 
These aircraft have performed well and represent a good balance 
between procedures and configuration. It is unlikely that better times can be achieved 
for aircraft in this quadrant through procedural improvements. Evacuations within this 
quadrant are to be expected from a well orchestrated evacuation of a relatively good 
design.
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3.13 Discussion of the current deficiencies of airEXODUS and their 
relation to the field of evacuation modelling
This section describes the key deficiencies of the airEXODUS evacuation model in 
the context of aircraft evacuation modelling technologies. In doing so it is possible to 
establish key areas that are in need of development in order to advance the field of 
evacuation modelling.
The first key criticism of airEXODUS when used for certification applications is the 
relatively small quantity and piece meal approach that has been taken to its validation 
thus far. Indeed the lack of systematic validation is not unique to airEXODUS but 
applies to the entire field of aircraft evacuation model. In order for evacuation 
modelling to be considered as a viable tool for the certification and design of aircraft 
it is critical that this area is addressed and that a more rigorous and systematic 
approach to validation is adopted.
The second criticism is its limited capabilities when simulating cabin crew behaviour. 
Whilst airEXODUS can currently model an deterministic imposed crew performance, 
it cannot predict the impact of crew procedures or provide insight into any proposed 
design. In real accidents and 90-second certification trials crew redirect/bypass 
passengers to/from exits within the cabin, as they react to the developing evacuation 
scenario. Whilst some basic explicit crew simulation is provided, such as 
opening/closing exits etc, this very important procedure is absent from the model.
In the context of the field of evacuation modelling technology in general, it is true that 
AIREVAC and GPSS had a rudimentary system of cabin crew redirection. However, 
these were based on simply counting the number of users for each exit and did not 
take into account the numerous likely factors that influence crew cabin management 
procedures. Indeed this was recognised by a report by the Office of Technical 
Assessment for the US congress in 1993 [1], which highlighted the inability of 
mathematical evacuation assessment models to simulate operator procedures. Thus, 
this failing must, again, be considered as a failing in the field of aircraft evacuation 
modelling.
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The final criticism of airEXODUS V3.0 is that the basis for human behaviour is 
relatively simplistic. Within airEXODUS V3.0 passengers have no knowledge of the 
exits that they are going to use and merely know the next best node to occupy. In 
essence this dictates that passengers plan their route on a step by step basis essentially 
looking at their feet as they walk. In addition passengers do not have a mechanism for 
making decisions based on information obtained from the environment through their 
senses. This can lead to passengers blindly walking towards congested areas when 
alternative paths may exist. Likewise, the effects of smoke are limited.
As discussed in the previous chapter some other evacuation models have rudimentary 
decision based movement models for passenger route choice and exit selection. 
However, they are all very simplistic and none contain a satisfactory set of influences 
on passenger behaviour. Ideally, any decision making model should be empirically 
based and consider the multitude of possible influences such as: the flow pattern within 
the aircraft cabin and the density of passengers within the cabin, the environmental 
effects within the cabin (i.e. smoke, etc), the visibility afforded to each person within 
the cabin, and the effects of cabin crew on their decision making processes. The lack of 
a sufficiently detailed decision making model should, again, be considered a failing of 
the field of aircraft evacuation modelling technology.
3.14 Concluding remarks
This section has provided a detailed overview of the mechanics of the airEXODUS
evacuation model and its current capabilities and when taken with Chapter 2 provides 
an answer to the question 
This chapter has highlighted three main shortcomings of V3.0 of the airEXODUS 
model, they are,
1. the limited quantity of validation,
2. the limited ability of the model to represent crew procedures in both 90- 
second certification trials and real emergency evacuations,
3. the rudimentary/unadaptive and in some cases lack of models of human 
behaviour in real emergency scenarios.
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The three issues that were highlighted should be considered as failings in the field of 
aircraft evacuation modelling in general and block the progression of this technology 
in becoming viable tools for the certification and design of passenger aircraft. As 
such each of these issues will be tackled in turn in the remainder of this thesis and in 
doing so evacuation modelling technology advanced.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter poses and to some degree answers the 
In this context, this chapter examines 
the capabilities of the airEXODUS to simulate the current aircraft evacuation 
performance benchmark - the 90-seconds certification trial. This involves subjecting 
the model to a battery of qualitative and quantitative tests. In order for the user to 
have confidence in the results produced by the evacuation model, it is crucial that 
they are comprehensively evaluated and as much as possible shown to be accurate. 
This section undertakes such an assessment.
In the validation study undertaken in this chapter, the 90-second certification trials of 
four previously certified wide-bodied and two previously certified narrow-bodied 
aircraft will be simulated. This evaluation will assess the performance of the model 
in two ways. Firstly, its underlying accuracy at reproducing the results of 90-second 
certification trails is assessed. This can be achieved via using the data from the actual 
trails to specify model parameters a technique that is explained in more detail later. 
Using this technique the fundamental accuracy of the model can be gauged using the 
'best' information that is available. Following from this, the capability of 
airEXODUS when used to predict the results of 90-second certification trials is 
evaluated. When used to predict the results of a 90-second certification trial the 
model is configured with 'generalised data' (in essence 'average data') based on 
performance levels measured from many aircraft evacuations. This approach will 
allow an assessment of the accuracy of the model when used to predict future 90- 
second certification trials.
Using these techniques the most comprehensive set of aircraft evacuation model 
validation is performed to date. In doing so, arguments as to the fundamental validity 
of the 90-second certification trial methodology as a means of ranking aircraft 
evacuation performance are raised.
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4.2 The certification trial cases
This section details the certification trial cases that will be utilised in the validation
analysis presented in this report.
Before continuing it is important to appreciate the limitations of data derived from 
certification trials when used to validate aircraft evacuation models. This section 
provides a brief discussion of the use of certification trial data for validating aircraft 
evacuation models. More general information concerning the validation of aircraft 
evacuation models can be found in the work of Galea [41] and has already been 
discussed (see Section 2.3.2).
It is important to appreciate that a single certification trial result for a particular aircraft 
should not be taken or assumed to represent the mean TET for the trial, as the single 
data point could lie anywhere on a frequency distribution of likely results (see Figure 
21). In the same way, a single airEXODUS simulation generates only a single TET 
data point. However, unlike certification trials, it is possible to run airEXODUS many 
times to generate a distribution of TETs that reflects the variation within the 
experimental scenario. Thus, airEXODUS is typically used to generate a TET 
distribution. It is from the airEXODUS generated TET distribution that a mean TET 
can be derived.
Figure 21: Hypothetical Distribution of the Probability of Specific Total Evacuation Times
102
______________Chapter 4_____________________
Difficulties arise when comparing a mean TET generated by airEXODUS with a single 
data point from a single 90-second certification trial. When comparing model 
predictions with the trial result, a positive agreement would be achieved if the actual 
certification trial result falls within the predicted distribution. It is difficult to make a 
more definitive statement concerning the actual trial result and the model predictions. 
A more demanding comparison between model predictions and experimental results 
can be made by comparing the predicted time out for each passenger with that derived 
from the certification trial. In this case, the trial results are compared with the window 
of predicted results generated by taking the maximum and minimum time out for each 
passenger throughout the entire range of repeat simulations.
In order to undertake a detailed evacuation analysis requires a significant amount of
effort. It was therefore not practical to attempt to perform validation analysis on all the 
certification trials available (22 in total). It was therefore necessary to select 
appropriate cases for analysis. Primary selection was dictated by the provision of a 
detailed aircraft cabin layout description in the certification trial documentation. 
Having established that a suitable diagram existed and that a model could therefore be 
defined, additional filtering criteria were applied to the certification trials.
It would advantageous to indicate whether airEXODUS can predict the potentially 
small differences that may arise between derivative aircraft belonging to a single 
aircraft family. Thus, derivative aircraft were favoured by the author - both narrow- 
and wide-bodied aircraft. In addition, it was desirable to select aircraft that had a variety 
of exit types.
In order for the results of airEXODUS to be comparable to the results of a certification 
trial the OPS values for both should be similar. Optimality, as measured by the OPS 
parameter - i.e. OPS values less than 0.1 - is a good baseline to adopt as it indicates that 
the aircraft evacuation was well executed. An OPS score was calculated for each of 
the candidate cases. Where the optimality was above the critical value of 0.1, the 
certification trial case was rejected. Problems may arise when cases are selected with 
an OPS = 0.1. These are border line cases that may display considerable sub-optimality 
in some areas.
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Those certification trial cases that were considered optimal - i.e. OPS < 0.1 - were then 
examined for significant cabin crew intervention such as directed bypass or passenger 
initiated redirection. Cabin crew directed bypass is defined as a procedure in which a 
cabin crewmember redirects passengers past an exit in the cabin section to another exit 
in the cabin section. This is employed to more evenly balance the number of 
passengers to the exits given their evacuation capabilities. Passenger initiated 
redirection is where passengers redirect from their initial exit choice to an alternative 
exit. Both of the above could lead to significant periods of exit non-flow or single lane 
flow. Furthermore as mentioned in the previous chapter airEXODUS does not 
currently have an adequate representation of cabin crew procedures. Thus, where cabin 
crew directed bypass and/or passenger initiated redirection had a major affect on the 
evacuation the cases were discounted.
A final check for serious abnormalities - such as passengers refusing to evacuate - were 
then undertaken. Where found these cases were also rejected on the grounds that they 
would be difficult to model and even more difficult to predict. The selection process 
resulted in a total of six certification trials. Four aircraft were wide bodied and two 
were narrow bodied. Of the four wide-bodied aircraft three were derivatives of the 
same series. Both of the narrow-bodied aircraft were derivatives of the same series. 
Finding suitable narrow-body cases for examination was difficult either because the 
certification video footage was quite old and difficult to study in detail, or the cases 
failed or nearly failed the selection criteria. As a result, the two narrow-body cases 
finally selected are less than ideal but are the best of the cases available.
This certification trial was the first in a series of derivative wide-bodied aircraft that 
were studied. The aircraft seated 255 passengers and was configured with three pairs of 
exits. Type-A exits were positioned at either end of the passenger cabin sections. 
These exits were labelled Rl and R3. A pair of Type-in over wing exits accessible 
over seating was located at approximately the centre of the cabin section, 
approximately in line with the wing. This exit was designated L2. Seat rows were in a
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2-3-2 configuration with each seat row separated by an aisle. The cabin section was 
div le in the centre of the cabin.
The last passenger evacuated the cabin section via the Rl exit after 83.7 seconds. 
Calculating an OPS score (see Equation 2) for trial case 1 reveals that this aircraft meets 
the OPS criterion (OPS < 0.1) scoring a value of The majority of the passengers 
evacuated via the forward and aft Type-A exits. The type-El overwing exit generated 
much lower flowrates than the forward and aft Type-A exits. Manufacturer procedures 
for this aircraft indicated to the crew that only a small number of passengers should use 
the over wing exits as their flow rates were likely to be low. Some cabin crew directed 
passenger bypass occurred during this certification trial. In the certification trial 
approximately 6% of those passengers that evacuated via the Rl exit were bypassed 
from the Type-in over wing exit. This resulted in a 3 second period of passenger 'no- 
flow' at the Rl exit towards the end of the evacuation. No bypass to other exits was 
observed.
This aircraft seated 285 passengers and was configured with four pairs of exits. Type-A 
exits were located at both the forward and aft end of the cabin section and are labelled 
Rl and R4. Two Type-lH over wing exits were positioned in the centre of the cabin 
section and are labelled R2 and R3. The two Type-Hi exits were positioned adjacent to 
each other. These Type-IH exits were accessed via a small clear space vestibule 
common to both Type-El exits. Seat rows were in the 2-3-2 configuration with an aisle 
separating each seat block. The total passenger seating was divided into two sections 
by a cross aisle in the centre of the cabin section adjacent to the two Type-HI exits. The 
last passenger evacuated the cabin at seconds via the R3 Type-El over wing exit. 
This trail generated an OPS score of thereby satisfying our certification criterion 
(OPS < 0.1). The Type-A exits evacuated the majority of the passengers which 
conformed to the manufacturer's procedures for this aircraft, which indicated to cabin 
crew that these exits would achieve higher flow rates than the Type-El exits and should 
therefore receive more passengers. During the certification trial the Rl and R4 exits 
generated much higher flow rates than the mid-section Type-IE exits. The cabin crew 
at the Type-IE exit bypassed some passengers. The bypass resulted in passengers 
switching from one Type-IE exit to another. The alternative Type-IE exit was
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positioned immediately adjacent (within 0.5 metres). Any resulting delay to 
passengers' evacuation is considered minimal.
This aircraft is the most recent in the series of derivative wide-bodied aircraft that is 
examined as part of this study. This aircraft seats 351 passengers. The aircraft 
contains four pairs of exits. Type-A exits were positioned in the forward and aft 
sections and are labelled Rl and L4. A canted Type-A exit was positioned just before 
the leading edge of the wing and was labelled R2. A Type-I exit was positioned just 
after the trailing edge of the wing and was labelled L3. The cabin section was divided 
into three seating sections by a cross aisle and clear space vestibule area. In each 
seating section the seat rows were generally in the 2-4-2 configuration with each seat 
block separated by an aisle.
The last passenger evacuated the cabin section after 71.7 seconds via the Rl exit. 
Calculating an OPS score for this case yields a value of and therefore meets our 
optimality criterion (OPS < 0.1). The three Type-A exits generated higher flow rates 
than the mid-section Type-I exit. Some cabin crew directed bypass occurred during this 
certification trial. Ten percent of those passengers that evacuated via the Rl exit were 
bypassed from the mid-section. Of the passengers that evacuated via the aft exit (L4), 
eight percent were bypassed from the mid section. None of these bypass operations 
resulted in periods of exit 'non-flow'.
This aircraft is from a different family of wide-bodied aircraft to the previous derivative 
aircraft series. The aircraft seated 440 passenger and was configured with four Type-A 
exits. The two mid-section exits were canted. From forward to aft the exits were 
labelled Seat rows were generally in the 3-4-3 configuration with each seat 
block separated by an aisle. The fuselage tapered at the forward and aft positions, thus 
the number of seats abreast was reduced in these areas. The cabin section was broken 
into three sections by cross aisles and clear space vestibule areas adjacent to the mid- 
section exits.
The last passenger evacuated the cabin section via the LI exit after seconds. An 
OPS score of was generated by this certification trial and the evacuation is 
therefore classed as optimal (OPS < 0.1). The majority of passengers evacuated via the
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mid-section exits. The bias towards more passengers evacuating via the mid-section 
exits, resulted from the mid-section exit's comparatively high flow rates coupled with a 
low OPS value for the aircraft as whole. Some cabin crew directed bypass occurred 
during this certification trial. This resulted in approximately a third of the passengers 
that evacuated via the Rl exit and of passengers that evacuated via R4 exit being 
bypassed from the mid-section.
This certification trial is the first in a series of derivative narrow-bodied aircraft that was 
examined. The aircraft seated 149 passengers and had three pairs of exits in total. 
Type-C exits were positioned at either end of the passenger cabin sections. These exits 
have been labelled Rl and R3. A further pair of Type-in over wing exits accessible 
over seating was located at approximately the centre of the cabin section, 
approximately in line with the wing. This exit was designated as R2. Seat rows were 
in a 3-3 configuration with a central separating aisle.
The last passenger evacuated the cabin section through the R2 exit after seconds. 
This aircraft meets the optimality criterion (OPS < 0.1) scoring a value of The 
majority of passengers evacuated via the forward and aft exits (Rl and R3). These exits 
generated the highest flow rates. A small number of passengers evacuated through the 
centrally located over wing exit (R2). This exit generated the lowest flow rate. Some 
cabin crew directed passenger bypass occurred during this certification trial. Flight and 
cabin crew had taken up positions in an aisle seat two/three rows forward and aft of the 
Type-in exit performed some passenger redirection. In the certification trial 
approximately 5% of those passengers that evacuated via the Rl exit were bypassed 
from the Type-in over wing exit. The bypass did not result in any major periods of exit 
inactivity, i.e. non-flow. Bypass was not observed to other exits.
This certification trial was the second in the series of derivative narrow-bodied aircraft 
examined in this report. This aircraft seated 188 passengers and was configured with 
four pairs of exits in total. Type-C exits were positioned at either end of the passenger 
cabin. These exits have been labelled Rl and R4. Two pairs of Type-in over wing 
exits accessible over seating were located at approximately the centre of the cabin 
section, roughly in line with the wing. These exits were designated as R2 and R3. The
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two Type-in exits were positioned in adjacent seat rows. Seat rows were in a 3-3 
configuration with a central separating aisle.
The last passenger evacuated the cabin section at 78.5 seconds through R2. An OPS 
score of 0.1 was calculated from the exit finishing times and just meets our optimality 
criterion (OPS < 0.1). The two Type-C exits generated relatively high flow rates 
compared with the two Type-in exits. The cabin crew created a split in the cabin 
section such that the majority of passengers evacuated via the Type-C exit positioned at 
the forward and aft of the aircraft. Examination of video footage of this certification 
trial revealed that the only bypass that occurred was locally between the adjacent R2 
and R3 exits. The forward exit (Rl) finished evacuating passengers before the other 
exits. This is reflected in the OPS score of generated by the certification trial. This 
indicates that some passengers at the R2 and R3 exits could have been bypassed 
towards the Rl exit. Should this have occurred, it is likely that both the evacuation time 
and optimality score of this certification trial would be reduced.
4.3 Model configuration
As mentioned previously two settings for the passenger Exit Delay Time and Exit
Ready Time parameters will be used for each certification trial case that will be 
considered in this study.
The first setting is referred to as the 'Actual data'. The Actual data settings represent 
the actual passenger exit delay and exit ready times extracted from video evidence of 
each exit on each aircraft. This parameter represents the actual timings exhibited 
during the certification trials. Using the 'Actual data' setting should enable 
airEXODUS to model the Exit Delay Times and Exit Ready Times achieved on the day 
as accurately as possible. This will demonstrate the ability of airEXODUS to reproduce 
the results of a certification trial when given the actual data from the certification trial.
The second setting is referred to as the 'Generalised data'. The Generalised data 
represents an average setting that has been derived from multiple certification trials. 
Use of the generalised passenger exit delay time data enables airEXODUS to make 
predictions of the evacuation performance of new configurations, based upon the
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average performance derived from the analysis of many previous certification trials. 
Generalised settings have been determined for each of the five exit types.
While airEXODUS has the ability to represent "extreme" passenger behaviour of the
type reported in actual aviation accidents [90,6], such as seat jumping, this type of 
behaviour is not included in this assessment as they are not considered features of the 
90-second certification scenario. All the cases considered here are run under 
certification evacuation conditions involving:
  Half the total number of aircraft exits,
  Assertive cabin crew located at each Type-A exit,
  Orderly passenger behaviour of the type found in certification evacuations,
  Each exit being made ready in a representative time derived from past relevant 
certification tests.
An optimal distribution of passengers to each exit was determined for all of the 
aircraft considered in this study. In this way the model was configured so that it was 
likely that an optimal evacuation would be achieved. As the model was set up to 
produce optimal results, adaptive procedures such as cabin crew initiated bypass or 
passenger initiated redirection were not explicitly modelled.
Passengers defined in airEXODUS are created using the 90-second Population
function available in the software. This function generates the required numbers of 
passengers according to the specified mix (in terms of age and gender) as set out in 
FAR 25.803 [12]. In addition, the Patience attribute was set at a very large value for 
all the simulations in order to model a compliant (non-competitive) population. 
Passengers when attributed with infinite patience will always wait patiently in queues 
whilst moving towards their nearest exit. Listed in Table 9 are the range of core 
attributes generated for the passenger populations.
Table 9: Core passenger attribute ranges used in the airEXODUS simulations
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A schematic of the interior cabin arrangement of each aircraft was provided with each
of the certification trial reports. From these diagrams, the aircraft geometries were 
constructed within the model using techniques that have been described in previous 
work [37,38,44-47,41] and this thesis (see Chapter 3).
Once the aircraft geometries were defined within airEXODUS and populated with
representative passengers two different sets of scenarios were defined. To ensure that 
the base models for each of the scenarios were identical in every respect the aircraft 
models were cloned.
To define the two scenarios the first clone was assigned passenger exit delay times and 
exit ready times in accordance with the actual data (see Section 4.2). The passenger 
exit delay times and exit ready times of the second clone were then set in accordance 
with the generalised settings (see Section 4.2). This procedure yielded two slightly 
different scenarios for each aircraft (see Table 10). The first scenario made use of the 
actual data from the certification trial whereas the second scenario made use of 
generalised data.
Table 10: Scenario description for each of the validation cases
4.4 Results and discussion of the wide-bodied validation scenarios
This section evaluates the ability of airEXODUS to reproduce the results of the 
certification trials using the actual passenger exit delay times and exit ready times. 
This series of validation cases will give an indication of how close airEXODUS can 
get to the results of the actual certification trial.
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As the certification trial is a benchmark it provides us with a way of ranking aircraft 
evacuation performance. For the computer model to be considered representative of, or 
equivalent to the certification trial, the ranking of aircraft by the model should be 
broadly equivalent to that generated by the trial. In this section the ability of 
airEXODUS to rank aircraft will be examined.
A summary of the trial results and the model predictions can be found in Table 11 and 
Figure 22. For the family of derivative aircraft, the rank ordering of the certification 
trial results places Case 3 with the quickest evacuation time, followed by Case 2 and 
lastly case 1. Examination of the data in Table 11 demonstrates that airEXODUS 
reproduces the same rank ordering when the mean time from the airEXODUS 
distribution is used to rank the aircraft.
Table 11: Trial and airEXODUS results for certification trial cases 1-4 using the actual data
Furthermore, the relative differences between the various aircraft performances 
generated by airEXODUS match those observed in the actual certification trials. Closer 
examination of Figure 22(a) reveals that the difference between the certification trials 
(Dashed lines in Figure 22) of Case 2 and Case 3 were only small, i.e. the dashed lines 
are close together, whereas the difference between certification trials of Case 2 and 
Case 1 was large. It can be seen in Figure 22(a) that airEXODUS broadly reproduces 
these features. The airEXODUS generated TET frequency distributions of Case 2 and 
Case 3 are relatively close together, whereas the airEXODUS generated TET frequency 
distributions of Case 2 and Case 1 are reasonably far apart.
At this point it is important to raise a note of caution in the above analysis concerning 
the rank ordering of the aircraft. As the actual performance (and model simulated 
performance) of an aircraft is defined by a probability distribution, it is possible for the 
rank ordering of the aircraft - as gauged by a single data point - might change with 
repeated trials. Thus the rank ordering achieved by the certification trials single data
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point is not truly indicative of the rank ordering of the performance capabilities of the 
aircraft. This will be the case if the probability distributions for any two aircraft overlap.
To demonstrate this let us assume that the model generated probability distributions for 
each aircraft accurately represents the actual frequency distribution. We see from 
Figure 22b that these frequency distributions all overlap to a certain extent. Thus if we 
were to select one time at random from each distribution to represent that actual time 
achieved in the certification trial we would obtain a particular rank order. If we were to 
select a second point at random from each distribution it is possible that we would 
obtain a completely different rank ordering - due to the overlap. Thus the rank 
ordering achieved in the certification trials cannot be taken as a definitive measure of 
the relative ranking and hence relative performance of the aircraft. Thus, it may in fact 
be fortuitous that the rank ordering achieved by airEXODUS and the certification trials 
agree. This issue is further discussed in Section 4.7.
To summarise, airEXODUS has demonstrated that it is able to reproduce the rank order 
of each of the derivative aircraft. Furthermore airEXODUS is capable of capturing the 
relative differences in the performances of each of the derivative aircraft. However, the 
rank ordering produced by the certification trials is subject to variation due to the 
probabilistic nature of the trials.
The frequency distribution of TETs for Case 4 - which is not part of the family of 
aircraft examined in Cases 1-3 - is presented along with the results for the first three 
cases in Figure 22(b). Looking first at the times generated by the certification trials, it 
can be seen that the evacuation time measured in the certification trial of case 4 is 
positioned between the times measured for case 2 and case 1. It can be seen that the 
frequency distributions that were generated by airEXODUS demonstrate exactly the 
same ordering. In addition, the TET frequency distribution for Case 4 has been 
correctly placed in between the TET frequency distribution of Case 1 and Case 2. In 
other words, airEXODUS is able to correctly rank order all of the wide-bodied cases 
considered and in doing so capture the major quantitative differences between each of 
the cases.
112
Chapter 4
300 -, 
^ 250
M
C 
O
73 200
3
£
2 150 -f
o
§ 100o-
o>
"" 50 
0
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
TET (seconds) 
(a)
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
TET (seconds) 
(b)
Figure 22: Combination of frequency distributions generated by airEXODUS using the actual data (a) the derivative
cases 1- 3 and (b) all cases 1-4
Having established that airEXODUS can reproduce the general trends of the 
certification trials we now examine the differences between airEXODUS predictions 
and the evacuation times of the certification trials.
Table 12: Summary of the comparisons between the results of the certification trial cases and the 
airEXODUS results when using the actual data from the certification trials
Firstly, we note that in each case the evacuation time of the actual certification trial was 
within the range of values predicted by airEXODUS. hi other words, airEXODUS is 
generating results that include the result of the certification trial. Table 12 also reveals 
that the magnitude of the difference (in seconds) between the mean TET generated by 
airEXODUS and the evacuation time achieved in the certification trials. As shown, the 
differences range from 2.2 to 3.5 seconds with a mean absolute difference of 2.8 
seconds. These results suggest that when using the actual data from the certification 
trial airEXODUS can produce a mean TET that is within 3.0% to 4.9% of the result of 
the actual certification trial (or 3.7% on average).
In two cases the airEXODUS mean was higher than the result of the certification trial 
and in two cases the airEXODUS mean was lower thus, airEXODUS is not consistently
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over or under predicting the certification results. Furthermore, the degree of over- or 
under-prediction is small, with an average absolute mean difference of 3.7% (2.8 
seconds).
As mentioned previously, the evacuation time generated in each of the certification 
trials represents only one data point from a hypothetical distribution of data points. It 
could be that a certification trial that generated an evacuation time that was higher than 
the airEXODUS mean performed worse than the average certification trial of the 
aircraft. Conversely a certification trial that generated an evacuation time that was 
lower than the airEXODUS mean could have performed better than the average 
certification trial of particular aircraft. The differences between the mean TETs of 
airEXODUS and the evacuation time of the certification trials could originate from A) 
error in airEXODUS at simulating the events and/or B) the intrinsic unreliability 
associated with performing a single certification trial.
In conclusion, given the lack of multiple data points for each certification trial it is 
difficult to make definitive statements concerning how accurate airEXODUS 
reproduces the certification trials. However, we can improve our level of confidence 
through the number of certification trials with which airEXODUS is compared. 
airEXODUS has consistently shown that it is capable of producing a range of TETs that 
both include the evacuation time generated in the certification trial and produce a mean 
that is reasonably close to the evacuation time of the certification trial. More 
confidence can be derived from the fact that airEXODUS is reproducing the 
comparative trends, i.e. the correct rank order of the aircraft.
The previous section demonstrated that airEXODUS could reproduce the results of 
certification trials with reasonable accuracy when supplied with the actual data from the 
certification trial. In the absence of data from the actual certification trial, airEXODUS 
makes use of generalised data appropriate to the exit type. This generalised data is 
based upon numerous previous evacuation certification trials. If demonstrated as 
feasible, this approach allows a based on a appropriate generalised data for
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the aircraft. In this section we re-evaluate the certification trials using the generalised 
data within airEXODUS.
Generalised data will be applied to both passenger exit delays and to the time required 
to ready an exit for use. In these cases cabin crew performance is uniformly fixed as 
assertive. The time required to ready an exit for use will be set to an average value that 
was derived from the analysis of certification trials (see Section 4.2.3). Apart from the 
aforementioned variables all of the parameters will remain identical to the previous 
section. This will enable a direct comparison with the results using the actual data.
A summary of the trial results and the model predictions can be found in Table 13 and 
Figure 23. Examination of the data in Table 13 demonstrates that, when using the 
generalised data, airEXODUS is still capable of reproducing the same rank ordering of 
aircraft performance as is achieved in the actual certification trials.
Table 13: Trial and airEXODUS results and rank order for certification trial cases 1-4 using the
generalised data
Once again, it is important to note that the rank ordering produced by the certification 
trials should not be taken to indicate a definitive rank ordering due to the probabilistic 
nature of evacuation performance.
Having established that airEXODUS can predict the general trends, i.e. rank ordering, 
of the certification trials, we can now examine how the means of the TETs generated by 
airEXODUS compare with the measured evacuation time of the certification trials. 
Similarly to the reconstruction cases of the previous sections, confidence in the 
predictive ability of the model using generalised data can be derived from the fact that 
in every case the evacuation time of the certification trial was within the range of values 
predicted by airEXODUS. When using the generalised data airEXODUS predicts 
TETs that include the evacuation time of the certification trial.
115
_____________________Chapter 4_____________________
The differences between the airEXODUS mean TET and the evacuation time of the 
certification trials is shown in Table 14. It can be seen that the difference between the 
airEXODUS mean TETs and the evacuation time measured in the actual certification 
trials range from 0.5 to 3.5 seconds (0.8% to 4.7%). Two of the cases generated mean 
TETs that were very close to the TET of the certification trial, i.e. 1.2% (1.0 seconds) 
and 0.8% (0.5 seconds). The remaining two cases were within 4.7% of the measured 
result.
The mean absolute difference across all cases was 2.8% (2.1 seconds). Returning to 
the results from the certification reproduction cases (i.e. using the actual data), we note 
from Table 12 that the maximum difference between the airEXODUS mean and the 
actual evacuation time achieved in the certification trials was 4.9% (3.5 seconds) with 
an average variation between all of the actual cases of 3.7% (2.8 seconds). Contrasting 
the results of the actual and generalised cases reveals that the results have not greatly 
altered.
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
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Figure 23: Combination of frequency distributions generated by airEXODUS using the generalised data for (a) the
derivative cases 1- 3 and (b) all cases 1-4
Table 14: Summary of the comparisons between the results of the certification trial cases and the
airEXODUS results when using the generalised data
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However, as is to be expected when using generalised data, there are some differences 
between the predicted and measured trends. For example, a feature of the certification 
trials was that the difference between the evacuation time of Case 3 and Case 2 was 
small (see the dashed lines on Figure 23(a)) while using the generalised data we predict 
a larger difference. The actual difference between the performance of these two aircraft 
was 0.9 seconds or 1.3%. Using the actual data, this difference was 2.2 seconds or 
3.2% while using the generalised data the difference was 4.8 seconds or 7.0%. Thus, 
while the rank ordering of the two aircraft is correctly predicted using the model, when 
the generalised data is used we have a greater relative difference between the 
performance of these two aircraft.
This can again be seen by comparing the relative performance achieved in Case 3 and 
Case 1. The actual difference between the performance of these two aircraft was 12 
seconds or 16.7%. Using the actual data, this difference was 18.4 seconds or 27.0% 
while using the generalised data the difference was 14.4 seconds or 21.1%. Once 
again, while the rank ordering of the two aircraft is correctly predicted using the model, 
when the generalised data is used we have a lower relative difference between the 
performance of these two aircraft.
Thus, while using the generalised data, the model has not been able to correctly predict 
the magnitude of the differences between the cases, the model has correctly predicted 
the trends in the differences, namely that the difference between Cases 3 and 2 will be 
relatively 'small' while the difference between Cases 3 and 1 will be relatively 'large'. 
Finally, it is worth recalling here that the trial results are only the result of a single 
experimental trial. Had more trial results been generated, the relative difference 
between the trial means could be very different.
To summarise, airEXODUS appears to be able to predict the results of the certification 
trial using the generalised data with at least as much accuracy as in the previous cases. 
In all of the wide-bodied cases the measured evacuation time of the certification trial is 
within the bounds of airEXODUS predictions. Additionally the difference between the 
airEXODUS generated means and the measured evacuation time of the certification 
trial is not significantly altered when using the generalised data compared with the 
actual data. While general trends in the results such as the rank ordering have been
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maintained, there are some differences in the nature of the frequency distributions 
produced by the generalised and actual data.
The ability of airEXODUS to generate TETs that are reasonably close to the evacuation 
time of the certification trial is of major importance. However, simply predicting the 
total evacuation time is insufficient as this is simply a measure of the degree to which 
the model fits only a single measured quantity (i.e. the TET). It is possible to arrive at 
a good estimate of the end point for all the wrong reasons, thereby providing a 
misleading representation of the aircraft performance. It is therefore also essential that 
the model correctly predicts the evolution of the evacuation.
One measure of the manner that the evacuation evolves is provided by cumulative exit 
performance. This is a measure of the total number of passengers to exit the aircraft in 
each second of the evacuation. The cumulative number of passengers who have exited 
the aircraft at every second during the certification trial can be compared against the 
results generated by airEXODUS. In this way the airEXODUS predictions can be 
compared against the performance of the certification trial throughout the evacuation.
In airEXODUS the personal evacuation time (PET) of each passenger is recorded. 
From this the cumulative number of passengers who have exited the aircraft in each 
second of the evacuation can be determined. This process can be repeated for each of 
the repeat simulations. For the series of simulations presented previously a simulation 
envelope can be defined by taking the minimum and maximum number of passengers 
who have exited the aircraft in each second. For the simulations considered here, each 
case was repeated 1000 times. The simulation envelope for each scenario represents 
the minimum and maximum from 1000 simulations. Thus, each of the 1000 repeat 
simulations will produce a curve that falls within the envelope. In addition, the median 
of the 1000 airEXODUS simulations can be determined.
This predicted window of cumulative exit timings can be compared with the actual 
results derived from each certification trial. In order to construct the cumulative exit 
curve for the certification trial it is necessary to study the video recording of the actual
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certification trial. Video recordings of each certification trial were inspected and the 
time that each passenger exited the aircraft was noted. Using this data, the cumulative 
number of passengers who have exited can be determined at every second of the actual 
evacuation. These results were then plotted as a function of time and compared with 
the model generated curves.
The airEXODUS cumulative exit envelope predicted using the actual data, together 
with the result of the certification trials for each of the four aircraft is shown in Figure 
24. As can be seen from the curves, initially there is a period during which no 
passengers evacuate whilst the doors are readied for use. This is typically followed by 
a short period during which the passenger flow is established. This is marked by the 
rapid initial increase in gradient at around 10 seconds. Very quickly the exits are at 
near maximum flow capacity, indicated in Figure 24 by a near constant positive 
gradient. This state persists for the majority of the evacuation. Near the end of the 
evacuation, when the supply of passengers to exits begins to diminish the gradient also 
begins to diminish. The flow terminates when there are no more passengers to 
evacuate.
It can be seen that airEXODUS predictions produce similar structure to the certification 
trial. This indicates that airEXODUS is predicting a similar chain of events to that 
which occurred during the certification trial.
Furthermore, it can be seen that the results from the certification trials, denoted by the 
black lines in Figure 24, are totally within the airEXODUS simulation envelopes for 
Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3. This suggests that at each second of the evacuation 
airEXODUS is producing a similar number of evacuees to that which occurred in the 
certification trial.
However, for Case 4 (B777-200) we note that between 35 and 60 seconds the 
certification trial curve crosses outside of the airEXODUS simulation envelope, but is 
within a +/-5% error band drawn around the minimum and maximum times. This 
minor departure from the simulation envelope indicates that the certification trial 
performed marginally better than airEXODUS during this period. This may result
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from an abnormally high exit flow rate during this period. Further examination 
reveals that it is a minor excursion from the airEXODUS envelope and that the results 
of the certification trial quickly return within the simulation envelope. In general it is 
apparent that at every second of the evacuation airEXODUS is generating similar 
results to the certification trials.
(d)
Figure 24: airEXODUS simulation envelope generated using the actual data and actual trial results for (a) Case 1, (b)
Case 2, (c) Case 3 and (d) Case 4
The airEXODUS simulation envelope generated using the generalised data can be 
seen in Figure 25. As described in the previous section, the curves generated by the 
generalised data follow the general trends observed in the trials. The envelopes are 
similar in shape to those generated using the actual data (see Figure 25). 
Furthermore, for each of the wide-bodied cases examined, for the vast majority of the 
evacuations, the certification trial curve falls within the simulation envelope 
generated by airEXODUS.
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Figure 25: airEXODUS simulation envelope generated using the generalised data for (a) Case 1, (b) Case 2, (c) Case 3
and (d) Case 4
As with the case for the actual data, we find that for Case 4 we note that between 40 
and 55 seconds the certification trial curve crosses outside of the airEXODUS 
simulation envelope, but is again within a +/-5% error band drawn around the 
minimum and maximum times. This minor departure from the simulation envelope 
indicates that the certification trial performed marginally better than airEXODUS 
during this period. In general it is apparent that at every second of the evacuation 
airEXODUS is generating similar results to the certification trials.
Several key points can be made from the analysis of the wide-bodied results: 
la) Using the actual data from specific certification trails, airEXODUS is able to 
produce distributions of Total Evacuation Times for each aircraft such that the actual 
trial data point is contained within the distribution.
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Ib) Using the generalised certification trial data, airEXODUS is able to predict
distributions of Total Evacuation Times for each aircraft such that the actual trial data
point is contained within the distribution.
2a) Using the actual data from the specific certification trials, airEXODUS was able to
successfully rank three derivative aircraft in the identical order that was achieved in the
certification trials. However, it should be noted that a ranking based on a single
certification trial result for each aircraft may not be indicative of the actual ranking of
the aircraft.
2b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS was able to successfully rank
three derivative aircraft in the identical order that was achieved in the certification
trials.
3a) Using the actual data from the specific certification trials, airEXODUS was able to
closely predict the relative and absolute differences between the rank ordering.
3b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS was able to closely predict the
relative differences between the rank ordering, while the absolute differences could not
be predicted with a high degree of certainty due to the natural differences that occur in
specific certification trials.
4a) Using the actual data from the specific certification trials, airEXODUS was able to
successfully rank the performance of an additional aircraft not related to the original
three derivative aircraft.
4b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS was able to successfully rank
the performance of an additional aircraft not related to the original three derivative
aircraft.
5a) Using the actual data from specific certification trials, airEXODUS predicted that
one of the four aircraft (one of the aircraft in the three aircraft derivative family), while
having a strong possibility of passing the certification trial, has a small probability that
it could fail the certification criterion.
5b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS predicted that the same
aircraft had a small probability of failing the certification criterion. However, the
probability of failure was smaller using the generalised data.
6) The cumulative exit curves for each of the four aircraft examined fall within the
numerical envelope predicted using airEXODUS and the generalised certification data.
This suggests that airEXODUS is capable of predicting the time evolution of the
evacuation using the generalised data.
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Thus, whether the model makes use of the generalised or actual trial data, an engineer 
using the model would come to the same conclusions regarding the TET of the aircraft 
and the evolution of the aircraft evacuation. Of more importance however, the mean 
TET predicted using the generalised data is a good indicator of the likely performance 
of the aircraft in the actual certification trial. In addition to predicting the mean TET 
and the evacuation evolution, the model can also estimate the likelihood of failure and 
identify potential problem areas with the cabin layout. This is an important conclusion 
as it suggests that airEXODUS has the capability of predicting the likely distribution of 
Total Evacuation Times under optimal certification conditions.
4.5 Results and discussion of the narrow-bodied validation scenarios
In this section we continue the validation of airEXODUS using data from narrow body
aircraft trials.
As in the wide-bodied aircraft analysis, the data will be utilised to establish how 
accurately airEXODUS can match the results of the actual certification trial. The actual 
distribution of passenger exit delay times experienced at each exit were extracted from 
the video record for each of the exits used on each aircraft and used in the simulations. 
Similarly the actual time required to ready each exit for use was measured and assigned 
to each of the exits within airEXODUS.
It can be seen that the rank ordering of the derivative narrow-bodied aircraft during their 
respective certification trials shows that Case 5 was the fastest and that Case 6 was the 
slowest (see Table 15). The mean TETs and rank ordering generated by airEXODUS 
can be seen in Table 15. It is apparent that when using the actual data airEXODUS 
ranks the aircraft in the same order as the certification trial.
Once again, it is important to note that the rank ordering produced by the certification 
trials should not be taken to indicate a definitive rank ordering due to the probabilistic 
nature of evacuation performance. This issue is further discussed in section 4.7.
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The airEXODUS generated frequency distribution for these aircraft can be seen in 
Figure 26. From the TET frequency distribution it is apparent that the relative 
differences between the two derivative narrow-bodied aircraft was greater in the 
certification trials (indicated by dashed lines) than predicted by airEXODUS.
Table 15: Trial and airEXODUS results and rank order for certification trial cases 5 and 6 using the
actual data
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Figure 26: Combination of frequency distributions generated by airEXODUS using the actual
data for the narrow-bodied derivative cases 5 and 6
The relative difference between the certification trial results for these two aircraft is 
14.4 seconds (see Table 15). However, the difference between the airEXODUS 
generated means for these two cases was only 2.5 seconds. Thus, while the 
airEXODUS simulations have correctly predicted the performance rank ordering of 
these two aircraft, the relative difference between the two aircraft has not been correctly 
predicted. airEXODUS predicts that the differences between the two aircraft are small 
while the trial results suggest that there is a more significant difference.
Table 16: Summary of comparison between the results of the certification trial cases and the 
airEXODUS predictions when using the actual data
airEXODUS results with an OPS > 0.1 are excluded
124
_____________________Chapter 4_____________________
However, the discrepancies that were noted in each case act so as to compound the 
differences between the two aircraft. In Case 5 airEXODUS generated a significant 
number of sub-optimal cases (38.4% were sub-optimal) which effectively increased the 
mean TET for these predictions. This had the effect of moving the TET frequency 
distribution towards longer evacuation times. In a report submitted to the CAA [49], it 
was demonstrated that if the sub-optimal cases were removed from the analysis - 
thereby bringing the simulations into line with the observed trial - the mean TET would 
be reduced from 70.5 seconds to 69.5 seconds. A reason for the failure of the model to 
generate a result similar to the trial is that the model lacks the capability of simulating 
crew redirection procedures which were employed during the actual certification trial. 
This issue was highlighted as a potential deficiency of V3.0 of the software and will be 
developed in later chapters of this thesis.
In Case 6, effectively the opposite problem occurred. In this case, the trial achieved a 
relatively poor level of optimality, producing an OPS = 0.1, compared with a predicted 
mean OPS of 0.05. This had the effect of pushing the predicted TET frequency 
distribution towards shorter evacuation times. Had a more optimal distribution of 
passengers been achieved during the trial, it is possible that the measured TET would 
have been reduced, bringing it closer to the predicted mean TET. When airEXODUS is 
configured to provide a similar level of OPS to that achieved in the trial the predicted 
mean TET is increased from 73.0 seconds to 76.0 seconds.
Taking these two factors into account, the difference between the predicted TETs for 
the two cases increases to 6.5 seconds, which is more inline with the observed 
difference. These two factors in conjunction with the limitations of having only a single 
trial data point for each case explain the variation in the relative differences.
To summarise, when using the actual data airEXODUS is able to successfully rank both 
of the narrow-bodied derivative aircraft. The mean absolute difference between the 
certification trial results and the mean TET generated by airEXODUS was 8.5%. This 
relatively large difference results from disparities in the levels of optimality that could 
be achieved in the airEXODUS simulations and that achieved during the actual
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certification trials. Should optimality in all of the cases have been low then the mean 
absolute difference would have been reduced.
The previous section demonstrated that airEXODUS could reproduce the results of 
certification trials with reasonable accuracy when supplied with the actual data from the 
certification trial. In the absence of data from the actual certification trial, airEXODUS 
makes use of generalised data appropriate to the exit type. This generalised data is 
based upon numerous previous evacuation certification trials. If demonstrated as 
feasible, this approach allows a based on a generalised data for the aircraft. 
In this section we re-evaluate the certification trials using the generalised data within 
airEXODUS.
Similar to the analysis of the wide-bodied aircraft, the generalised data will be applied 
to both passenger exit delays and to the time required to ready an exit for use. In these 
cases cabin crew performance is uniformly fixed as assertive. The time required to 
ready an exit for use will be set to an average value that was derived from the analysis 
of certification trials (see Section 4.2.3). Apart from the aforementioned variables all of 
the parameters will remain identical to the previous section. This will enable a direct 
comparison with the results using the actual data later in this report.
Table 17 shows the results of the certification trial evacuations and the mean TETs 
generated by airEXODUS when using the generalised data. As can be seen, the 
airEXODUS predictions generated using the generalised data rank the aircraft in the 
same order as was achieved in the actual certification trials i.e. the evacuation 
performance of Case 5 is better than the evacuation performance of Case 6.
Examination of the TET frequency distribution generated by airEXODUS when using 
the generalised data is shown as Figure 27. It can be seen that the relative difference 
between the evacuation times of the certification trial (indicated by the dashed lines) is 
greater than the relative difference between the maximum frequencies of the 
airEXODUS curves.
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The relative difference between the certification trial results for these two aircraft is 
14.4 seconds (see Table 17). However, the difference between the airEXODUS 
generated means for these two cases is seconds. Thus, while the airEXODUS 
simulations have correctly predicted the performance rank ordering of these two 
aircraft, the relative difference between the two aircraft has not been correctly 
predicted. airEXODUS predicts that the differences between the two aircraft are small 
while the trial results that there is a more significant difference.
Table 17: Trial, airEXODUS results and rank order for certification trial cases 5 and 6 using the
generalised data
Table 18: Summary of the comparisons between the results of the certification trial cases and the
airEXODUS results when using the generalised data
The difference between the airEXODUS mean TET and the certification results in each 
case is shown in Table 18. It can be seen that the mean TET generated by airEXODUS 
is relatively close (within 1.4% or 0.9 seconds) to the time recorded during the 
certification trial evacuation of Case 5. However the mean TET generated by 
airEXODUS in Case 6 is 11.6% (9.6 seconds) from the time recorded during the 
certification trial evacuation. The mean absolute difference between the airEXODUS 
means and the results of the certification trial is 6.5% (5.0 seconds). Whilst in Case 5 
the result of the certification trial falls within the range of TETs generated by 
airEXODUS, in Case 6 the result of the certification trial does not fall within the range 
of TETs generated by airEXODUS.
It is important to recall the disparity in the level of optimality achieved in airEXODUS 
and during the certification trial of Case 6. In addition to this, differences are expected 
to result when comparing an average performance of passengers and crew - the 
generalised data - against a single performance during a single evacuation.
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This is to be expected, as has already been discussed, the certification performance of 
the Case 5 was more optimal than one would normally expect while the certification 
performance of the Case 6 was considerably worse than the model indicates could be 
achieved, thus compounding the measured difference between the two aircraft.
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Figure 27: Combination of frequency distributions generated by airEXODUS using the 
generalised data for the narrow-bodied derivative cases 5 and 6
To summarise, when using the generalised data airEXODUS is able to rank the 
derivative narrow-bodied aircraft in the same order as the certification trials. The 
relative difference between the aircraft is not as pronounced as is suggested by the 
certification trial. This results in part from the relative sub-optimality of the 
certification trial evacuation for Case 6. The modelling results also suggest that both 
aircraft did not perform as would normally be expected, with the Case 5 performing 
better than expected and Case 6 performing considerably worse than expected. This 
highlights the difficulties in making comparisons based on only two data points from 
single evacuations.
In this section we examine the ability of airEXODUS to predict the evolution of the 
narrow-bodied aircraft evacuation. Recall from Section 4.4.3 that a simulation 
envelope can be determined from the results of airEXODUS. The results from the 
certification trial is then compared with the airEXODUS generated simulation 
envelope at every second of the evacuation.
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The airEXODUS cumulative exit envelope predicted using the actual data, together 
with the result of the certification trials for each of the two aircraft is shown in Figure 
24. As can be seen from the curves, initially there is a period during which no 
passengers evacuate whilst the doors are readied for use. This is typically followed 
by a short period during which the passenger flow is established. This is marked by 
the rapid initial increase in gradient at around 10 seconds. Very quickly the exits are 
at near maximum flow capacity, indicated in Figure 24 by a near constant positive 
gradient. This state persists for the majority of the evacuation. Near the end of the 
evacuation, when the supply of passengers to exits begins to diminish the gradient 
also begins to diminish. The flow terminates when there are no more passengers to 
evacuate.
The airEXODUS cumulative exit envelope predicted using the actual data, together 
with the result of the certification trials for each of the narrow body aircraft is shown in 
Figure 28. In Case 6, it can be seen that the result of the certification trial is within the 
bounds of the simulation envelope. However, Case 5 falls outside the bounds of the 
envelope initially and remains marginally outside the envelope for the first 35 seconds. 
This suggests that in Case 5, the model was initially under-predicting the speed at 
which the passengers were exiting the aircraft.
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Figure 28: The airEXODUS simulation envelopes generated using the actual data for (a) Case 5 and (b) Case 6
This discrepancy is quite small and is within a +/-10% error bands defined around the 
model window. Recall that the absence of cabin crew redirection in the airEXODUS 
models was proposed as a possible reason for the differences between the TETs 
generated by airEXODUS and that achieved during the 90-second certification trial.
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This explanation cannot explain the discrepancy shown in Figure 28 as cabin crew 
redirection procedures would not have an influence until near the end of the evacuation. 
A possible explanation of this discrepancy could be the nature of the population 
distribution generated by airEXODUS. For each of the 1000 repeat simulations each of 
the passengers had the same seating allocation. Thus if slow passengers were seated in 
crucial positions they would always be in those positions and thus could adversely 
affect the result of the simulation. After examining Case 5 it was found that this was 
indeed the situation. In this case, slow passengers with relatively long response times 
were situated in the front rows on the aisle seats. Thus they delayed the start up of the 
evacuation process and thus may have caused the initial discrepancy in the results. This 
is an important observation and has a bearing on the nature in which certification 
simulation cases should be run.
To investigate this possibility, simulations were repeated - with the same population as 
was used in Case 5 - but several different approaches were tried to randomise the 
population. In the first approach a single randomisation of the seating allocation was 
generated and the simulation repeated 1000 times. This generated a distribution with a 
mean TET of 68.8 seconds (see Table 19). This represents a reduction in TET of 1.7 
seconds or 2.4%. The second approach consisted of three randomised seat allocations 
each run 333 times and the third case consisted of 10 randomised seat allocations each 
run 100 times. As can be seen from Table 19 and Figure 29, each of the different 
randomised selections produced similar results and all of them are different to the 
original single randomised selection.
Table 19: Results from an airEXODUS sensitivity analysis for Case 5 of passenger seat allocations
using the actual data
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Figure 29: Results of airEXODUS when randomising passenger seating allocations for Case 5 using the Actual data 
Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 30, the numerical window of results better 
captures the trial curve when a randomisation of seating allocations is used.
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Figure 30: Results of airEXODUS when randomising passenger seating allocations for Case 5 using the Actual data
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The simulation envelopes generated by airEXODUS for the narrow body aircraft using 
the generalised data are depicted in Figure 31. It can be seen that in Case 5 the result of 
the certification trial is within the airEXODUS generated simulation envelope (see 
Figure 31 (a)) for practically the entire certification trial with the exception of the first 
few seconds of the evacuation. Thus, when using the generalised data in Case 5 
airEXODUS predicts a similar number of evacuees to the certification trial at every 
second of the evacuation.
The results for Case 6 fall marginally outside of the airEXODUS generated simulation 
envelope after approximately 30 seconds, but remain within or just exceeds a +/-5% 
tolerance window (see Figure 31(b)). This is consistent with the observation made 
earlier that this trial was considerably slower than would normally be expected for this 
type of aircraft configuration. Thus the results of airEXODUS are expected to be better 
than the results of the single certification trial.
Table 20: Summary of the result of an airEXODUS sensitivity analysis of the B737-300 to passenger
seat location when using the generalised data
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Figure 31: The airEXODUS simulation envelopes generated using the generalised data for (a) Case 5 and (b) Case 6
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In order to be consistent with the analysis using the actual data, Case 5 was run with 
several randomisations of the passenger seating allocation. The results are shown in 
Table 20 and Figure 32.
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Figure 32: Results of airEXODUS when randomising passenger seating locations for the case 5 using
the Generalised data
Several key points can be made from the analysis of the two narrow-bodied aircraft
validation cases:
la) Using the actual data from specific certification trails, airEXODUS is able to
produce distributions of Total Evacuation Times for each aircraft such that the actual
trial data point is contained within the distribution.
Ib) Using the generalised certification trial data, airEXODUS was able to predict the
distribution of Total Evacuation Times for one of the two aircraft such that the actual
trial data point is contained within the distribution. However, the level of optimality as
measured by the OPS for the simulation and the trial should be broadly in agreement.
2a) Using the actual data from the specific certification trials, airEXODUS was able to
successfully rank the two derivative aircraft in the identical order that was achieved in
the certification trials. However, it should be noted that a ranking based on a single
certification trial result for each aircraft may not be indicative of the actual ranking of
the aircraft.
2b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS was able to successfully rank
the two derivative aircraft in the identical order that was achieved in the certification
trials.
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3a) Using the actual data from the specific certification trials, airEXODUS did not
predict the relative and absolute differences between the rank ordering. However, it
should be noted that the relative differences between aircraft, like the ranking, based on
a single certification trial result for each aircraft may not be indicative of the actual
differences between the aircraft.
3b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS did not predict the relative and
absolute differences between the rank ordering.
4a) Using the actual data from specific certification trials, airEXODUS predicted that
both of the aircraft would pass the certification criterion.
4b) Using the generalised certification data, airEXODUS predicted that both of the
aircraft would pass the certification criterion.
5) The cumulative exit curves for each of the two aircraft examined fell within the 
numerical envelope predicted using airEXODUS and the generalised certification data 
or only marginally exceeded the envelope (within +/-5%). This suggests that 
airEXODUS is capable of predicting the time evolution of the evacuation using the 
generalised data.
6) The observed differences between the simulation predictions and the actual data are 
thought to be due to the natural variations that occur in specific certification trials. 
Indeed the two trials that were investigated are believed to be quicker than would 
normally be expected - for Case 5 - and slower than would be expected - for Case 6 - 
thus compounding the differences between the model predictions and actual data. 
However, two points have been noted concerning the use of and further development of 
the model. In terms of model use, it is important to generate randomisations of the 
seating allocations of passengers within the sequence of 1000 repeat simulations. In 
terms of model development, it would be desirable to develop an explicit capability to 
simulate crew instigated passenger by-pass.
7) For direct comparisons to be made between model predictions and trial results, 
similar levels of optimality must exist between the model and trial results. When 
quoting numerical results it is essential to not only quote the times achieved but also the 
levels of optimality achieved.
Finally, the general conclusions made for the wide-body aircraft apply equally well to 
the narrow-body aircraft.
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4.6 Interpretation of model performance
This work has shown that the same broad conclusions concerning aircraft
performance can be derived from simulations utilising the generalised data for exit 
hesitation times and exit opening times as simulations using the actual data. This 
suggests that the generalised data represents a good approximation for how key 
aircraft components will perform under certification applications. This provides the 
modelling and regulatory community with strong evidence to support the use of the 
generalised data for aircraft certification applications in which the standard 
configurations and components are being considered.
This general approach can be extended to situations in which the generalised data is 
not applicable, for example, when a new or significantly modified aircraft exit type is 
being used. In this situation, rigorous testing of the exit component is necessary in 
order to generate the appropriate data to use in the model. This testing should be 
sufficient to provide data of similar quality to that used to generate the existing 
generalised data.
In comparing the model predictions with the trial performance, we are attempting to
compare a single experimental data point of a variable known to be defined by a 
probability distribution i.e. TET, with a predicted probability distribution for the TET. 
In reality, the TET from the trial could be any point on the probability distribution. In 
this analysis, we have chosen to compare the trial data point with the mean from the 
predicted distribution of TETs.
Across the six aircraft studied, using the generalised data, airEXODUS was able to 
predict the TET on average to within 3.8% (variation of 0.8 - 11.6 %) or 2.8 
(variation of 0.5 - 11.6 seconds) (see Table 21). When using the actual data, 
airEXODUS was able to predict the TET on average to within 5.3% (variation of 3.0 
- 10.0 %) or 3.8 (variation of 2.2 - 6.4 seconds) (see Table 22).
Situations that created the largest error involved cases in which the level of optimality 
of the trial did not sufficiently match that of the simulation. In these cases larger
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errors are to be expected as strictly speaking, like is not being compared with like. 
Effectively, differing levels of optimality should be represented as different scenario 
specifications. It was also demonstrated that airEXODUS was correctly able to 
predict the evolution of the evacuation in virtually every case and only in cases where 
the optimality was borderline there was a slight divergence between measured and
model predictions.
Table 21: Summary of Trial and airEXODUS predictions using the generalised data
Table 22: Summary of Trial and airEXODUS predictions using the actual data
It is recommended that as an indication of the likely error in predicted results, the 
errors associated with the actual data should be taken as this represents a true 
indication of the predictive capability of the model.
4.7 Ranking aircraft performance
Using the mean TET from the predicted distribution, it has been shown that
airEXODUS was able to correctly rank the performance of the four wide body aircraft 
and the two narrow body aircraft (see Table 23). However, when the narrow and wide 
body aircraft were put together and the six aircraft are ranked, we no longer find that 
the predicted ranking of the aircraft match the ranking observed on the basis of the 
single certification trial (see Table 23). This is true whether we make use of the actual 
or generalised data.
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As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to attempt an absolute or even relative rank ordering 
of aircraft performance based on the performance of a single certification trial (or 
model result). This is because the performance of the aircraft is defined by a 
probability distribution of which the single data point is not a characteristic measure. 
Thus there is no guarantee that the ranking derived from the certification trials are 
typical or indicative of actual relative or absolute performance.
Table 23: Rank ordering of aircraft evacuation performance using the trial data and airEXODUS
generated TET using the actual and generalised data
As can be seen from Figure 33 if the trials are repeated a sufficient number of times, the 
TET can be distributed with a large scatter and it is possible for data points for different 
aircraft to become mixed. In this overlap region it is possible for the rank ordering of 
aircraft to be altered, depending on which data points are selected at random to 
represent the aircraft. This can be more clearly seen in Figure 34 that shows the range 
of TETs generated by airEXODUS for each aircraft.
90
95
90
60
OPS
005 020
Figure 33: airEXODUS produced scatter plots of TET Vs OPS for the six aircraft 
generated using (a) actual data and (b) generalised data
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Figure 34: airEXODUS produced TETs generated using (a) the actual data (b) the generalised data and
As can be seen from Figure 33 and Figure 34, in the majority of cases the frequency 
distribution curves for the various aircraft show some degree of overlap. In cases where 
overlap occurs it is possible for the ranking of the aircraft to be altered if only a single 
data point is selected to represent the performance of the aircraft - as is the case in the 
certification trials. Similarly, in cases where there is no overlap, it is possible to define 
a definitive ranking.
This chapter has demonstrated how the results of a model can be tested, verified and
interpreted through the application of a comprehensive validation exercise. Whilst 
validation will never prove a model correct, confidence in the models predictive 
capabilities will be improved the more often it is shown to produce reliable 
predictions. In this context this chapter has tackled one of the key questions raised in 
this thesis that blocks the acceptance of evacuation modelling technology in the 
design and certification of passenger aircraft (see Section 3.14).
This work has added an additional six test cases to the list of validation already 
undertaken by airEXODUS. These cases have shown that the model is capable of 
successfully reproducing the overall evacuation performance of both wide-body and 
narrow-body aircraft under certification conditions. Using the mean of the 
airEXODUS generated total evacuation time distribution for each aircraft and the 
single time achieved by the aircraft in each of the trials to represent the typical 
evacuation performance, airEXODUS is capable of predicting the total evacuation 
time to within 5.3% or on average. It was also shown that in most cases 
the model is able to reliably predict the likely evolution of the evacuation from its 
start to its completion.
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The success of the airEXODUS evacuation model in predicting the outcome of previous 
90-second certification trials is a compelling argument of the suitability of this model 
for evacuation certification applications - at least for derivative aircraft. For aircraft 
involving truly 'new' features it is expected that evacuation models in conjunction with 
component testing of the new feature will be necessary. Examples of new features 
include a new exit type or an established exit configuration placed at a sill height 
surpassing that previously used. In both these examples it is assumed that sufficient 
data does not exist that would allow a reliable representation within the evacuation 
model. In these cases, the combination of computer model and component testing 
offers a sensible and reliable alternative to full-scale live evacuation trials.
This chapter has also indicated a potential area that needs to be addressed to answer the 
second key question posed by this thesis, namely, 
The results of these validation 
tests demonstrated the lack of an adequate representation of crew procedures and their 
interactions with passengers. Indeed this is thought to have negatively impacted on the 
accuracy of the model in these validation exercises. This further strengthens the 
observation that future work should be directed at developing these capabilities. Indeed 
this area and others are addressed in the following four chapters.
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So far this thesis has demonstrated how evacuation models can be tested.and how
confidence can be gained in their use. However, in doing so the requirement for a 
more realistic representation of was highlighted. This feeds 
into the second key question posed in this work, namely 
In attempting an answer to this 
question this chapter poses and answers the following question, 
Also, recall that Chapter 3 highlighted two other critical areas for model development. 
They were the absence of passenger aisle swapping behaviour and the simplistic 
approach to simulating seat climbing behaviour. Before these areas can be addressed 
their frequency and features require exploration. In this context this chapter poses 
and attempts an answer to the question, 
Before continuing it is important to more accurately specify the processes that have 
been highlighted for development in this work. The first is referred to as cabin crew 
redirection procedures. This is a major function of cabin crew during an evacuation 
and involves them managing the flow of passengers within the cabin and to seek an 
optimal distribution of passengers to each of the available exits this role is often 
referred to as passenger flow management or crew initiated redirection. As part of 
this role cabin crewmembers can redirect passengers away from one exit towards 
another. The procedure represents an attempt by the crew to expedite a faster 
evacuation for the aircraft as a whole.
At present aircraft evacuation models do not have an adequate representation of this 
very important aspect of evacuation. This was recognised in a report by the Office of 
Technical Assessment for the US congress in 1993 [1], which highlighted the inability 
of mathematical evacuation assessment models to simulate operator procedures. As
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such, this section develops a model to represent cabin crew redirection (a vital 
component of the operator procedure). For the purposes of this work, cabin crew 
redirection is defined as a procedure in which a cabin crewmember bypasses a 
passenger from one available exit in a cabin section to another exit in the cabin section 
in order to bring about a faster evacuation through more efficient exit utilisation. This 
section analyses 90-second certification trials and air accidents contained within the 
AASK database V3.0 to build a picture of this behaviour in real emergency 
evacuations.
In order to model the effectiveness of the procedure in real emergency evacuations it is 
also necessary to include passenger decision making relating to exit selection, as in real 
emergencies passengers are actively seeking their own escape routes during an 
evacuation. The interaction of passenger exit selection and crew exit selection is 
explored in this chapter.
An extension to the passenger exit choice model is to provide passengers with methods 
for evaluating and optimising their chosen evacuation route. This thesis primarily 
focuses on two main route optimisation strategies, namely passenger aisle swapping, 
and passenger seat climbing.
Aisle swapping refers to passenger(s) choosing to swap to adjacent aisle(s) in the view 
that it will expedite their evacuation. By definition aisle-swapping behaviour can only 
occur on aircraft that have multiple aisles. Given that proposed future aircraft designs, 
such as the BWB, may contain more than two passenger aisles, the significance of this 
type of behaviour may be of more importance in the future. Seat climbing is a more 
extreme form of route optimisation that sees the passengers climb over seat backs. This 
behaviour is frequently cited by researchers performing 'competitive' experimental 
trials and in air accident reports. This behaviour is also investigated in this chapter.
Before continuing with the investigation it is important to clearly define the behaviour 
that we are studying. In the context of this work aisle swapping is a behaviour that 
involves moving from one viable aisle to another viable aisle whilst maintaining the 
same target exit. By definition, this represents abandoning a escape path in 
favour of another escape path. The term seat climb can describe numerous
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types of behaviour such as, climbing over a seat to reach a rupture in the cabin, 
climbing to circumvent a physical blockage, etc. In the context of this work seat 
climbing is defined as a behaviour that involves a passenger climbing over seating to 
avoid a particular route based on the locations of other passengers. Situations in 
which passengers climb seating or swap aisles when the path represents the ONLY 
viable escape route are excluded as they represent a different type of behaviour that is 
already covered within the model.
Before any development can take place it is necessary to answer the following 
questions, 
and 
To answer these questions a study of 
human behaviour in aircraft accidents is undertaken in this chapter. In doing so an 
empirical understanding of the processes involved and their frequency and nature is 
developed. In addition this study provides insight into the third key question in this 
thesis, namely, 
Video footage and crew interview transcripts from 90-second certification trials and
survivor accounts from real accidents contained within the AASK database V3.0 were 
available to the authors for the research of these behaviours. This analysis concentrates 
first on observed behaviour from 90-second certification trials. This is followed by an 
analysis of behaviour found in real emergency evacuations.
Cabin crew instigated redirection is frequently witnessed in 90-second certification
trials. As such they represent a rich source of information concerning this behaviour. 
In addition, 90-second certification trials are recorded on video and most 90-second 
certification trial reports contain post-evacuation interviews with cabin crewmembers. 
These are extremely useful for understanding the reasons why cabin crewmembers 
preformed certain actions. An understanding of crew instigated bypass in 90-second 
certification trials is developed from the interview transcripts using video footage for 
support. In contrast, passenger interviews were not included in any of the 90-second
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certification trial reports. As such understanding passenger behaviour is more difficult. 
However, scrutiny of 90-second video footage allows some insight into the frequency 
of certain behaviours as well as the conditions in which the behaviours most frequently 
occur. This insight can give some tentative understanding of the behaviours in 90- 
second certification trial conditions.
Finally, the availability and quality of data should be tempered by the knowledge that 
the behaviour of passengers and crew during certification trials are not representative of 
the likely behaviours witnessed during real emergency evacuations [1]. Thus, any 
model that is based upon performance during certification trials is likely to represent the 
performance of the procedure under essentially optimal conditions. When designing 
mathematical models of human behaviour it is often useful to begin with a relatively 
simply set of behaviours which can later be extended to encompass more scenarios. In 
this respect, 90-second certification trials offer an ideal initial starting point for a 
mathematical model of cabin crew instigated redirection. This analysis therefore 
begins with behaviour during 90-second certification trials.
This section discusses behaviour from video footage of 90-second certification trials 
and verbatim post-evacuation transcripts of cabin crew interviews. The purpose of the 
discussion is to describe the process and to highlight the salient features that a prototype 
model should contain.
It was evident from video footage of 22 certification trials that crew directed bypass 
occurs relatively frequently during 90-second certification trials. This is not surprising 
as crew are briefed on the manufacturer's procedures for the aircraft prior to the 90- 
second certification trial taking place. During these evacuations, they are acutely aware 
of the possible requirement for the procedure during the evacuation.
From examination of video evidence it is apparent that a pair of floor level exits usually 
have two cabin crew stationed within their vicinity that operate as a team during the 
evacuation [90]. Since the exit availability criterion of 50% is always met by disabling 
one exit from each exit pair, typically one of the cabin crew occupies the DAS
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(Dedicated Assistance Space) and motivates passengers onto the escape slide whilst the 
other takes responsibility for motivating passengers to the exits and redirect passengers 
within the cabin.
Video evidence from 90-second certification trials strongly suggests that crewmembers 
whose duty is motivating passengers onto slides are very rarely involved in passenger 
redirection [90]. In general they are too preoccupied with motivating passengers onto 
the escape slides. From video evidence it was apparent that it was sometimes the duty 
of the flight crew to assist the cabin crew in directing the flow of passengers within the 
cabin. However, this practice was only evident in early certification trials and has for 
some years not been required within flight crew evacuation procedures. Thus, in future 
they would not be involved in redirection during certification trials.
Manufacturer procedures nearly always designate specific locations on the aircraft that 
cabin crewmembers should occupy in order to supervise the flow of passengers 
throughout the cabin. This was apparent from examination of 90-second certification 
trial documentation in which cabin crew training materials were enclosed. On any 
given aircraft these positions can be located close to their jump seat or some distance 
away. If the location is some distance away the cabin crewmember may have to 
negotiate a path through the cabin. It was therefore necessary to re-examine video 
footage of trials in order to determine any inherent difficulties in reaching their assigned 
station. The video footage suggests that cabin crew are able to move through aisles - 
albeit more slowly than when the cabin is empty - even when the aisles are packed with 
passengers. During their movement they typically shout instructions for passengers to 
move out of the way. Sometimes crew member resorted to climbing over seats to avoid 
confluence with passengers in the aisles.
Whilst during the early portion of evacuations cabin crew can generally move to their 
designated areas within the cabin, they do sometimes experience difficulties when 
moving through congested aisles to reach over wing exits. This was highlighted within 
the post evacuation interviews from certification trials. As an example the First Officer 
from the certification trial of a narrow bodied aircraft described some difficulty in 
moving to the overwing exit thus,
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Similar difficulties were stated by the captain when moving from the cockpit to 
centrally located exits during the evacuation of another narrow bodied aircraft,
"... 
However, whilst difficulties were cited in post evacuation interviews and observed on 
video footage the passengers are rarely completely obstructive to the crew. Typically, a 
shouted instruction or a push is sufficient for the passenger(s) to give way. As another 
cabin crewmember stated after the evacuation of another aircraft,
Given these difficulties, a requirement of a prototype model is that the movement of 
crewmembers is explicitly modelled. In addition, a method imposing some movement 
penalty when moving against the flow of passengers should be incorporated.
Once the cabin crewmember has reached their designated position within the cabin they 
typically begin to monitor proceedings and try to ensure that all of the exits finish 
evacuating passengers at approximately the same time. At this point the cabin crew 
begins to implement flow management procedures.
Table 24: Relevant quotations found in 90-second certification trial interviews
In order to develop a model, it is necessary to understand the thought process of the 
cabin crewmember during this period (or at least the behavioural manifestations of
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these processes). It is necessary to determine how they decide when to redirect 
passengers and how they obtain information upon which their decisions are based. In 
order to answer this, post-evacuation interviews were examined to understand the 
crewmembers' reasons for redirecting passengers and their methods of gathering 
information. In total 40 relevant and potentially useable references were made with 
respect to redirection during 90-second certification trials (see Table 24). Given the 
large number of quotations it is not feasible to include them all in this work. However, 
some representative quotations that encapsulate the features of their category are 
provided within this discussion.
During the post certification trial interview of the a wide-bodied aircraft a crewmember 
described his rationale for redirecting passengers to another exit. The crew was 
stationed at the 2LL exit and was managing the flow within the cabin as his exit was 
inoperable. He stated that,
A crew involved in another wide-bodied 90-second certification trial was again 
responsible for cabin management as his exit (3R) was inoperable. He described his 
rationale thus,
These two examples, encompass the content of many more extracts that were found 
within cabin crew interviews and suggest a rationale for crew redirection. Crew appear 
to make a determination on the likely finish time of the exits in their vicinity and
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attempt to fix any imbalance via redirecting passengers. It appears that information is 
central to their making judgements, i.e. information of: the location of exits, the exits 
for which the cabin crewmember is responsible, knowledge of useable exits, the 
number of passengers that are using particular exits, the current flow pattern within the 
cabin section, and the flow rate capabilities of the individual exits. Whilst not 
definitive, this list gives some indication of the likely factors that cabin crewmembers 
would consider when managing the flow of passengers. This information can be 
categorised as either dynamic or static.
Dynamic information is gained during the evacuation itself and is subject to change 
during the evacuation. For example, the location of passengers within the aircraft cabin 
at a particular point in time, active exits onboard the aircraft, flow pattern through the 
cabin section, flow rates that are being achieved at each exit, etc, are all dynamic 
information. Static information does not change during an evacuation. For example, 
the configuration of the aircraft, locations of exits, exits for which a cabin crewmember 
has responsibility, relative differences in likely flow rates, etc, are all static information.
By definition dynamic information must be collected during the evacuation. From the 
analysis of video footage of certification trials and interviews of the crew, it is apparent 
that crew typically collect dynamic information visually. For example, the cabin crew 
stationed at the 4L during the certification trial of a narrow-bodied aircraft stated,
noticed 
The first officer on board the same aircraft was also involved in redirection activities. 
He stated a similar method of obtaining information. He stated that,
"... noticed 
Indeed vision was also frequently stated as the means that cabin crew determined 
useable exits during the evacuation. As the account of the FL cabin crew during the 
post evacuation interview of a wide bodied aircraft certification trial demonstrates,
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"... 
Again, these extracts are illustrative of numerous similar accounts and indicate that a 
requirement of the prototype model is to have a mechanism of representing passenger 
vision that affects the gathering of dynamic information during the evacuation.
Another finding of this study was that instances of cabin crewmembers verbally 
communicating dynamic information were rare. Indeed when communication occurs, 
video evidences strongly suggest that it is between the crew and is regarding the cabin 
sweep, i.e. the determination of whether the cabin is clear of passengers. As such it 
invariably occurs once the majority of passengers have evacuated. During the period 
when redirection is most likely, i.e. during the mid portion of the evacuation, video 
footage and interview transcripts suggest that verbal communication between cabin 
crew is extremely rare.
From further examination of crew interview transcripts it appeared that the level of 
visibility varied according to the location and capabilities of the cabin crewmember. 
For example, whilst the cabin crewmember stationed at the 3R exit during the 90- 
second trial of a wide-bodied aircraft stated,
"... 
His colleague at the 4R exit stated the opposite. He stated that,
"/ 
Indeed the level of visibility is affected by numerous interacting factors, such as the 
height of the crewmember, the level of lighting, the visual accessibility of the structure, 
the height of passengers, the presence of bulkheads or monuments, the location of the 
crewmember, to name but a few. This suggests a further requirement of a prototype 
model is that it contains a mechanism for defining individual levels of visibility for 
each crewmember/station within the aircraft cabin.
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The final aspect of redirection examined was the method employed when 
communicating their instructions to the passengers. Video footage of certification trials 
suggested that cabin crew use either, verbal commands (shouting, speech, etc), gestures 
(pointing, waving arms), physical contact (manhandling, pushing in a direction) or 
sometimes a combination of these methods. Some crew described their method of 
communication in post evacuation interviews. For example, one crewmember stated 
that,
" 
Whilst a first officer from a different aircraft evacuation described a similar approach,
"... 
From the interviews of cabin crewmembers it is apparent that they generally perceive 
physical communication to be a more effective means of asserting their will than 
merely shouting. As the following example demonstrates, another observation was that 
for some crew shouting was deemed enough motivation to persuade passengers to 
redirect,
In general video evidence indicated that cabin crew are generally very successful at 
enforcing their commands. Indeed, interview transcripts indicate that passengers 
appear to be very receptive and cooperative in response to cabin crew commands. For 
example passengers ask polite questions to the crew, such as [90 
or [90]. Certainly cabin crew 
perceive their actions as being very effective during 90-second certification trials. 
For example, a crew member in a narrow-bodied aircraft trial described their 
redirection experience thus,
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A similar statement was made by the 4R cabin crew during the certification trial of a 
wide-bodied aircraft, who stated that,
From this it is apparent that a requirement for the prototype model is that it represents 
the two principle modes of cabin crew communication, i.e. verbal/gesture and physical. 
Furthermore, it would be desirable that the model should have a mechanism for 
representing difference in communication ability and a level of passenger receptiveness 
to their commands.
To summarise, from the analysis of video footage it is apparent that cabin crew
redirection occurs frequently during certification trials. In performing redirection the 
cabin crewmembers have to travel to a designated location within the aircraft cabin 
interior to perform their management duties. Video evidence and anecdotes from cabin 
crewmembers indicate that they are generally able to achieve this. However their 
movement speed is sometimes hindered by the presence of passengers.
Once at their station cabin crewmembers begin to monitor the flow of passengers in the 
aircraft. Generally this involves the cabin crew assessing local factors and switching 
passengers to other exits where necessary. Vision is the primary mechanism that they 
use in determining conditions within the cabin. This is affected by their own abilities 
and the configuration of the cabin. Thus, a model should represent individual visibility 
levels for crew.
Having determined that redirection is required they must communicate commands to 
passengers. Video and anecdotal evidence suggests that cabin crewmembers are 
highly effective at transmitting commands to passengers during 90-second certification
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trials and that the passengers are very co-operative. A mechanism of representing 
crew-passenger communication is also a requirement of any model.
In total, video footage was available from 13 wide-bodied certification trials. Video 
footage of one entire aircraft series was not of sufficient quality to allow even 
qualitative observations of behaviour within the seating zones. However, the video 
footage of nine aircraft all contained acceptable camera angles of the cabin interiors. A 
brief summary of aisle swapping related behaviour present within the video footage of 
these aircraft certification trials now follows. It should be noted that the numbering 
scheme used in this section is different to that used in the validation study in Chapter 4.
(i) Trial 1
Examination of the seating zones during the evacuation of trial 1 indicated that aisle
swapping did not occur.
(ii) Trial 2
The video footage of trial 2 contained camera shots of two passenger zones. No 
passenger initiated aisle swapping was witnessed from the video footage of these zones. 
However, some instances of the flight crew ordering passengers (between 4 and 5 
passengers) to switch aisles was evident.
(iii) Trial 3, 351 passengers
The video footage of trial 3 contained camera angles of three passenger zones. No
passengers swapped to the empty near aisle. In zone two, aisle swapping was not
witnessed. In zone three, a single passenger swapped to the back of the near aisle
queue.
(iv) Trial 4
Video footage of three passenger zones were available from the video of trial 4. No 
passengers in the forward zone swapped to the far aisle. In zone two, over 30 
passengers swapped aisles. Some of these (approximately five) swapped into the mid- 
portion of the queue. Many of these passengers later swapped back to the aisle from
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which they had originated. The majority of passengers swapped aisles to the back of 
queues. In zone three approximately seven passengers swapped to the back of the 
near aisle queue.
(v) Trial 5
Video footage from another three passenger seating zones were available of trial 5. In 
zone one, some 30 or so passengers were redirected forwards using the far aisle. The 
20th from last passenger slipped in the aisle causing a delay to those behind. Five of 
those passengers that were behind switched to the near aisle.
In zone two, approximately 14 passengers swapped from the far aisle to the back of the 
near aisle. In the third zone two passengers swapped to the back of the near aisle 
queue. Later another passenger - the last person in the far aisle queue - swapped to the 
virtually empty near aisle.
(vi)Trial 6
Video footage of three more cabin zones was available from the certification trial of 
trial 6. In the first zone, one passenger swapped to the back of the far aisle queue. 
Later some 40 passengers were redirected by the crew to the forward exits via the near 
aisle. During this period the far aisle was empty, save two passengers who were 
redirected forwards via the far aisle. After 25 seconds of the aisle being empty, a 
passenger swapped aisles. Subsequently three others followed his lead.
In zone two approximately 12 passengers swapped to, what was essentially, the back of 
the far aisle queue, some of these swapped from within seating. In the same zone, a 
very fast moving flow of passengers was bypassed aftwards. Approximately 5-10 
passengers swapped from the near aisle to the far aisle queue. Most aisle swapping 
occurred at the back of the far aisle queue, although one or two passengers swapped 
into the mid-portion of the far aisle queue. Towards the end of the evacuation, 5 
passengers switched to the back of the near aisle.
In zone three approximately 15 passengers swapped to the back of the far aisle. At the 
same time the cabin crewmember at the mid-section exit began to bypass passengers to 
the aft exit using the far aisle. During this period the near aisle cleared of passengers
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and was completely empty for some time. After the near aisle had been completely 
empty for approximately 5 seconds, 14 of the bypassed passengers swapped to the near 
aisle.
(vii) Trial 7
Video footage of trial 7 was of lower quality than other certification trials. Camera 
angles were more limited and did not show much of the seating within the zones. As 
such making determinations as to whether aisle swapping even occurred was extremely 
difficult. Of the camera angles that were examined, no passenger initiated aisle 
swapping was observed, although in zone one the cabin crew switched passengers from 
the far aisle to the near aisle through seating adjacent to the exit
(viii) Trial 8
Video footage of trial 8 was also of poor quality. Camera shots were limited to two 
internal shots. One was from the aft cross aisle looking forwards the entire length of 
the aircraft and the other was of the last 10 rows of seating in the aircraft. None of the 
camera shots gave a view of the forward cabin zone. From the footage of the aft 
seating it was observed that approximately 3 passengers swapped from the aft far aisle 
to the near aisle. The aisle swapping occurred relatively early during the evacuation 
and was into the middle of the aisle queues.
(iix) Trial 9
Video footage of the trial 9 was taken using the same camera set-up as that of trial 8. 
Using the two camera angles, aisle-swapping events were observed in the aft cabin 
zone. Some 13 passengers swapped from the near aisle to the back of the far aisle 
queue. Later, one passenger swapped from the far aisle into the mid-portion of the near 
aisle. A gap may have developed on account of a passenger falling in the near aisle.
Aisle swapping occurred in 6 of the 9 evacuations from wide bodied aircraft during 90- 
second certification trials (see Table 25). Approximately 130 passengers (4.2%) from 
the total number of 3047 swapped aisles. It appears that instances of aisle swapping 
are relatively low when considering the total number of passengers on the aircraft. 
Having scrutinised video footage some tentative conclusions can be drawn.
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Firstly, it appears that despite some evacuations sharing similar circumstances aisle 
swapping does not necessarily occur. The notable example of this was that aisle 
swapping did not occur in zone one of trial 4 despite conditions being similar to those 
in other aircraft in which aisle swapping occurred. In addition, it was rare for only a 
single passenger to swap aisles. It appears that once an initial passenger decides to 
swap aisles, others tend to follow. There was also some evidence of passengers 
choosing to swap to an aisle and then swapping back again.
An important observation from the video footage was that passengers only seem to 
swap aisles when an opposite aisle is relatively free from other passengers (see Table 
25). Thus, it tends to occur late during the evacuation process and usually involves 
passengers joining the back of the queues (see Table 25).
The implication of this observation is that for most of the evacuation aisle swapping is 
simply not an option as the path to an alternative aisle may be blocked by other 
passengers. Indeed this is true for much of the total evacuation time. Furthermore, if 
the alternative aisle is densely packed then it would be difficult to enter another aisle 
and so again aisle swapping would not be very attractive - 'why having entered an aisle 
would you leave it only to have to do it all over again?'. These two conditions prevail 
for most of the evacuation time.
As such only a small percentage of the passenger compliment are exposed to conditions 
in which aisle swapping is a viable option, i.e. when the alternative aisle is lightly 
packed and the seating to the aisle is clear. Thus it may be unwise to give too much 
credence to the frequency of occurrence expressed as a percentage of the entire 
passenger compliment, i.e 4.2%. Perhaps a more meaningful statistic is that in 11 out 
of 20 cabin zones (e.g. 55%) some aisle swapping was witnessed.
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Table 25: Summary of aisle swapping in 90-second certification trials
9
From these general observations the following aspects need to be incorporated into an 
aisle-swapping model:
A) when aisle swapping is a viable option it occurs with reasonable frequency,
B) a mechanism that represents the likelihood of a given passenger choosing to aisle 
swap should be developed,
C) any mechanism should result in the first aisle swap being less likely than any 
subsequent aisle swap events,
D) passengers should only swap aisles if the adjacent aisle is relatively sparsely 
populated. This is concerned mainly with the area immediately adjacent to their aisle.
Instances of seat jumping during 90-second certification trials are extremely rare.
Examination of the video footage available at FSEG revealed only one instance of a 
single individual climbing over seats during the certification trial of a wide-bodied 
aircraft evacuation. As such the development of a model for seat jumping cannot 
benefit from the relatively good quality observational data from 90-second certification 
trials.
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This section examines crew bypass, passenger aisle swapping and redirection in actual
emergency evacuations. It is widely acknowledged that in actual emergency 
evacuations passenger motivation is different to that in 90-second certification trials 
[122,128], thus making cabin management procedures more difficult to enforce in real 
emergencies. In addition, the presence of a thermo-toxic atmosphere can also affect the 
physiology and psychology of crew and passengers during an actual evacuation 
affecting their ability to obtain information and inhibiting the execution of cabin 
management procedures. Likewise increased stress levels may lead to differences in 
behaviour that must be examined [171].
The presence of fire and toxic products within the aircraft cabin can affect the
physiology of both passengers and crew. Since, this work is concerned only with those 
effects that impact upon cabin management procedure the most relevant physiological 
effects are those that impair vision, vocal communication or movement capabilities.
The presence of smoke particulate within the atmosphere reduces the range of visibility 
of both crew and passengers [89,146]. Primarily this occurs through the opacity of 
smoke particulate limiting visibility. For example, one surviving cabin crewmember 
from the emergency landing and evacuation of Air Canada Flight 797, a McDonnell 
Douglas DC-9-32, at greater Cincinnati International Airport on 2nd June 1983 stated 
that [20].
In addition to a reduction in visibility, chemical effects from irritant and acidic gases 
can also affect crew and passengers sight [89,88,10]. As an example, the Human 
Factors report of the Boeing 737-236 at Manchester International airport on 22 August 
1985 stated that survivors eyes were "frosted over" [10]; a known reaction of the eyes 
to irritant acidic gases. Chemically induced visual impairment during an aircraft 
emergency evacuation involving fire occurs primarily from the effects of acidic and/or 
irritant smoke, such as hydrogen chloride or sulphur dioxide [88, 89].
Loss of vision has implications on the movement capabilities of passengers. In 
extremely dense conditions passengers are limited to tactile spatial awareness, as in the
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Manchester accident. This would severely reduce their movement capabilities. This 
has been documented in non-aviation specific research performed by Tin in 1977 (see 
Section 2.4.3.3).
In addition to difficulties seeing, the presence of a fire atmosphere can also affect the 
vocal ability of cabin crewmembers and passengers [134,10]. This results from 
physiological reactions to heat, toxic products and chemical reactions that can induce 
respiratory tract pain and difficulty in breathing [88,89]. For example, the presence of 
toxic gases can induce a contraction of the throat (laryngopasm), a contraction of the 
lungs (bronchospasm), wheezing, coughing, pain to mention but a few [10, 167]. 
Medical questionnaires submitted by 12 survivors of the Manchester disaster who were 
exposed to thick black smoke revealed that 9 had experienced bronchospasm, as well as 
other toxic related affects such as coughing or wheezing [10, 167]. The net result of 
exposure to toxic gases is that the ability to communicate vocally is severely reduced 
[10,99,134]. In reporting the accounts of evacuees from the United Airlines Boeing 
727 at Salt Lake city in 1965, Snow reported that:
"... 
Both passengers and cabin crewmembers accounts from other accidents corroborate this 
conclusion. For example, a cabin crewmember from the Manchester accident [10] 
stated that [166]. During the same 
accident passengers cited similar experiences, for example the accident investigation 
stated that:
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Finally, in addition to the presence of smoke, heat and toxic gases can force passengers 
to crawl in order to avoid contacting the worst thermo-toxic hazard contained within the 
cabin. Again this would have the effect of reducing passenger movement capabilities.
In addition to physical reactions to fire, the psychology of passengers and crew during a 
real emergency evacuation is also likely to be different from that of 90-second 
certification trials [122]. Whilst it is widely acknowledged that the presence of fire with 
the perceived threat of injury or death can cause psychological differences to be more 
pronounced [122, 168], even without a fire, failures in emergency lighting, smoke, 
impact injury and general stress are likely to result in differences in passenger and crew 
behaviour.
The aims and motivation of evacuees are likely to be different in real emergency 
evacuations as compared with 'mock' evacuations, such as the 90-second certification 
trial. For example, it is recognised by all of the participants that the aim of a 90-second 
certification trial is to evacuate the entire aircraft as quickly as possible. By contrast 
during real emergency evacuations the aim of each passengers is to get themselves, and 
others with whom they are emotionally attached out of the aircraft as quickly as 
possible. This difference in aims and motivation can lead to differences in observed 
behaviours [5,6,7].
Given these potential differences, it was necessary to examine data sources from real
emergency accidents. The A ASK database V3.0 contains the testimonies of passengers 
and crew from 55 real emergency evacuations. The data contained within AASK has 
been interrogated in order to develop an understanding of cabin management 
procedures and passenger route optimisation in real emergency accidents.
Testimonies that describe redirection events are present in 27 of the 55 accidents 
contained within the database. A useful analysis could only be achieved given
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sufficient data within the database. In seven of the 27 accidents there was insufficient 
data for a meaningful analysis of the cabin management procedures. For example, the 
description of a redirection event may have been limited to the simple statement "I 
redirected". These accounts were discarded from this analysis. This left 20 candidate 
accidents for investigation. The revised dataset contained accidents involving fires, 
ruptures and water evacuations. In rupture scenarios a severe impact force can cause 
seating sections to warp and cabin fittings such as overhead stowage bins can be 
demolished. As such the movement of passengers within the cabin and the cabin 
management procedures are likely to be very different to situations with ruptures. 
Furthermore, those accidents that involve comprehensive structural damage such that 
passengers are trapped within debris and unable to move are beyond the scope of this 
study. However, accidents with more minor ruptures provide additional information on 
cabin crewmember control during emergency evacuations. As such some of these 
scenarios were investigated.
Table 26: The exit choice and redirection accident dataset for investigation selected from AASK
(shaded rows are accidents involving cabin burn through)
V3.0
The motivation and behaviour of passengers and crew during scenarios where the 
aircraft comes to rest in water are very different to that of land evacuation scenarios. In 
these types of evacuation behaviour is confused as passenger and crew find it difficult 
to decide whether to evacuate or wait to be rescued in the comparatively dry aircraft. In 
addition, delays preparing slides and rafts all serve to make these types of evacuations
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unique. Given their abnormality when compared with land based evacuations, they are 
not considered in this analysis.
The dataset was then filtered to remove scenarios that involved severe rupture(s) and 
cabin deformation. Finally, the aircraft had to be of sufficient size to allow redirection 
to occur. The final dataset for investigation contained 10 accidents (see Table 26). 
Two of these two were evacuations without fire, two involved minor external fires, five 
involved serious external fires that penetrated the aircraft cabin and one involved an 
internal cabin fire.
The AASK database was then queried for passenger accounts that described some 
form of aisle swapping. This resulted in a few passenger accounts, although, most of 
these did not concern aisle swapping to optimise evacuation speed, but were 
accidentally generated via querying the strings "crossed" and "seating" within the 
database. The majority of other accounts were from shallow ditching scenarios 
without fire. These behaviours are considered a feature of the scenario involving 
evacuations from shallow water with little urgency. As such these accounts have 
been excluded from this study.
Only one account of aisle swapping of the type witnessed in 90-second certification 
trials is contained within AASK V3.0 (see Table 27).
Table 27: Accidents that contain passenger accounts contained within AASK V3.0
Turning to seat climbing behaviour, interrogating AASK V3.0 revealed 13 accidents 
in which passengers had described climbing over seats. However, in some cases the 
aircraft sustained substantial impact damage and passenger seats were spread over a 
large area and the cabin was severely disrupted. For example, two accidents were 
actually referring to instances of passengers extricating themselves from warped and 
wrecked seating. These instances do not represent an optimisation of an escape route
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but the only way out of a destroyed cabin. For this reason, these two cases were 
excluded from further analysis.
A further case involved evacuation without fire following an overrun of the runway 
and with the cabin containing water. In these types of accidents passengers and crew 
are reluctant to evacuate at all yet alone optimise their route to the exit. As such this 
represents a scenario that is beyond the scope of this work. These cases were also 
discarded from this analysis. This left a final dataset of 10 accidents. Five of these 
involved fuselage burn through resulting from substantial post-crash fires. Two 
contained no-fires at all and three were evacuations that involved minor external fires 
(see Table 28).
Table 28: Summary of the accidents in AASK in which one or more passengers described seat climbing
The accidents have been categorised according to the following categories of fire
severity of fire and scenario type, non-fire scenarios, external fire scenarios, burn 
through fire scenarios and internal fire scenarios.
In this analysis each accident category is discussed in ascending order of fire severity. 
In this manner the accidents without fire will first be discussed, followed by those 
accidents involving minor fires and finally those that involved a serious fire. Where 
available accounts from both passengers and cabin crew are presented. Where
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appropriate general conclusions are presented with respect to developing a model to 
simulate the behaviours.
Table 29: Summary of accidents and their relevance according to their type
In total 12 accidents are investigated in detail. Of these 10 accidents contain relevant 
accounts to crew redirection/exit choice, 1 accident contains an account of passenger 
aisle swapping and 10 accidents contain descriptions of passenger seat climbing (see 
Table 29).
Before beginning the analysis, it is important to stress that the data contained within the 
reports should not be assumed to describe every event that took place during the 
evacuation. Some accounts provide more detail than others. Furthermore, some 
passengers may consider a possibly important feature of their evacuation too minor to 
describe. As such the data should be taken as an indication of the some of the 
qualitative features of the evacuations. Finally whilst useful, this data should be viewed 
with caution as reports differ in terms of the quantity of data that is available. For 
example, greater attention is given to evacuation issues in investigations of burn 
through accidents than non-burn through accident without fatalities. It could therefore 
be expected for more accounts to originate from the larger and more detailed studies, 
i.e. those involving fire and loss of life.
The first 3 emergency evacuations that are investigated did not involve fires. No
instances of aisle swapping were present in any of these accidents, however accounts 
relating to redirection and seat climbing behaviour were present (see Table 30).
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Table 30: Non-fire accidents and behaviours contained within accounts
On the 9th of January, 1983 the propeller of a Convair 580 hit a snow bank, separated 
and penetrated the aircraft whilst landing. The aircraft swerved to a halt and 
evacuation ensued.
Figure 35: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the Convair 580 at Brainerd in 1983 (crossed out exits were
unavailable)
The configuration and exit availability during the evacuation is shown in Figure 35. 
The aircraft contained seven exits two of which where in pairs. Of these only the AL 
exit was used during the evacuation. Seating was configured four abreast throughout 
the aircraft.
Of the 30 passengers onboard, 28 escaped injury. Of the remaining two passengers, 
one was killed and one injured by the penetration of the fuselage by the propeller 
blade. The single cabin crewmember survived without injury. General evacuation 
conditions within the aircraft were relatively good. The only impediment to 
evacuation was some minor damage to the cabin at the point where the propeller 
blade entered the cabin.
In total there were 22 passenger accounts contained within A ASK V3.0 for this 
accident. 19 of these were obtained from reported passenger transcripts and three 
were inferred from the accounts of others.
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Or umping was contained within this accident. It 
We le stated that she unfastened her seat belt and 
climbed over a seat. She stated that she climbed the seat in order to avoid some 
debris in the aisle. She further stated that some seat backs were "knocked down" 
before the aircraft came to a halt.
No redirection events were reported and aisle swapping was not possible for this 
aircraft type. However, the evacuation yielded two passenger accounts of seat 
climbing behaviour, one of which was discounted from this study. The remaining 
account was an instance of a passenger circumventing an obstruction rather than 
congestion. Both accounts are not examples of passenger optimising their routes to 
exits but more finding the only available route to the exit.
On the 2nd of March, 1994, an MD-82 rejected take-off and overran the runway at 
LaGuardia Airport New York. The aircraft came to rest with its nose resting on a dyke 
of tidal mud flats.
All of the 110 passengers and 4 cabin crewmembers escaped alive. However, 29 
passengers sustained minor injuries. There were three pairs of exits fitted to this 
aircraft and two singular exits - a lone port side service door and tail cone exit at the 
rear of the aircraft. From front to rear the exit pairs were of, Type-I, Type-IH and Type- 
Hi. Only the right side of the Type-in over wing exits were used during the evacuation 
and both of the forward exit pair. Seating was arranged 2-2 abreast forward of row 5 
and 2-3 thereafter. The aircraft configuration and exit availability can be seen in Figure 
36.
Figure 36: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the MD-82 at La Guardia in 1994 (crossed out
exits were unavailable)
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Physical cabin conditions during this evacuation were probably better than in 90-second 
certification trials. For example, there was little reported debris in aisles, cabin lighting 
was reported as excellent and the aircraft was not carrying its full passenger payload.
Within AASK there are only 14 passenger entries for this accident. These were all 
based on data taken extracted from air accident reports. In total there were four entries 
from cabin crew contained within AASK V3 for this accident. They are all based on 
full transcripts of their personal testimonies.
None of the passengers described having to change their direction during their
evacuation. However, some passengers described hearing the commands of cabin 
crewmembers. The first, a female passenger sat in 12D described hearing the 
commands of cabin crewmembers during the evacuation. She heard someone say 
" Another two females, one 
sat in 15A the other in sat 12F both reported hearing the cabin crewmembers calling 
"come forward".
However, this is counter balanced by the accounts of other passengers. One seated in 
21 A, stated that 
Another passenger seated in the rear portion 
of the aircraft (26F) stated that 
These two accounts seem to contradict 
the statements presented earlier. Examination of the passengers seating location 
indicates that the negative accounts generally come from passengers seated in the aft 
portion of the cabin. From this it appears that the aft cabin crewmember was not 
assertive during the evacuation, however the forward crewmember was. This appears 
to confirm the notion that crew should be assigned individual levels of assertiveness 
with the prototype model.
Whilst passenger accounts of redirection are scarce within this accident, cabin
crewmember accounts do make reference to some redirection that occurred. The details 
of these accounts are presented below.
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Firstly, the 55 year old female cabin crewmember stationed at the FR exit stated that she 
moved through the cabin in order to redirect approximately 5 or 6 passengers from the 
mid-portion of the cabin towards the front exits. She stated that the passengers 
complied with her wishes. As she stated in her account,
By implication the FL cabin crew must also have been involved in cabin management 
procedures during this evacuation, although she did not state this in her account.
Another redirection event occurred at the rear of the aircraft. This was instigated by the 
57 year female cabin crewmember stationed at the AL exit. She decided that the AL 
escape slide had deployed at too steep an angle for safe use. Consequently, she decided 
to redirect passengers forwards to other exits. As she stated in her account,
"... 
This cabin crewmember also stated that passengers responded to her commands. Recall 
that the passengers stated that they were not assisted during their evacuation.
These two redirection events demonstrate that redirection occurred in this emergency 
evacuation. Furthermore, it is apparent that it occurred for two different reasons.
In the first instance passengers were directed forwards from the mid portion of the cabin 
as the forward exits had exhausted their supply. In this instance the cabin 
crewmembers made a judgement similar to that witnessed in 90-second certification 
trials. They decided it would be beneficial for evacuation as a whole if some of the 
passengers in the aft of the cabin utilised the idle exit capacity at the front of the 
aircraft. Recall that cabin conditions during this evacuation were not unlike the 90- 
second certification trial scenario. In fact they were probably marginally better. The 
passengers generally rated the performance of the crew that performed the redirection
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as being assertive and stated that they obeyed their commands. Recall that the crew try 
to generate the fastest evacuation time for the whole aircraft population. Dependant 
upon the passenger flows and configuration of the aircraft, the implication of a 
redirection decision on the passengers that are redirected can be that they incur a longer 
personal evacuation time. It is not known in this accident if this was the case.
The second form of redirection that occurred was redirection away from an 
inactive/unusable exit. This type of behaviour already exists within airEXODUS and 
does not require a new model. It is however relevant to note that these passengers 
didn't state that they redirected because the cabin crewmember had instructed them to 
but made their own decisions and that in these instances the cabin crewmembers were 
not assertive in their actions.
This aircraft type was not appropriate for aisle swapping behaviour and no passenger 
seat climbing behaviour was reported. However with respect to crew redirection, this 
accident has demonstrated that cabin crewmembers were able to redirect passenger in 
the way witnessed in 90-second certification trials. Furthermore, this accident showed 
that when the crew issued their instructions in an assertive manner that the passengers 
obeyed their commands. However, those passengers that were not assertively 
instructed followed their own evacuation plans. This is different to behaviour in 90- 
second certification trials in which passengers are totally compliant to crew 
instructions.
On the 25th of October, 1986, a B737-222 over ran the runway at Charlotte Douglas 
International Airport, North Carolina, impacted with the ILS localiser antenna, a 
concrete culvert and chain link fencing coming to rest pitched slightly upwards on a 
railway embankment.
Of the 114 passengers and three cabin crewmembers onboard there were 31 injuries to 
passengers and one injured cabin crewmember. The aircraft contained 3 pairs of exits. 
From front to rear they were of, Type-I, Type-Hi and Type-I. All of the exits with the 
exception of the AR were used during the evacuation. Seating was configured in the 3- 
3 arrangement, with the exception of the Type-m exit row (row 9) where the out board 
seat was removed.
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Table 31: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the B737-222 at Charlotte Douglas in 1986
(crossed out exit was unavailable)
Conditions within the cabin were broadly equivalent to those in 90-second certification 
trials. There was some luggage and debris in the aisles and visibility was good. In 
addition more than 50% of the available exits were used during the evacuation.
Contained within AASK V3.0 are 114 passenger entries. Of these 111 are based on 
transcripts report in air accident reports and three are inferred from the accounts of 
others. Three cabin crewmember entries are also available. These were based on full 
transcripts of their personal accounts.
There are only a few accounts in which passengers describe changing direction within
the AASK database for this accident. The first was from a male seated in 12B, and was 
to rescue/warn two intoxicated passengers who had not realised that the aircraft had 
experienced an accident. In addition to this there were two accounts in which 
passengers described hearing cabin crewmember instructions.
The second was from a 43-year-old female passenger seated in 13A. She reported 
hearing the cabin crew calling "come forward". This passenger exited via the LOW 
exit located at seat row 10. Another account was from a male passenger seated in 12B. 
He stated that he heard cabin crew calling passengers forward. Again this passenger 
exited via the LOW exit.
Two accounts from cabin crewmembers described attempting to redirect passengers
forward through the cabin. The first was from the 26-year-old male cabin crewmember 
stationed at the FL exit. He stated that he called to the centre of the cabin for 
passengers to come forward. He went on to explain why, stating that he took this action
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because he observed that passengers were at the over wing exits. This 
version of events was corroborated by the 39-year-old female senior cabin crewmember 
stationed at the FR, who stated that passengers were 
Both expressed difficulty in motivating passengers to move forward within the 
cabin. The FL cabin crewmember stated that the passengers hesitated, whilst the FR 
cabin crewmember stated that the passengers disobeyed her instructions. Both of the 
crew described environmental conditions within the aircraft cabin as and the 
evacuation as orderly. Furthermore all of the cabin crewmembers stated that they could 
be seen and heard throughout the evacuation.
This aircraft type was not appropriate for aisle swapping behaviour and no seat 
climbing behaviour was reported. However, with respect to crew redirection 
procedures it is apparent from this accident that there were attempts at redirection 
within the cabin. Again, in this instance it was initiated by the cabin crewmember and 
was aimed at expediting the evacuation of the aircraft as a whole. The cabin 
crewmembers explicitly stated that reducing congestion was the reason for attempting 
redirection. In this respect, the crewmembers acted in a way that was similar to 90- 
second certification trials.
However, unlike certification trials the passengers were not totally subservient to their 
commands. In this accident, some passengers hesitated and disobeyed instructions. 
Unfortunately, they did not explain their reasons for doing so, however it seems likely 
that they judged that the requested action would likely increase their personal 
evacuation time and so decided against the requested action.
The following 3 accidents involved external fires, which did not penetrate the aircraft
fuselage during the evacuation and contain references to redirection/exit choice, aisle 
swapping and seat jumping.
Table 32: External-fire accidents and behaviours contained within accounts
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On 14th of April 1993, a DC-10-30 left the runway at Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas in poor 
weather conditions shortly after landing. The forward landing gear collapsed during the 
accident and the aircraft came to rest nose down and listing to port at the side of the 
runway.
The DC-10 had four pairs of exits, the first being Type-I, followed by Type-A, Type-in 
and Type-I. The evacuation was somewhat problematic. Since there was a potential 
fire threat on the left wing the cabin crewmembers initially attempted to utilise all of the 
starboard exits (FR, MFR, ROW, AR) and the two forward exits (FL and MFL). 
However, as the orientation of the aircraft was forward and to port, the escape slides on 
the starboard side of the cabin deployed at extremely steep angles. Approximately 
midway through the evacuation the cabin crewmember at the ROW exit judged that its 
use was too dangerous to be continued. In addition the AR escape slide was flipped by 
the wind thus reducing its evacuation capability to one lane. Seating was in the 2-5-2 
configuration, except for the first six rows which were in the 2-2-2 configuration. The 
configuration and exit availability is shown in Figure 37.
Figure 37: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the DC-10 at Dallas Fort-Worth in 1993
(crossed out exits were unavailable)
The entire passenger and crew complement of 189 passengers and 10 cabin 
crewmembers all evacuated the aircraft. Of these 37 passengers and 2 crewmembers 
were injured. During the evacuation cabin crewmembers and passengers saw a minor 
fire erupt on the left wing of the aircraft.
Physical conditions within the cabin were marginally worse than a standard 90-second 
certification trial; some passengers described luggage and debris within the cabin. 
Furthermore, the aircraft attitude was nose down and listing to port. Many passengers
170
_____________________Chapter 5_____________________
in the middle and aft portion of the aircraft saw smoke and flames outside of the cabin. 
Finally, the emergency lighting system failed. Evacuees described the cabin as 
(MFR) and that they 
(FL).
Contained within AASK are 111 passenger entries for this accident. Of these 64 are 
based on full transcripts of passenger testimonies, 7 are based on reported testimonies 
in air accident reports and 40 were inferred from the descriptions of others. In total 7 
crew member entries are available. Six are based on testimony transcripts and one is 
based on a summary style of transcript.
From the accounts within AASK it appears that redirection mainly occurred in two 
locations, either from the ROW exit or from the AR exit. The following descriptions of 
redirection events were provided within passenger testimonies.
The first passenger account found was from a 61-year-old male passenger seated in
13H, who reported that a cabin crewmember had instructed him to redirect from the 
MFR exit to the MFL exit. He followed the instructions and finally evacuated via the 
MFL exit. No more information was contained on this passenger within AASK.
Two passengers, a husband and wife, aged 68 and 58 respectively were seated in 19A 
and 19B. Both initially redirected from their nearest exit; the LOW to the ROW exit. 
The 58-year-old wife exited via the ROW onto the starboard wing. Once on the wing, 
the cabin crewmember instructed her to re-enter the cabin and to exit elsewhere. 
Instead she disobeyed and jumped onto the near vertical ROW slide. In justification of 
her action she stated that she thought that the aircraft was about to explode. Her 
husband was forced to redirect from the ROW as he was pushed back by a of 
people re-entering the cabin via the ROW exit. Both stated that they heard cabin 
crewmember commands during the evacuation.
A 62 year old male passenger who was seated in 17H attempted to evacuate via the 
ROW exit. Having evacuated onto the wing, a cabin crewmember told him that the 
escape slide was not useable so he redirected to the MFR exit. Two more passengers
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from the same seating row, a husband and wife pairing seated in 17A and 17B, also 
initially attempted to evacuate via the ROW exit. However, the husband stated that he 
heard someone say that the ROW exit was unavailable. Both redirected from the ROW 
exit to the MFR exit.
Another husband and wife pair, seated in 23A and 23B, redirected from the ROW exit 
to the MFR exit. The husband stated that he decided to redirect from the ROW, as he 
observed that the orientation of the off wing escape slide was too steep. Furthermore, 
the husband stated that he did not hear any instructions from cabin crewmembers 
during the evacuation.
A husband and wife seated in 21J and 21H who had evacuated onto the starboard wing 
were redirected away from the ROW exit back into the cabin. The husband stated that 
both he and his wife were redirected by the cabin crewmember.
Another instance of redirection was from a 31-year-old female seated in row 25. She 
stated that she waited 15 seconds in a queue at the ROW exit before hearing someone 
say that the slide was unavailable. She also redirected to the AR exit.
Another wife and husband pairing, comprising of a 72 year old female and a 77 year old 
male were seated in 26J and 26H respectively. Both initially tried to evacuate via the 
ROW exit. However, they were both redirected by the cabin crewmember to the aft 
exit. At the aft exit they encountered a stationary queue and were redirected back to the 
ROW exit. They finally evacuated via the ROW exit. They did not state whether they 
heard cabin crewmember instructions during their evacuation.
A female passenger seated in 26F (not related to the previous passengers), followed a 
similar evacuation route. However her rationale for redirecting was somewhat 
different. She stated that frightened passengers and the sight of fire and smoke at the 
aft exit as her reason for choosing to return to the ROW exit.
A 43 year old male seated in 27G stated that he and his family, consisting of his wife 
and two children, originally attempted to evacuate via the ROW exit. At the ROW exit 
he was instructed by a cabin crewmember to evacuate via the aft exit. He and his
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family complied with the command and redirected. However, upon reaching the aft 
exit the aft cabin crewmember instructed them to use the ROW exit. He stated that this 
process was repeated many times. Eventually they exited via the ROW exit. The 
passenger commented that they 
Another husband and wife pairing, consisting of a 68 year old male and a 63 year old 
female seated in 29H and 29J, also described redirection events. They originally 
intended to evacuate via the AR exit. They stated that they formed this decision as they 
saw that it was less crowded. However, upon reaching the AR exit they were redirected 
by the cabin crewmember to use the ROW exit. They finally evacuated using the ROW 
exit.
A 25 year old male seated in 30C also stated that he initially intended to evacuate via 
the AR, however he redirected to the ROW exit. Whilst he did not state that he took the 
action as a result of cabin crewmember instructions, he did state that he heard the 
commands of the cabin crewmembers at various points during the evacuation.
A dead heading (non-revenue) male cabin crewmember who was a passenger seated in 
32D also described being redirected. He stated that he also initially intended to 
evacuate via the AR exit. However, he stated that he saw that the ROW exit was vacant 
and so redirected himself and others towards the ROW exit.
In another instance, a 47-year-old female passenger seated in 33H stated that she also 
initially attempted to evacuate via the AR exit with her family, consisting of a husband 
and two children. Her husband and one child successfully evacuated via the AR exit. 
However, shortly afterwards the escape slide flipped over and the cabin crewmember 
stationed at the exit began to redirect some passengers away from the exit. She stated 
that she and her son followed the instructions of the cabin crewmember and evacuated 
via the ROW exit.
Finally, a male passenger who did not recall his seat number also redirected from the 
AR exit to the ROW exit. He did not supply any more details of his evacuation.
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As i the cabin crewmember accounts within AASK.
Sui /.
The first account was from the female cabin manager. During this evacuation she had a 
free role and attempted to manage the flow of passengers within the cabin. She did not 
express any difficulties in redirecting passengers. As she stated in her testimony:
The male cabin crewmember stationed at the AR exit stated that he ceased evacuating 
passengers via the AR exit when the slide flipped over. He also stated that he 
subsequently continued to evacuate passengers via the exit using the single operable 
lane of his escape slide. On the basis of reduced exit capacity he redirected 
approximately 15-20 passengers from the AR exit to the ROW exit. This is an 
important event as it demonstrates a crew successfully redirecting passengers away 
from an active exit.
The cabin crewmember that was responsible for the right over wing exit spent much of 
the evacuation on the wing. She stated that some elderly passengers refused to use the 
off wing escape slide as the angle was so steep. Therefore, she decided to cease 
evacuation via her assigned exit (ROW) and to redirect passengers forward.
Finally a female cabin crewmember stationed at the FL exit stated that she diverted 
passengers away from the unusable FL exit towards the useable FR exit.
Only one account of passenger aisle swapping was present in this accident. This was 
from a 31-year-old female seated in 25A. This passenger moved around the aircraft a 
considerable amount. She initially moved towards her nearest exit (AR) but found it 
to be unusable. Consequently, she attempted to use the AL but the cabin 
crewmember directed her away from this exit as she considered it unsafe for use at 
that time. She began to move up the cabin in the left aisle however whilst doing so 
the crewmember at the AR exit decided that the AR exit was again useable and began 
calling passengers back aft wards. The recently redirected passenger complied with
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the inctrnrtinn hmx/^/^r rmtirMno that the left aisle was empty she switched aisles to 
exj
Only one passenger account of 'seat climbing' is contained within the AASK database 
for this accident. The account was described previously under aisle swapping It is 
likely that the seat jump that she described occurred during the switching of aisles.
This accident contained one report of seat climbing and aisle swapping behaviour which 
were found to be the same event. In the example the passenger swapped into an empty 
adjacent passenger aisle. This account demonstrates a similar event to those seen in 90- 
second certification trials in which the passenger swaps into an empty aisle.
Numerous accounts concerning crew redirection were available within AASK. From 
these, it is apparent from passenger and crew testimonies that redirection occurs. These 
testimonies suggest that the majority of passengers did as instructed. However, there 
was an instance of somebody disobeying cabin crew commands. Some passengers 
claimed to redirect themselves on the basis of the congestion within the cabin. These 
accounts further support the inclusion of varied levels of passenger subservience and a 
method for passengers to decide to redirect themselves in any prototype models of this 
behaviour.
In one instance a cabin crewmember decided to redirect some passengers due to a 
reduction in exit capacity - the escape slide flipping halved the AR exit capacity. 
Noticing this, the cabin crewmember sought to better balance the passengers that 
required evacuating. As it transpired she made a poor decision, as she redirected some 
passengers away from a useable exit and towards an unusable exit. This event is 
significant as the passengers followed her instructions - despite them being ill advised 
with hindsight.
However, this event suggests that the prototype model should take account of dynamic 
changes in the flow rate capability of exits. In other words the exit flow capability 
should not be purely static as was the case in the original model, but should adapt if the 
actual achieved flow conditions are significantly different.
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On the 8th of March 1998 a DC-10 was evacuated following the discovery of a fuel spill 
at Manchester Airport, England. Whilst the passenger load and injuries associated with 
this evacuation are not documented within version 3.0 of AASK, it is known that no 
deaths occurred.
The aircraft contained eight exits. From front to rear they were of Type-I, Type-A, 
Type-A and Type-A. All eight exits were prepared for evacuation. However, the 
escape slides of the FR and ALOW exits failed to deploy properly. The evacuation 
was achieved through the remaining six exits. Lack of information prohibited further 
definitive knowledge of the cabin configuration for this accident.
Cabin conditions in this accident were much like the 90-second certification trial. 
However, there was not any debris or luggage within the cabin. In addition the cabin 
was well illuminated throughout the evacuation and 75% of the total number of exits 
were used.
In total 126 passenger accounts were available in AASK for this accident. Of these 199 
were taken from full passenger testimonies and 7 were inferred from the accounts of 
others. No accounts from crew members were included within AASK for this accident.
Contained within AASK are numerous passenger accounts of redirection, mainly
involving redirection away from the exits whose escape slides malfunctioned. Much 
redirection occurred in the over wing exit area and involved passengers being redirected 
mainly forwards to other exits. These accounts are presented below.
The first account was from a 55 year old male seated in 18B who initially attempted to 
use the ALOW exit. He stated that he as the ". . 
He finally evacuated via the AROW exit. He explicitly stated that he 
heard cabin crewmember instructions during the evacuation. Another passenger, a 48 
year old male seated in 18A, described a similar chain of events. However, he did not
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state whether he heard cabin crewmember instructions during the evacuation. His final 
choice of exit was unknown.
Similarly, a 48 year old female passenger seated in 20D was redirected from the wing 
back into the cabin to use another exit. She finally evacuated via the FL exit. She also 
explicitly stated that she heard the instructions of cabin crew during the evacuation. 
There were 3 other descriptions of redirection from the wing back into the cabin.
A 29-year-old female passenger seated in 34D also redirected away from the ALOW 
exit. She stated that it This 
passenger finally evacuated via the MFR exit. She did not state whether she had heard 
the commands of cabin crewmembers or not or whether she was outside of the cabin.
A 62-year-old female seated in 34G redirected from an active exit. However, she stated 
that overcrowding at her original choice of exit led to her forming the decision to 
redirect. As she put it, 
This passenger finally evacuated via the FR exit.
Another instance of redirection was described by a 49-year-old female seated in 36K. 
She described the event thus:
They finally evacuated via the AROW exit.
Numerous redirection events were localised around the aft exit pair. This resulted from 
the AL escape slide taking longer to inflate that normal. These accounts now follow.
A 35-year-old male seated in 4IK stated that he originally attempting to use the AL 
exit. However, he was temporally redirected to the AR exit as the escape slide took
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some time to inflate. He evacuated via his original choice of exit (AL) once the slide 
had inflated. Two more passengers, a 64-year-old male seated in 44H and a 59-year- 
old female seated in 44K described similar actions. However, whilst the male from 
41K explicitly stated that the 
male from 44H did not. Both passengers finally evacuated via the AL exit.
A 38-year-old male passenger seated in 42K also stated that an aft exit had problems 
inflating. However, he mistakenly stated that it was the AR exit that inflated slowly not 
the AL exit. He stated that he was redirected to the left side exit (AL).
Only passenger accounts were available within the AASK database V3.0 for this
accident.
From this accident only a single passenger stated that she jumped over seating during 
the evacuation. This passenger was a 25-year-old female originally seated in 34B. 
She stated that she had to climb over seats in the centre to exit from the right hand 
side. It could be that the passenger referred to seat climbing when she actually meant 
re-entered seat rows. This cannot be known for sure.
This accident contained no reports of aisle swapping behaviour. However, an account 
of aisle swapping behaviour was reported, although it is questionable as to whether 
this account represents the behaviour under investigation. Regardless, the account 
was of insufficient detail to draw any conclusions.
With respect to crew redirection, this accident provides much qualitative data on the 
redirection process. It is apparent from these passenger accounts that redirection 
occurred frequently during this evacuation. The majority of the redirection was away 
from unavailable exits and was taken under the instruction of the crew. It appears that 
in this evacuation the passengers obeyed the commands of the crew. Again there is 
support for attributing crewmembers with unique assertiveness levels.
In addition, an important feature of these accounts is that some passengers described 
redirecting themselves. They cited congestion at their original exit choice as 
justification for their decision and would have been attempting to minimise their own
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personal evacuation time. It was also apparent that some passengers were redirected 
multiple times.
Also it was apparent from the testimonies of the passengers in this accident that the 
crew performed well and were able to assert their will on passengers. This was 
exemplified by the case of the husband and wife from 36K. These passengers made 
their own decision to redirect due to congestion. However, they were forced to 
abandon their plan by the assertiveness of the cabin crewmember.
Indeed, passengers from all quarters of the aircraft commented on the effectiveness of 
the cabin crew during this accident. For example, it was stated from a passenger in 9A 
that by a passenger seated in 17K 
that he and a passenger in 41G that 
Again there is strong evidence to support varied levels of communication assertiveness. 
Furthermore this accident highlighted the fact that in some real accidents passengers 
may decide to redirect of their own accord. The judgement process of passengers' 
initiating redirection is slightly different to that of crew. The crew attempt to minimise 
the evacuation time for the aircraft as a whole whereas passengers attempt to minimise 
their personal evacuation time. Thus, it seems necessary to develop a model in which 
passengers judge the merit of various escape routes for themselves. However, its use 
during non-fire scenarios should be limited as few passengers actually chose to redirect 
themselves. It is recommended that it be used in non-fire / external fire scenarios when 
crew have not issued the passengers with instructions. In this way, the instructions of 
crew may override the plans of passengers.
On the 2nd of April 1995 a pilot of an MD-11 at John F. Kennedy International 
airport was alerted by the pilot of a nearby aircraft that he could see an engine fire on 
his aircraft. The captain stopped the aircraft on the taxiway where evacuation was 
performed.
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This aircraft contained four pairs of lower deck Type-A exits. Of these the FR, FL, 
MFR, LOW, ROW, MFL, MAR and MAL exits are thought to have been used during 
the evacuation (see Figure 38).
Figure 38: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the MD-11 at John F. Kennedy in 1995 (crossed
out exits were unavailable)
Exact information regarding passenger numbers is not provided within AASK V3.0 
for this accident. It is thought that 100 passengers were onboard the aircraft. Of these 
biometric data of the 37 injured passengers were provided to FSEG along with 10 full 
passenger transcripts. From these transcripts a further two accounts of passengers 
were inferred, thus providing a total of 12 passenger accounts within AASK V3.0 for 
this accident.
Whilst the external fire burned through the fuselage and destroyed the aircraft during 
the period that evacuation occurred conditions during the evacuation were relatively 
good. Only a few passenger accounts described seeing light smoke during the 
evacuation. The only obstructions that passengers described during the evacuation 
were from other passengers. Thus, whilst this accident could be classed as a burn- 
through scenario conditions were non-severe during the evacuation phase within the 
aircraft cabin itself.
The only account of seat climbing from this accident comes from a male passenger 
seated in 34H. He described his route being blocked with passengers who were 
searching for belongings. Thus, he decided to climb over 13 rows of seating to reach 
the LOW exit.
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This accident demonstrates an instance of passenger seat climbing in an evacuation 
that did not involve a major fire. Furthermore this account demonstrates a passenger 
climbing many rows of seating to completely circumvent congestion. No accounts 
relating to either cabin crew redirection or passenger aisle swapping were reported in 
this accident.
The following 5 accidents involved substantial fires that penetrated the cabin fuselage.
All of these accidents contain references to crew redirection/exit choice and seat 
jumping behaviour and none contain reference to aisle swapping behaviour (see Table 
33).
Table 33: Burnthrough fire accidents and behaviours contained within accounts
On the 1 st of February Fairchild Metro liner, carrying 20 passengers and one 
cabin crewmember, crossed an active runway and collided with a departing B737-300 
during its takeoff roll. The Fairchild Metro liner jammed underneath the forward 
fuselage of the B737 and was instantly destroyed killing all of the passengers onboard. 
Following the impact the B737-300 lost control and crashed into a disused fire station 
where fire engulfed both aircraft. The fire was severe completely destroying the Metro 
liner and penetrated the B737 cabin through the floor where the Metro Liner was 
embedded. Consequently, the fire in the B737 was of greatest intensity where the 
Metro Liner was jammed, e.g. in-between the forward and over wing exits.
The B737-300 had a pair of forward Type-I exits, a pair of Type-Hi over wing exits and 
an aft pair of Type-I exits. The FR, LOW, ROW and AR exits were used during the 
evacuation. The first two rows of seating were arranged in the 2-2 configuration with 
the remaining seats arranged in the 3-3 configuration. Cabin crewmembers were
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stationed at the forward and aft exits. The cabin layout and exit availability can be seen 
in Figure 39.
/NK*
Figure 39: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the B737-300 at Los Angeles in 1991 (crossed
out exit was unavailable)
In total 42 passenger accounts from this accident are available within the A ASK V3.0. 
Of these only two are taken from full transcripts and 40 are based on accounts 
contained with various air accident reports. Data from three full transcripts of cabin 
crewmember accounts are available within A ASK V3.0.
From their descriptions it is apparent that the cabin quickly filled with toxic gas and 
smoke. Passengers described the effects of the cabin environment as making visibility 
difficult, some stated the difficulty as being severe, causing them difficulty breathing 
and/or causing them to hold their breath, some were forced to crawl. One passenger 
described the effects of the smoke as The female AL cabin crew stated 
that they and the 23 year old male cabin crew at the FR exit 
stated that he had In conclusion conditions within the 
cabin were dire.
One cabin crewmember and 20 passengers of the four and 83 that were onboard the 
B737 perished, mainly from thermo-toxic exposure. The other three cabin 
crewmembers and 26 passengers sustained injuries during the evacuation. Only 37 
passengers avoided any injuries.
In total seven passengers described a redirection event. The first was from a 46 year old
male seated in 6A. He initially attempted to evacuate at the rear of the aircraft. He 
moved past the over wing exits. He stated that he then noticed that there were 15
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people ahead of him moving aft. He looked around for alternative options and spotted 
the left over wing exit, which at this time was still closed. He stated that he 
He also stated that he did not hear any 
cabin crewmembers throughout his evacuation.
The second account was from a 53 year old female seated in 13F who originally chose 
to evacuate via the ROW exit. However, she redirected to the LOW exit as she thought 
that there were too many people ahead of her using the ROW exit. She also stated that 
she did not hear the commands of cabin crewmembers during the evacuation.
The third redirection event was described by a 22 year old male passenger seated in 
ISA. He originally attempted to evacuate using the ROW exit, however stated that he 
decided to redirect to the AR exit as the aisle to the ROW exit became blocked with 
passengers. This passenger stated that he heard someone shouting instructions during 
the evacuation.
The fourth was from a 25 year old female seated in 17B. She originally began to move 
forwards, presumably towards the over wing exits. However, this passenger stated that 
"choking smoke" forced her to redirect to the AR exit. She did not comment on 
whether she heard cabin crewmember instructions.
The fifth was from, a 44 year old male who was seated in 17F. He had originally began 
to move towards the over wing exits. However, chose to redirect to the AR exit as he 
stated that there were He also stated that other 
passengers followed his lead and redirected to the AR exit. He did not comment on 
whether he heard the instructions of the cabin crewmembers during the evacuation.
The sixth and seventh did not actually change their direction of travel during the 
evacuation, however described hearing crew commands during the evacuation. Both of 
these two passengers were situated within 5 rows of the aft exit. The first, a 49 year old 
male in 19A stated that 
Another, a 26 year old female passenger seated in 21E stated that the AR 
crewmember She also stated that she 
and that the passengers seemed to be moving forwards."
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The accounts of the cabin crewmembers corroborate the accounts of the passengers in
this emergency evacuation. The first is from a 26 year old female cabin crewmember 
originally assigned to the AL exit. She stated that she began to redirect passengers 
from the AL to the useable AR exit. However, she tried to redirect passenger from the 
over wing exits towards the aft exits. She stated that this was unsuccessful. Her 
description of events was that 
The cabin 
crewmember also stated that she attempted to move to the over wing exit, presumably 
so as to physically manhandle them, but was forced to turn back by the environmental 
conditions within the cabin. As she stated, 
None of the passengers that evacuated via the over 
wing exits stated that they heard the commands of the cabin crewmember during the 
evacuation.
The 26 year old male cabin crewmember that was stationed at the AR exit was 
preoccupied with expediting the use of the escape slide. As such he stated that he did 
not see much of the proceedings within the cabin.
Finally, the 23 year old male cabin crewmember stationed at forward right exit where 
the fire was most intense commented that "/ 
He also commented that he could not see or be seen 
and that Only four passengers evacuated from the forward 
right exit.
In total there are 9 passenger accounts describing seat-climbing behaviour all of 
whom evacuated via the over wing exits. Each account is described in order of seat 
location below.
The first account was from a 23-year-old female originally seated 4D who described 
crawling across seats to evacuate via the ROW exit. She did not specify how many 
seats that she crawled over although she stated that shortening the path to the exit was 
her reason for taking this action.
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Another description came from a 46-year-old male passenger seated in 6A. He 
described moving towards the ROW exit, but noticing that the LOW exit was not 
open. Having noticed this, he described jumping over a couple of seats, opening the 
exit and then evacuating through it. He stated that congestion was his reason for 
climbing over seating.
Another account was from a 22-year-old male seated in 6E who described climbing 
over 3 rows of seating in order to reach the ROW exit before diving out of it. From 
his starting position, jumping over three seats would have taken him directly into the 
exit row. He stated that the sight of passengers jammed in the aisles was his reason 
for seat jumping.
The next account was from a 36-year-old male who was seated in 7D. He described 
climbing over one seat to get to the ROW exit. He stated that shortening his route to 
the exit was his reason for climbing over the seating. Since there were three rows 
between his initial seating location and the exit row, he must have entered the aisle 
only to later climb over seating once he was within a single seat row of the exit.
Another account was from a 29-year-old male seated in 9F who described jumping 
over the single row of seating that stood between him and the ROW exit. He stated 
that minimising the distance of his route to the exit was his primary reason for seat 
jumping. Furthermore, this passenger stated that he started seat jumping almost 
immediately that the evacuation begun.
Another account was from a 32-year-old female seated in 11C. She described 
climbing over one row of seating. This would have taken her directly into the over 
wing exit row. She stated that she had to climb over the seats in order to reach the 
exit due to other passengers blocking her preferred route.
Another instance was from a 51-year-old male seated in 11D. This passenger stated 
that he noticed that the back of the seat at 10E could be pushed down to afford access 
to the exit row. Having noticed this, he pushed the seat back down and climbed into 
the exit row, where he proceeded to open the exit.
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Another passenger, a 26 year old male seated in 15F described having to travel over 
seats to get to the ROW exit. He stated that shortening his route to the exit was his 
reason for this behaviour.
Finally, a 37-year-old male seated in 14D also described jumping over seats. His 
description of this event within A ASK V3.0 was short. He only stated his reason for 
jumping seats, which was to reduce the route to the exit. This passenger also 
described seeing other passengers "running" over the tops of the seats.
No reports of aisle swapping were contained within AASK for this accident. 
However numerous accounts of redirection were reported. From the passenger 
accounts of this accident contained within AASK, it appears that those passengers 
that changed direction did so regardless of cabin crew instructions. Furthermore, 
most stated that seeking to reduce the number of people in the queue ahead of them as 
their reason for redirection. In other words they were trying to minimise their own 
personal evacuation times. This conclusion is even apparent from the accounts of the 
two passengers that categorically stated that they heard the cabin crewmember calling 
for passengers to move aft who observed that the majority of passengers were moving 
forwards.
The cabin crew described their effectiveness as being severely reduced by the cabin 
conditions. Furthermore, the accounts of the cabin crewmembers indicate that most 
passengers either did not hear or ignored the commands of the cabin crew. 
Consequently they made their own evacuation decisions that were, invariably, based on 
a personal assessment of the quickest available evacuation route. However with 
hindsight, their decisions may not have actually achieved the fastest evacuation 
possible. This was highlighted by the fact that the aft exit exhausted its supply of 
passengers. Those passengers at the periphery of the ROW exit queue may have 
expedited their evacuation by redirecting to the AR exit. However, they did not. The 
reason for this is unknown. It may be that they simply did not know that the AR exit 
was available. Alternatively it may not have been possible to see clearly from the OW 
areas to the aft of the cabin. If so, they may not have realised that the AR exit had 
exhausted its supply of passengers. Alternatively, they may have over estimated the
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flow capability of the ROW exit, thus making it a more attractive option than risking a 
potentially lengthily navigation through the smoke logged aircraft cabin to the AR exit.
From these accounts it is apparent that a passenger initiated redirection model should 
take into account the environmental conditions within the cabin and the reduced 
movement speeds that are associated with it. In addition, the conclusion from the non- 
fire cases that instructions from crew should override the plans of the passengers is not 
corroborated in this accident. In this case the passengers either did not hear the 
commands of the crew or decided that they had a better idea of which route provided 
the quickest exit or where not prepared to move through the smoky environment.
In addition to crew redirection, numerous accounts were available describing seat 
climbing behaviour. Of these three were from passengers who were seated in rows 
immediately adjacent to the exit, one was from a passenger who moved through the 
aisle until he neared the over wing exit where he jumped the adjacent row. In other 
accounts, one passenger claimed to climb three seat backs. Unfortunately the 
remaining passengers did not indicate the number seat rows that were jumped.
The reasons that were cited by the passengers for climbing seats were varied. Six 
stated that they wanted to take the shortest route to the exit, whilst two described 
congestion as their reason - the remaining passenger did not specify a reason for their 
actions. Two of the three passengers that jumped the adjacent row seating to the exits 
stated congestion and the other shortening the route as their reasons. The passenger 
that jumped three rows did not give a reason for seat jumping.
Passengers that chose to seat jump in this accident were not as young as those in the 
Manchester accident. However, most of the ages (22,23,24,26,29,32,37,46,51) were 
below the mean age of passengers contained within A ASK V3.0 for this accident 
(mean age of 34 years). Gender was split with six males and three females 
describing seat jumping.
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Table 34: Summary of those passengers that described seat climbing within AASK V3.0 from the Los
Angeles accident in 1991
On the 30th of July, 1992 a L1011 aborted take-off immediately following rotation at 
John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York. In doing so the captain touched 
down with some force. The Captain determined that the aircraft would not stop before 
colliding with a blast fence at the end of the runway. He therefore steered the aircraft to 
the side of the runway where the evacuation ensued. During touch down the aircraft 
sustained damage that led to the development of a severe external fire that later 
penetrated the cabin.
Onboard the aircraft was a full passenger complement of 280 passengers and 9 cabin 
crewmembers. There were no fatalities, although 10 passengers were injured during the 
evacuation. None of the cabin crewmembers were injured during the evacuation.
The quantity of passenger accounts contained within the AASK database V3.0 for this 
evacuation is low (39). Of these, 14 were based on full transcripts of passengers, 20 are 
based on reported transcripts within air accident reports and five were inferred from the 
accounts of others. Nine cabin crewmember entries were available within AASK. Of 
these 7 were based on summary style of testimonies and 2 were inferred from the 
accounts of others.
The aircraft had four exit pairs. The front two pairs and the aft were of Type-A. The 
MA exit pair was of Type-I. Whilst six exits were opened passengers evacuated 
through only three, the FL, FR, and MFR (see Figure 40).
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Figure 40: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the L-1011 at John F. Kennedy in 1992 (crossed
out exits were unavailable)
Only one passenger, a male seated in 31-1, stated that smoke obscured his vision during 
his evacuation. This was not corroborated by other passengers and crew. In fact all of 
the cabin crewmembers stated that they could see and be seen during the evacuation. 
The physical conditions within the cabin must be considered as close to the 90-second 
certification trial scenario.
Figure 41: AASK generated seat plan view of exit use during the evacuation of a L-1011 at John F. 
Kennedy on 30th of July 1992 (circled passengers must have bypassed an exit)
Only four passenger accounts make reference to redirection events. The first was from
a 38 year old male seated in 26-3. This passenger stated that he initially started to move 
towards the MAL exit, however later he redirected to the forward exits having seen 
flames at the MAL exit. The second account was from a 53 year old male who was 
seated in 36-9. He stated that he heard cabin crewmembers saying 
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He stated that this confused passengers in other parts of the aircraft. The third was from 
a 63 year old seated in 3-4. This passenger stated that the 
The final reference was from a female seated in 
34-5. She described passengers being forward through the cabin.
Cabin crewmember accounts contained within A ASK V3.0 on this evacuation are brief.
In total nine accounts are available. However, none are taken from full transcripts of 
their testimony. Seven are taken from a summary presented within an air accident 
report and two are inferred from the accounts of others. From this data only three 
accounts make reference to redirection events.
The first is from the 44-year-old female cabin crewmember stationed at the MAL exit. 
This crewmember reported opening the MAL exit. However, whilst doing so she 
noticed that smoke and flames entered the cabin. She decided that the exit was not 
useable and blocked it from passengers. She noticed an glow through the 
window of the opposite exit in the MA exit pair and decided that this was also 
unusable. She proceeded to redirect passengers forward. She stated that she had no 
difficulties in instructing passengers.
The 35-year-old female cabin crewmember stationed at the AL exit followed a similar 
chain of events. Again she opened her exit and determined from flames and smoke 
entering the cabin that the exit was unusable. She directed passengers forward to 
alternative exits. Again, she stated that she thought that she could be seen and heard 
throughout the evacuation. The 35-year-old cabin crewmember stationed at the AR 
followed a similar series of events.
From the accounts contained within the AASK database it appears that redirection 
occurred within this evacuation. From the few passenger accounts that exist it appears 
that their instructions were heard, although not always understood. Examination of the 
AASK seat plan viewer revealed that three passengers (dashed circle in Figure 41) 
bypassed their nearest useable exit, the MFL, and used exits at the front of the aircraft 
cabin. Thus more instances of redirection occurred than were described. In addition, 
whilst not mentioned within AASK V3.0 the official NTSB air accident report of this 
accident states that 
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This suggests that the cabin crewmember at the 
MFR position may have diverted passengers forward towards the under utilised forward 
exits. Unfortunately the lack of data on this evacuation precludes further conclusions.
There was only one passenger that stated that they jumped over seating during the 
evacuation. The account was from the mother of a 35-year-old male who was seated 
in 35-9. She described her son climbing over some seating in order to switch aisles. 
He evacuated via the MFL. It is not known whether this description referred to 
'squeezing' side-ways through the seating or climbing longitudinally over seat backs.
The usefulness of this accident in providing insight for the development prototype 
redirection sub-models is limited. From the data contained within AASK all that is 
really apparent is that passengers moved forwards through the aircraft cabin under the 
instructions of the cabin crew. In addition, there was one reported instance of seat 
climbing and/or aisle swapping behaviour. The detail of this account was however too 
small to draw meaningful conclusions.
On the 3rd December 1990, a DC-9 taxied onto an active runway and collided with a 
B727 during its take-off roll. The DC-9 suffered extensive impact damage. A major 
fire quickly developed which eventually completely destroyed the DC-9 aircraft.
The aircraft contained two pairs of exits and a tail cone exit. Of these only the FR, FL 
and LOW exits were used during the evacuation. The first two rows of seating were in 
the 2-2 configuration, with those after in the 2-3 configuration. The seating layout and 
exit availability can be seen in Figure 42.
Figure 42: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the DC-9 at Detroit in 1990 (crossed out exits
were unavailable)
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Onboard the DC-9-20 were 40 passengers and 2 cabin crewmembers. Both of the cabin 
crewmembers and 31 of the passengers were injured onboard the DC-9. Nine of the 
passengers that were onboard the DC-9 were killed, mainly from thermo-toxic exposure 
as the fire penetrated the cabin. The B727 suffered some structural damage but was not 
subjected to fire. All of the 5 cabin crewmembers and 146 passengers that were 
onboard the B727 evacuated without injury. This section concentrates purely on the 
evacuation from the DC-9-20.
Data for only 17 of the 40 surviving passengers are available within the AASK database 
V3 for this accident. This data was based on reported testimonies taken from air 
accident reports. Only one crewmember account was available. The cabin 
crewmember data was taken from a summary style of testimony.
Conditions within the cabin were extremely hazardous. An 82 year old female seated in 
18D stated that the cabin contained debris. Furthermore, she stated that expired 
passengers acted as obstacles to movement in aisles and in negotiating Type-IE exit 
passageways. Another passenger, a male from 9D, stated that visibility was reduced 
during the evacuation. Passengers stated that they and 
another that she saw The fire was most intense at the rear of 
the aircraft. This had the effect of making passengers move forwards, away from the 
seat of the fire in a very rapid manner. The accounts of passengers indicated that the 
evacuation was very urgent, exemplified by the account of one passenger who stated 
that the during the evacuation.
Relevant survivor testimonies from the DC-9-20 concerning redirection events are
presented below.
A male seated in 7D stated that the crowd was forward. However, he stated 
that he thought that there was an exit close by that was not being utilised. He therefore 
visually searched for it whilst continuing to move forwards. He stated that he spotted a 
closer exit that was positioned four rows behind him. He shouted for other passengers
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to open the exit, which they did. He then stated that the crowd surge pushed him 
through the exit once it had been opened.
Two more passengers stated a similar chain of events. The first, a male seated in 9D 
stated that he was moving forward when he noticed that the LOW exit had been 
opened. He subsequently changed direction and evacuated through the nearer LOW 
exit. The second, a male seated in 10A stated that he too noticed the LOW exit was 
being used. Having noticed, he backtracked two rows and exited via the LOW exit. 
This event is also significant as it demonstrates passengers deciding to change their 
direction of travel during an evacuation.
A male passenger seated in 9D stated that his rapid evacuation benefited from what he 
thought were poor redirection decisions by others. As he stated 
There were no comments from the cabin crew relating to redirection within the AASK
database for this accident, although in the one account that was available the 
crewmember commented on the physical cabin conditions, stating that it was dark.
Only one passenger described seat jumping during this accident. The passenger, a 
male seated in 1 ID, stated that he jumped over 2 seats and dove for the LOW exit 
opening, and landed on the wing. He did not give any more details on his reasons for 
taken this course of action. The number of rows that he climbed may indicate that he 
climbed the entire route to the exit.
No reports of aisle swapping were reported for this accident. Although one account of 
seat climbing was present it was of little value when considered in isolation as it merely 
described an instance of seat climbing behaviour.
Numerous accounts involving redirection were available from this accident. It appears 
that the redirection in this emergency evacuation was due to a new escape path 
becoming available. Indeed in this evacuation the majority of passengers opted to use 
their nearest available exits. This is highlighted by the fact that only 11 passengers 
are known to have evacuated via the pair of forward exits compared to 6 known to
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have evacuated through the LOW exit. This is significant as the LOW exit has a third 
of the evacuation capability of the combined forward exits. In addition, the LOW exit 
took longer to prepare. In other words many more passengers used the over wing 
exits than was optimal for the aircraft as a whole.
It appears in this accident that more passengers should have used the forward exits than 
did. This was highlighted by the account of the passenger in 9D who stated that the 
mass redirection of others expedited his personal evacuation. Again this demonstrates 
the unwillingness of passengers to risk movement through a hazardous cabin. The 
reason for this is again not clear. It maybe that the passengers over estimated the 
evacuation capability of the nearer Type-in exits, thus perceiving it as a better option 
than reality. This suggests that passengers do not fully appreciate the flow capability of 
aircraft exits. They may tend to over-rate the flow capability of some exits, in 
particular small Type-IE exits. This would have the effect of making it more attractive 
than it should be.
From the accounts within the database it appears that the crew were quite ineffective 
during the evacuation. Indeed, few passengers stated that they heard any instructions 
from the cabin crew during the evacuation.
On the 22nd of August 1985, a B737-300 suffered an uncontained engine failure during 
its take-off roll at Manchester Airport, England. The captain aborted take-off and 
stopped the aircraft at the side of the runway where evacuation ensued. The prevailing 
wind caused the fire plume from the left engine to be directed onto the aircraft fuselage. 
The fire penetrated the cabin.
In total there were three exit pairs fitted to this aircraft. From front to rear they were of, 
Type-I, Type-in and Type-I. Of these only the FL, FR and ROW exits were utilised. 
There was a large delay of approximately 50 seconds in preparing the ROW exit for 
use. Seating was arranged in the 3-3 configuration throughout the aircraft. The seating 
layout and exit availability can be seen in Figure 43.
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Figure 43: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the B737-236 at Manchester in 1985 (crossed out exits were
unavailable)
Conditions within the cabin were extremely hostile to life as toxic gas and smoke was 
initially sucked through the cabin from the slightly open AR exit and later penetrated 
through the cabin. Numerous passengers stated that they had difficulty breathing, some 
were forced to hold their breath and suffered reduced visibility. Graphically a 50 year 
old male seated in 8D reported using his handkerchief to wipe soot away from his eyes 
so that he could see better. The cabin manager stated that smoke emanating from the 
rear of the cabin quickly reached the galley area and became rapidly more dense and 
acrid. The other cabin crew member stated that the smoke forced her down onto her 
hands and knees. In addition, the accident investigation found numerous bodies within 
the aisles and seats adjacent to the over wing exits. Some of these may have acted as 
obstacles during evacuation. In short, evacuation was perilous.
Two of the four cabin crewmembers and 53 of the 131 passengers onboard the aircraft 
died from the effects of the fire and toxic gases and a further 15 passengers were 
injured.
In total 75 passenger entries are contained within AASK V3. These were taken for the 
full testimonies of passengers. Only 2 cabin crew entries are contained within AASK. 
Both of these come from summary style testimonies.
The first is from an 18 year old female seated in 7E who originally intended to use the
ROW exit which was 5 rows to her rear. Having waited in the aisle for some time she 
decided to redirect to the forward exits. The reason she stated for redirecting was that 
the aisle was too congested. To circumvent congestion behind her she was forced to
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climb over seating en route to the front exits. She eventually exited through the FR 
exit. She described the environment within the cabin as reducing her visibility and 
causing her to have difficulty breathing. Furthermore, she did not mention whether she 
heard cabin crewmember instructions or not.
The next account was from a 42 year old male seated in 9C. He also redirected from 
the ROW exit to the FR exit. He did not explain his rationale in making this decision 
nor whether he heard the instructions from cabin crew. Neither did he describe the 
effects of the hostile cabin environment.
Another account was from an 18 year old female seated in 11F, she stated that she 
attempted to enter the aisle. However, she stated that she could not. Presumably this 
was because it was packed with other passengers. She followed her boyfriend, who 
was sat in 1 IE, and redirected to the forward exits again exiting via climbing over seats. 
She did not state whether she heard the commands of cabin crewmembers or the effect 
that the thermo-toxic environment had upon her evacuation. Her boyfriend's testimony 
was brief and did not describe the evacuation in detail.
A 42 year old passenger in 13D stated that he noticed that the queue in the aisle for the 
ROW exit was stationary. From his seating location this passenger would have had to 
move 2 rows forwards to reach the exit. He therefore considered using the LOW exit. 
However he determined that fire outside the cabin made this choice of action too 
dangerous. Consequently, he decided to move forwards within the cabin and to head 
towards the forward exits. He eventually exited through the FL exit. He described the 
cabin environment as causing him difficulty in breathing. He did not mentioned 
whether he had heard cabin crewmembers during the evacuation. He did not mention 
whether he was forced to climb over seating en route to the exit. His family were 
seated next to him. They also evacuated via the forward exits. Presumably they 
followed a similar course of actions.
From the AASK seat plan viewer it is apparent that two more passengers, a 24 year old 
female sat in 14A and her friend a 28 year old male sat in 14B (circled in Figure 44), 
also bypassed the nearer over wing exit and evacuated using the front exits.
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Unfortunately they did not provide a detailed account of their evacuation within their
testimonies.
Figure 44: AASK generated seat plan view of exit use during the evacuation of a B737-300 at 
Manchester England on the 22nd of August 1985 (circle denotes passengers that must have bypassed an
exit)
Cabin crew data within AASK V3 is limited for this accident. Hence it was not
possible to derive anything meaningful from their accounts.
hi total there are 17 passenger descriptions of seat climbing contained within AASK 
V3.0 for this accident. They will be discussed in ascending order of their seat 
location and the exits that they used.
The first account is from a 19-year-old female seated in 3F. This passenger described 
attempting to climb seats to reach the exit. However, she stated that she was unable 
to climb over them and fell. She evacuated via the FR exit.
The next account was from a 21-year-old male seated in 6B. He stated that his aisle 
was moving too slowly and as a consequence he decided to climb over an unspecified 
number of seats. He finally exited via the FR exit.
Another was from an 18-year-old female seated in 7F who also described climbing 
over approximately 5 rows of seating. She did not specify her reason. She exited via 
the FR exit. An 18-year-old female passenger who was sat in the adjacent seat (7E) 
described waiting for the aisle. However, she stated that it didn't clear and so she 
decided to travel over the seating instead. She climbed an unspecified number of
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seats. She also exited via the FR exit. She stated that she followed other passengers 
(presumably the passenger in 7F) to the exit.
Another account was from a 42-year-old male seated in 9C who described climbing 
seats on the right hand side of the cabin. This passenger must have entered and 
subsequently left the aisle in order to climb over the seats on the right hand side of the 
cabin. He did not specify how many seats he climbed or his reasons for doing so. He 
exited via the FR exit.
Of those passengers that evacuated via the FR exit, five described climbing seats en 
route to the FR exit. There was a reasonable spread across gender (4 females and 1 
male), but these passengers are mainly youthful, with ages of 18,21,18,18 and 42. 
Four of the passengers jumped seats on the right hand side of the cabin, two of whom 
were seated adjacent to each other. The side of the cabin that passengers climbed 
seating could not be determined for one of the passengers.
Only one passenger stated how may seats he climbed, stating that he climbed 
approximately 5 rows. Two reasons for jumping seats were stated. They were, that 
the aisle was moving too slowly and that they followed the actions of another.
The remaining 12 accounts contained within A ASK for this accident involved 
passengers climbing seats en route to the ROW exit. They are each described in turn.
The first was from an 18-year-old female seated in 9D. She described jumping over 
one row of seating. Another passenger, a 21-year-old male who was seated in the 
adjacent seat (9E), also described jumping over one row of seating. This passenger 
stated that he chose his course of action as it offered the shortest route to the exit.
Another account was from an 18-year-old female originally seated in 11F who 
described attempting to get into aisle but stated that she could not. She described 
following her boyfriend over seating. It is likely that her boyfriend, a 21-year-old 
male seated in 1 IE, may have decided to jump seating for similar reasons and perhaps 
used the same route.
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Another account was from a 14-year-old female seated in 14F who described falling 
unconscious during the evacuation but recalled climbing over seating during the 
evacuation.
The next passenger to describe seat climbing was a 20-year-old female seated in 15A 
who described climbing over several seats before cutting back into the aisle and 
evacuating via the ROW exit. It should be noted that given her seating location she 
would have had to climb five seat backs rows to reach the exit. She stated that she 
took this action as her path out of the seat row and into the aisle was blocked by a 
male passenger seated in 15C.
A passenger sat in the adjacent seat (15A), and 19 year old female in 15B, also 
described her path into the aisle being blocked by a male passenger who refused to let 
her pass. She also described climbing over three seats to reach the ROW exit. Her 
actions were very similar to the passenger who was sat next to her.
Another account was from a 23-year-old female seated in 15D also described 
climbing over seats en route to the ROW exit. She did not specify any more 
information about this event.
The next passenger account within the database of seat climbing was from a 29-year- 
old female who was originally seated in 18E. She described climbing over seats to 
head straight out of the ROW exit. Her friend who was seating in 18F followed a 
similar course of actions. However, she - a 19-year-old female - cited that congestion 
in the aisle was her reason for climbing over seats.
The final passenger account of seat climbing behaviour was from a 21-year-old male 
seated in 20B. He described climbing at least one row of seating en route to the ROW 
exit. No more details were supplied by this passenger.
In total there were 12 passenger accounts of seat jumping en route to the ROW exit. 
Of these one - the 14 year old - was more a case of being pulled semi-unconscious 
over the seating rather than actually deciding to jump the seats. As such she is 
discounted from the remainder of the discussion. Of the remaining 11 accounts, they
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were from relatively youthful passengers (ages of 14, 18, 18, 18, 19, 19, 20, 21, 21, 
21, 23 and 29) and were from both males and females (eight females and three 
males). Eight out of eleven of these accounts were from passengers who were seated 
adjacent to each other and possibly followed the lead of others and chose a similar 
course of actions.
Table 35: Summary of those passengers that described seat climbing within AASK V3.0 from the
Manchester accident in 1985
Reasons cited by the passengers, were to shorten the route to the exit (3 accounts), to 
circumvent blockages (3 accounts), and being forced to by the environmental 
conditions (1 account); the remaining passengers did not specify reasons for their 
actions. It was difficult to ascertain the exact distance that they travelled over 
seating, although accounts do indicate that two passengers climbed three seat rows.
This aircraft type was not appropriate for aisle swapping behaviour to occur. However,
some instances of redirection were reported, all of which were passenger initiated. 
Indeed the primary reason that they stated for redirecting was that they decided that the 
current exit was over utilised and that their evacuation could be completed more 
quickly via another exit. The emphasis in this accident was on the passengers seeking 
to reduce their own, and their families and friends, personal evacuation times. Thus 
some passengers redirected from over utilised exits towards other exits within the cabin. 
This accident supports the view that in accidents involving severe fires passengers tend 
to make their own decisions regarding the best exits to use.
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With respect to seat climbing is apparent that seat climbing behaviour was more 
common among the youthful. The average age of respondents in AASK V3.0 for this 
accident is 27.5 years, whereas the average age of those that seat jumped was 21.3 
years. Secondly, many of the passengers who were seated adjacent to the exit leaped 
over the intervening seating. Others attempted to circumvent blockages and/or to 
gain egress expediency. Finally, similar actions were given by 10 of the 16 
passengers who were originally seated adjacent to each other and 13 of 16 were 
seated adjacent and or in close proximity (within a seat distance of each) to each 
other. It therefore seems likely that passengers may have copied the actions of 
another when climbing over seating.
On 31 st of August 1988, a B727 carrying 101 passengers and 4 cabin crewmembers 
abandoned its takeoff shortly after rotation. Following a hard landing onto the runway 
the aircraft over-ran the runway and impacted with the ILS localiser.
The aircraft contained four pairs of exits. From front to rear they were of, Type-I, 
Type-El, Type-in and Type-I. During the crash sequence the aircraft sustained 
significant impact damage with the fuselage rupturing in many places. Evacuation was 
achieved through the FL, FLOW and FLOW exits. In addition some passengers 
evacuated through forward and aft ruptures in the ceiling the through a rupture in aft 
left fuselage. The first four rows of seating were configured 2-2; the remaining seating 
was in the 3-3 configuration. The exit availability, seating layout and location of the 
ruptures can be seen in Figure 45.
Figure 45: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the B737-222 at Dallas Fort-Worth in 1988 (crossed out exits
were unavailable)
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During the crash the right wing contacted the ground and caught fire. The fire attacked 
the aft fuselage and penetrated the aircraft cabin whilst the evacuation was in progress. 
The accident resulted in the death of 12 passengers and 2 cabin crewmembers. A 
further 71 passengers and 2 cabin crewmembers sustained injuries. All of the fatalities 
were attributed to smoke (toxic gas) inhalation.
Conditions within the cabin during the evacuation were hostile. Some passengers 
commented that they whilst others stated that they suffered reduced 
visibility and were forced to crawl during the evacuation. The effects of the fire were 
most severe at the aft portion of the cabin. Numerous passengers reported that debris 
was obstructive to their evacuation.
In total 88 passenger entries are contained within AASK V3. Of these 66 are based on 
transcripts reported in various air accident reports and 22 are inferred from the accounts 
of others.
The first passenger account of redirection listed within AASK is from a 30 year old
female seated in 20D who assisted other passengers in opening the over wing exit, 
however she quickly abandoned this choice of exit as flames and smoke entered the 
cabin through the opening. The passenger evacuated via the FL over wing exit.
A 34 year old male seated in 16A began to evacuate towards the rear of the aircraft 
however he said that the rear exits were congested with so many people that he headed 
back towards the front of the aircraft. He finally evacuated through a rupture in the 
fuselage ceiling.
Another instance of passenger redirection was from a 67-year-old female passenger 
seated in 18E and a 69 year old male passenger seated in 18F. They decided to switch 
exits after noticing that other passengers in the aisle were stationary. They both finally 
evacuated through the AL over wing exit.
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A 36 year old male passenger seated in 11A tried to evacuate via the front exit however 
discovered that it was blocked and so evacuated via a fuselage rupture.
Finally, a 51 year old male passenger seated in 27C tried to exit at the rear of the 
aircraft, however he found that he could not see and so turned around and helped his 
step son to evacuate. Both finally evacuated via a fuselage rupture.
Only two cabin crew accounts were available and were brief summaries. As such they
contained little information on the evacuation.
In total five passengers described climbing seats during this accident. Each is 
described in order of their seat location below.
The first was from a 30-year-old female passenger seated in 1A who stated that she 
climbed one row of seating. This passenger did not specify her reason. She finally 
evacuated via the rupture at row one and so may have been moving forwards. This 
instance was not of a passenger optimising their evacuation route to an exit, but more 
a case of using the seats as a 'ladder' to evacuate via a ceiling rupture. As such it is 
not appropriate to the proposed model at this stage.
Another account was from a 38-year-old male seated in 19C who described climbing 
over one row of seating. He stated that it was the motion of dark smoke towards him 
that made him decide to take this course of action and as he stated he "dove" over the 
seating to the FLOW exit.
The next account was from a 24-year-old female seated in 21C. She stated that she 
climbed over the back of her seat and "hopped" out of the ALOW exit. She did not 
state her reason for taking this action. This passenger was located in the seat row 
immediately adjacent to the exit row.
The final account for this accident was from a 38-year-old male seated in 26A. He 
described climbing over some seats and debris whilst attempting to evacuate via the 
rupture at row 27. A 27-year-old female seated in 28D described seeing a man climb
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over seating in order to evacuate via a rupture. Again, this passenger was using 
seating as a 'ladder' to gain access to a ceiling rupture rather than seeking to reduce 
his evacuation time to an exit. As such this case is not appropriate to the model at this 
stage.
Table 36: Summary of those passengers that described seat climbing within AASK V3.0 from the
Dallas Fort-Worth accident in 1988
No accounts of aisle swapping occurred since this aircraft was narrow bodied. 
However there were some accounts describing redirection behaviour. The accounts of 
passengers contained within AASK V3 for this accident indicate that the passengers 
made their own evacuation decisions during this evacuation. It appears that congestion 
was the primary reason that passengers stated for redirecting. None of the passengers 
described hearing cabin crew issue redirection commands during the evacuation.
Four passengers described climbing over seats. Two of these were seated adjacent to 
the exit row and decided to climb the single seat row in order to gain access to the 
exit. The remaining two passengers climbed seating to access ruptures in the ceiling. 
Only one passenger cited a reason for climbing the seats. This passenger stated that 
the presence of smoke made him decide to hop over the single row of seating that was 
between him and the exit. Similar to previous accidents passengers who climbed 
seating were relatively youthful with ages of 24,30,38 and 38. The mean age of 
passengers onboard the aircraft was 40.2 years whilst the mean age of those that 
climbed seating was 32.5 years. Half of those passengers that climbed seating were 
male.
The following accident involved an internal in flight cabin fire. The only accident
available in this category was at Cincinnati in 1993. This accident contained accounts 
relevant to redirection/exit choice behaviour only.
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On the 2nd of June 1983 a DC-9-30 in mid-flight was forced to make an emergency 
landing following a fire in a toilet compartment panel. The fire was worst at the aft of 
the cabin where the fire had begun. By the time that the aircraft landed at Greater 
Cincinnati International Airport, Kentucky, the aircraft cabin and cockpit was full of 
dense black smoke. Evacuation swiftly followed landing. Remarkably, none of the 
cabin crewmembers sustained any injuries. However, 23 of the 41 passengers that were 
onboard were killed and 16 injured; only two passengers escaped injury.
The aircraft had 3 pairs of exits and one tail exit. Front from to rear, they were, a Type- 
1, Type-IH and Type-IH. Passengers and crew evacuated through only four of the exits. 
They were the FL, FROW, FLOW and AROW. Seating was configured in the 2-3 
arrangement throughout the aircraft cabin (see Figure 46).
Figure 46: Cabin configuration and exit availability of the DC-9-32 at Cincinnati in 1983 (crossed out
exits were unavailable)
The cabin crew had some time to prepare for the evacuation. There activities included 
the briefing of passengers on exit operation and the redistribution of passengers towards 
the front of the aircraft where the environmental conditions were less severe.
Environmental condition during the evacuation caused passenger visibility to be almost 
completely obliterated. Nearly all passengers described the cabin as being filled with 
dense black smoke. Furthermore, many described its affect as asphyxiating. During 
the evacuation passengers described the effects of the thermo-toxic environment as 
causing them difficulty in breathing with some stating that they had to hold their breath, 
suffering dizziness, severe reductions in visibility with some stating that they suffered 
eye irritation; some were forced to crawl. In short the cabin conditions were extremely 
hostile to life. A 34-year-old male commented that the smoke another 
man commented 
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In total there were only 18 passenger entries for this accident contained within AASK 
V3.0. 14 were based on reported transcripts contained within various air accident 
reports and four were inferred from the testimonies of others. Only three cabin 
crewmember entries were contained within AASK. All of these were taken from 
summary style testimonies.
From the AASK database only a few accounts exist in which passengers changed
direction.
The first account is from a 39-year-old female seated in HE. This passenger had 
intended to evacuate via the right over wing exit, but as she felt her way back through 
the cabin she could not find an exit. Eventually, she stated that she felt a breeze on her 
leg. This alerted her to the proximity of another exit. She turned and exited via the 
FLOW exit. This passenger described the effects of the cabin environmental conditions 
as causing her difficulty in breathing and seeing.
Another account is from a 28-year-old female seated in 3A. This passenger stated that 
she initially attempted to evacuate using an aft exit. However, whilst feeling her way 
aft through the aisle she encountered a passenger moving forwards. She turned around 
and moved towards the forward exits, finally evacuating through the FL exit. She 
described the cabin atmosphere as causing her to feel dizzy, suffer eye irritation and 
have difficulty breathing. Both of these passengers did not report hearing instructions 
from cabin crew during their evacuation.
A final account was from a 30 year old female who was sat in the centre of the cabin at 
the start of the evacuation. During the evacuation she moved to the FL exit and took 
responsibly for managing its use. She also stated that she issued commands for 
passengers to She stated that the passengers complied with these 
commands. She stated that the atmosphere within the cabin was irritant, dense and that 
it made her feel dizzy. She stated that she had to feel her way to the front of the cabin. 
She also stated that she could not see or be seen during the evacuation.
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A similar version of events was cited by the 28-year-old female cabin crewmember.
Again she was seated in the mid portion of the cabin during the landing. She also felt 
her way to the front of the aircraft, she stated that 
and had to feel her way forward using the seat backs. Once at the exit she took 
responsibility for its usage.
The 39-year-old senior cabin steward positioned himself between the first row of seats 
and the bulkhead during the evacuation. He stated that he called instructions during the 
evacuation. However, he stated that 
No reports of seat climbing behaviour were reported for this accident. In part this
may reflect the reduced mobility of the passenger that resulted from exposure to toxic 
gases prior to and during the evacuation. With respect to aisle swapping behaviour, 
this aircraft type was not appropriate for aisle swapping to have occurred.
There were however some reports of redirection. From these it is interesting to note 
that none of the passengers stated that they heard the commands of any of the cabin 
crewmembers during the evacuation. However this could be an artefact of their 
testimonies rather than actual events as numerous passengers invested much of their 
testimonies describing the events prior to landing in more detail rather than those of 
the evacuation itself. From the testimonies of passengers and crew it appears that 
little or no redirection occurred in this accident. The main reason stated for 
passengers changing their direction during the evacuation was that they had 
inadvertently passed an exit or met somebody walking in the other direction. Recall 
that visibility was completely obliterated forcing all evacuees to feel their way 
through the cabin. Whilst cabin crewmembers stated that they issued commands only 
one of the passengers stated that they heard them. Conclusions from this emergency 
evacuation are that dense smoke obliterates vision and makes movement extremely 
difficult. Given that movement is a time consuming business redirection would 
become a very unattractive option.
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This investigation has revealed a relatively large number of descriptions of redirection 
events and features that require representation in a mathematical model of the process.
From, the accounts contained within AASK it is apparent that all forms of redirection 
are based on an assessment of the current situation within the aircraft cabin and so 
change as the scenario evolves. Thus, models used to represent the passengers and 
crew should allow them to assess their environment throughout the simulation. Indeed, 
this investigation provides evidence to suggest that the stimulus to a redirection event is 
a change to the environment/scenario, i.e. changes to exit availability, congestion levels 
within the cabin or environmental conditions. Any model that is developed should 
take this into account.
A further finding of this work is that that redirection behaviour in emergency 
evacuations is relatively frequent. However, the data examined suggests that in 
scenarios without fire the behaviour of passengers was quite different to those in which 
fire was present. Indeed some differences were also observed between 90-second 
certification trials and real emergency evacuations that did not involve fire. 
Simplistically behaviour are grouped into two broad categories that define their 
characteristics,
  non-fire/external fire scenarios, and
  burn-through/internal fire scenarios.
As with 90-second certification trials, in the non-fire cases it was apparent that cabin 
crewmembers were able to redirect passengers to alternative exits with relative ease and 
that the majority of passengers appeared to do as instructed. Only a few instances of 
passengers disobeying the commands of the crew were present within AASK. 
However, when disobedience was observed it involved the passenger(s) deciding that 
they had a better evacuation route than that proposed by the crew. These differences 
are however small with the accounts reviewed in this thesis indicating that passengers 
were marginally less subservient to crew instructions in real emergency evacuations 
even those that did not involve fire or involved external fires.
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Another finding of this investigation is that in non-fire and external fire evacuations 
passengers sometimes chose to redirect themselves. This type of behaviour is 
occasionally witnessed during 90-second certification trials, however it is rare - in 90- 
seconds certification trials passengers generally do as instructed by the crew. In order 
to model redirection in non/external fire emergency evacuations it is necessary to have 
a form of passenger-initiated redirection. In other words there is a requirement to 
develop a model to represent passenger exit choice. Such a model should simulate 
passengers' attempts to find the shortest personal evacuation time.
Another feature of non/external fire scenarios was that passengers who were finding 
their own evacuation routes were generally willing to abandon their plan and obey 
orders from cabin crew when instructed. A model to simulate real emergency 
evacuations should incorporate this feature in non-fire or external fire scenarios.
The accounts of passengers and crew from accidents involving severe fires that 
penetrated the aircraft cabin were very different to those in which fire was absent or an 
external fire was present. Firstly, in burn through fire scenarios passengers were 
extremely insubordinate to crew instructions. It could not be determined whether this 
was due to an inability to hear instructions or simply electing to ignore instructions. 
Either way, the net result was that the passengers were very unlikely to obey crew 
commands. Secondly, the presence of a thermo-toxic atmosphere greatly affected the 
ability of the crew when collecting dynamic information. Very often in fire cases the 
visibility in the cabin was not conducive to vision at all. Any model should have a 
mechanism of representing the limiting effects that smoke has upon vision. Also the 
ability of the crew to communicate instructions to passengers was also extremely 
reduced in burn through scenarios. Any model of real emergency redirection behaviour 
should have a mechanism of representing reduced communication effectiveness.
Unfortunately there is very little evidence on which to base conclusions. Only one 
definite report of aisle swapping of the type defined earlier was present within the 
accounts contained in AASK. However, its absence does not mean that aisle 
swapping simply does not occur in real emergency evacuations but may indicate that
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it is not considered important enough to warrant description in post accident 
testimonies. The development of a model in this work will then be primarily based 
on the visual evidence from video footage of 90-second certification trials. That said, 
it is not unreasonable to assume that aisle swapping would occur with a frequency at 
least equal to that witnessed during 90-second certification trials. In addition, similar 
to redirection it is possible that during highly charged evacuations such as burn 
through scenarios passengers may be more likely to consider alternative strategies and 
swap aisles. Some representation of these features is considered desirable for a 
model.
Overall citations of seat climbing behaviour in passenger accounts are relatively low 
with approximately 1 out of 20 passengers describing seat climbing behaviour. The 
majority of citations come from accidents that involved cabin burn through. The 
reason for this is somewhat unclear. A possible interpretation is that passengers are 
more likely to climb over seating in accidents that involve a fire threat and a potential 
entrapment situation. However, conclusions should be tempered by the fact that more 
detailed reports were available for input into AASK from burn-through accidents, as 
such a higher frequency might be expected.
A further finding of this investigation is that the majority of seat climbing descriptions 
originated from only three narrow-bodied aircraft accidents. This may suggest that 
once someone has begun to climb seating others are likely to follow a similar course 
of action. This conclusion is strengthened by the accounts of passengers who were 
sat adjacent to each other describing similar actions during the evacuation. This is 
more clearly seen through plotting the seat locations of those passengers that seat 
climbed (see Figure 47). It can be seen that many passengers who seat climbed were 
sat adjacent to each other (solid rings) or within one seat of each other (dash rings). 
Also from Figure 47 it can be seen that much of the seat climbing behaviour were 
instances of passengers climbing a single seat row adjacent to a Type-III over-wing 
exit.
Only seat climbing accounts originate from accidents involving wide-bodied 
aircraft. All of which would be classed as non-severe emergency evacuations, i.e.
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burn-through did not occur. This reflects the lack of severe wide-bodied aircraft 
evacuations involving burn-through or internal fires contained within AASK. The 
closest accident involving a wide-bodied aircraft was that which occurred at John F. 
Kennedy Airport in 1995. However whislt this accident suffered burn-through, it 
occurred only once the passengers had evacuated the aircraft. Of the three accounts, 
from non-severe wide-boided accidents two referred to aisle swapping and seat 
climbing and did not specify the number of rows that were climbed. Only one of the 
accounts actually cited the number of rows that were climbed (13 rows). As such 
there is little available data on seat climbing in severe emergency conditions on wide- 
boided aircraft.
Finally, the gender of passengers that did decide to climb over seating was mixed; 
however the ages of passengers that climbed over seating was skewed towards the 
youthful. This suggests that the young are more likely to climb over seating then the 
elderly.
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Figure 47: Seating locations of seat climbers from Manchester 1985, Los Angeles, 1991 and Dallas
Fort-Worth, 1988
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The investigation in this chapter has to some degree answered the question 
and has 
also provided some understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in these 
behaviours.
In doing so a blueprint for answering the final two questions raised in this thesis can 
be addressed, namely, "How can the results and behavioural capabilities of the model 
be improved?" and "How can the behavioural capabilities of the model be extended to 
cover the range of behaviour witnessed in real accidents scenarios?" In this context 
the following blueprint for model development to answer these two questions is 
proposed.
Firstly this study suggests that behavioural characteristics during emergency 
evacuation can be categorised into three broad groups for the development of a 
model, they are,
  90-second certification trials
  non-fire/external fire scenarios, and
  burn-through/internal fire scenarios.
Crew redirection was frequently witnessed in every category, although its 
effectiveness differed according to the scenario. In contrast passenger seat climbing 
was most frequent in burn-through scenarios and barely witnessed in other types of 
evacuations. Curiously accounts of aisle swapping were absent from non/external and 
burn-through fire scenarios. This is thought to originate from passengers considering 
it of minor detail when filling questionnaires.
The principle mechanisms that are involved in these behaviours are,
1. the collection of information,
2. the processing of the information, and then
3. the actioning of any decision based on the above,
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and are similar across the three scenario categories. However, the effectiveness and 
outcome of each aspect varies according to the scenario/category. Any model should 
consider the three processes, their influences and effectiveness in the context of the 
three scenario groups. This should enable the trends of the three scenarios to be 
modelled accurately. The next two chapters document the development of models 
based on this blueprint.
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This chapter details the development of models to represent crew intervention during 
evacuations based on the analysis of previous accidents and 90-second certification 
trials from the previous section. Before, describing the model it is necessary to 
appreciate the dilemma that is faced by mathematical modellers of human behaviour.
When developing computer based models of human behaviour we are confronted with 
either lack of scientific understanding of the process involved or limitations imposed by 
current computational resources. Thus a degree of abstraction is nearly always 
required. However this must be tempered by the requirement that the model 
realistically represents the processes involved.
Conceptually, mathematical models of human behaviour exist within a continuum. At 
one end of the continuum lies a model that exactly represents the human decision 
making process. This is unlikely to be achieved due to limitations in scientific 
understanding and computational resources required to simulate them. At the other end 
of the continuum lies a simplistic mechanistic model of human behaviour that only 
consider the mechanisms involved with movement and virtually ignore all decision 
making. The need for realism prohibits models at this end of the continuum also. 
Thus, realistic mathematical models of human behaviour inhabit the middle ground and 
attempt to balance the need to represent the human processes via the use of 
mathematically derived approximations based on appropriate abstractions from current 
scientific understanding.
An understanding of the required features of a crew redirection model for use in 90- 
second certification trials was developed in the previous chapter. The proceeding 
sections describe the development of a mathematical method of representing this crew 
procedure. Prototypes of the model are then employed within the airEXODUS 
framework.
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The crew redirection models that are developed are designed to simulate a crew 
member stood relatively close to an oversubscribed active exit and bypassing 
passengers either forwards or backwards to another. Three examples of the type of 
scenario the crew direction model attempts to solve are shown in Figure 48. In each 
example a crew may be required to redirect passengers to other exits (indicated by the 
arrows). It is apparent from these three examples that redirection could occur in a range 
of different scenarios and configurations.
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 48: Three example scenarios that the crew initiated redirection model attempts to simulate
Figure 49: Redirection models that are developed
The complexity of behaviour exhibited during emergency evacuations can be viewed as 
a continuum in which a relatively small behavioural sub-set is produced during 90- 
second certification trials and a more complex and extensive behavioural sub-set occurs 
during highly stressed real emergency situations. As such the development of models is 
tackled incrementally, beginning with the simplest set of behaviours (i.e. 90-second 
certification trials) and then extending the model to cover more complex scenarios (i.e. 
real emergency evacuations). Based on the findings of the previous chapter, three sub- 
variations of the redirection models are developed (see Figure 49). Each model
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represents a different layer of behavioural complexity and so the number of features 
that are required in order to model the process is extended in each case (see Table 37).
Table 37: A Summary of the required features of passenger and crew redirection models according to the type of scenario
From the analysis of video footage of the redirection procedure, it was apparent that the 
first aspect of the model is for the crewmember to move to the designated redirection 
station within the cabin. Whilst the basic mechanics of simulating movement are well 
understood within evacuation modelling, additional analysis of video footage was
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required in order to understand and then model the unique nature of crew/passenger 
confluence. From the analysis of 90-second certification trials it was clear that the crew 
move throughout the cabin with relative ease and passengers are cooperative to the 
wishes of the crew. Within the model crew always win conflicts for space, however a 
small penalty should also be applied to their unimpeded movement speed to represent 
the relative awkwardness of squeezing past other passengers.
Each individual cabin crewmember is usually only responsible for a certain number of 
exits. However, as the evacuation unfolds the crew may move to other passenger 
direction stations and in doing so adopt/relinquish control of certain exits. In reality a 
crew that has more than one redirection station during the evacuation each have 
responsibilities for many exits, however during the evacuation each crewmember would 
concentrate on those that are specific to his/her current location/role.
As such, from an 'object orientated' perspective it was decided that exit responsibility 
should be considered as a property of the redirection station rather than the 
crewmember. This approach has advantages, primarily with respect to flexibility as it 
allows the role of crewmembers to change during the evacuation.
Within the model a crew first occupies a particular redirection station and takes the 
appropriate role and exit responsibilities for the station and the redirection process is 
initiated. The passenger direction process is concluded within the model when the crew 
determines that passengers in his/her assigned areas of responsibilities fall below some 
arbitrary threshold value. If the crew member was directing passengers until the 
completion of the evacuation this would be until the cabin is completely empty, i.e. a 
threshold of zero. It is recognized that in reality the cabin crew would use a range of 
criteria for determining when to cease redirection procedures. For example, they may 
cease redirection once a reasonable balance between exits is perceived and/or for a 
specified period of time has elapsed. At present a threshold value of zero, i.e. the cabin 
must be completely empty, has been employed within the experimental prototype. 
Extending the prototype to include the additional methods is of minor technological 
difficulty and is left for future work.
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Based on the analysis of video footage and crew interview transcripts a summary of the 
decision making process of crew in real 90-second certification trials is now described. 
When performing the redirecting procedure the cabin crew constantly assesses 
passenger flow patterns and conditions within the cabin. In doing so they would use 
their judgement to determine whether one exit will cease evacuating before another. 
They may consider factors such as which exits are moving more quickly than others 
and the number of users of each exit. In essence the crew member is performing a 
simple flow rate calculation in their head based on their intuitive knowledge of the 
aircraft and the events within the cabin.
If the cabin crewmember determines that there may be a problem, then they consider 
redirecting a passenger. At this stage it is necessary for the cabin crewmember to 
determine whether redirection would reduce the scale of the problem or alleviate the 
problem completely. This involves the crewmember assessing the impact of 
redirecting passengers, i.e. do they think redirecting will help or hinder the evacuation. 
This process also involves the crewmember selecting passengers to redirect who would 
best help to alleviate any imbalance in exit performance. In essence this involves 
assessing another flow rate calculation in which they presume that certain passengers 
would use the alternative exit and recalculate the finishing times of the exits 
accordingly. The final stage of the process involves the cabin crewmember 
communicating their instructions to passenger(s).
The flow diagram presented in Figure 50 summarises the sequence of events previously 
described and will serve as the basis of the prototype model. The prototype models that 
are developed in this chapter reflect this process. Within the prototype models a crew 
member will be given knowledge of the flow rate capabilities of the exits and the exits 
that the passengers are going to use. Using this information a determination can be 
made on whether redirecting a passenger from an overloaded exit to one that is 
undersubscribed would expedite the evacuation of the aircraft. This will take account 
of the flow pattern within the cabin and will use a rudimentary scheme for simulating 
the vision of crew. Having determined that it is beneficial to redirect a passenger, 
further algorithms are provided to simulate the communication of commands and the 
passenger's response to them. Each aspect of the model will be described in more 
detail in the following sections.
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Figure 50: Abstract flow diagram of the cabin crew model when redirecting passengers
According to Figure 50 the first step for the cabin crewmember is to determine whether 
there is an imbalance in the time that each of the exits for which they have 
responsibility will cease evacuating passengers. This involves forming an estimate of 
the likely finish time of the exits. This process is complex, involving a judgment of 
numerous factors such as the size of the exits, number of passengers using each exit, the 
likely exit choice of those passengers, their movement speeds, the nature of the queues 
within the cabins i.e. continuous or segmented. 
Given this complexity it is necessary to simplify 
the process to those aspects that are most vital to 
a model and capable of capturing the qualitative 
trends witnessed in 90-second evacuations.
The method adopted for estimating the likely finishing time of exit uses the flow 
capability of the exit and the number of passengers that are thought to be using it. It is 
not considered unreasonable to expect trained cabin crew to know that a Type-Hi exit 
would generate a much lower flow rate than a Type-A exit. This knowledge is 
represented through providing simulated cabin crew with an estimate of the amount of
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time that it typically takes to evacuate a passenger through each of the exit types (see 
Table 38). This estimate is analogous to the crew's perception of the capabilities of 
each of the exit types. The estimates shown in Table 38 were calculated using the 
average flow rate for each exit type and are indicative of general performance levels for 
their type [158]. These estimates will uniformly provide the crew with an extremely 
accurate assessment of the average flow rates through exits. However, in reality their 
judgement may not be so accurate and individuals' assessments would vary. To more 
realistically model these factors some error can be introduced into the static flow rate 
estimates in Table 38.
The number of passengers who will use each exit is considered as being dynamic 
information and thus should be collected by the crew throughout the evacuation. Two 
approaches to representing this information are proposed. The first approach gives 
cabin crewmembers a complete information set with regards to the location of 
passengers during the evacuation. The Total Dynamic Information Set (TDIS) method 
allows the cabin crewmember to know the exact location of every passenger onboard 
the aircraft at all times. This represents an optimal situation bestowing crew with 
complete visual access of their environment and as such does not represent the actual 
information gathering capabilities of the crew. The second implementation, Line Of 
Sight Information Set (LOSIS), limits the knowledge of the cabin crewmembers 
according to their line of sight.
Computationally, line of sight calculations are very expensive. Thus, within the 
experimental prototype model functionality has been developed for the user to 
manually define visibility regions specific to the location of the crewmember. Since 
redirection only occurs from specific redirection stations visible regions need only be 
supplied at the redirection stations. This limits the effort that a user must expend in 
defining visibility within the cabin whilst also avoiding the computational expense of 
line of sight calculations. Furthermore the approach is flexible allowing input from 
specific visual access software or experimental studies. Independent of the 
implementation, limiting dynamic information gathering to that of line of sight or visual 
accessibility is a more realistic method of representing dynamic information gathering
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within evacuation models. Both the TDIS and LOSIS approaches have been 
implemented within the prototype.
At this stage a simplistic estimate of the likely finish time of each exit for which the 
crew is responsible for is calculated using Equation 13. Considerations for passenger 
movement are dealt with later.
Ti=pifi 
i = an exit from the list of exits that the crewmember is responsible for and monitoring,
i.e. R1,L1,R2....
TI = clearance time of exit 
pi = the number of passengers thought to be using the exit i 
fi = an estimated amount of time required to evacuate a passenger through exit i 
R1 R2
Figure 51: Hypothetical cabin section showing how a crewmember using the total knowledge 
implementation would ascertain the number of passengers likely to utilise each exit
Using the TDIS method of information gathering, the number of passengers (Pi) that 
would be counted as using each exit is determined according to the area of the cabin 
section in which they are positioned, i.e. the potential well catchment areas for each 
exit, and the flow pattern within the cabin, i.e. their preferred exits. This is explained 
through a graphic example (see Figure 51). Figure 51 shows a hypothetical cabin 
section that has two Type-I exit pairs of which only the left side are operable. A cabin 
crewmember is positioned within the vestibule area of the R2 exit and is monitoring the 
flow of passengers to the two active exits, LI and L2. Given the scenario illustrated in
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Figure 51, the prototype model would conclude that 9 passengers are likely to use the 
LI exit whereas 13 passengers are likely to use the L2 exit.
Within the model an estimate for the likely amount of time required to evacuate a 
passenger through a Type-I exit (fi) under 90-seconds certification trial conditions is set 
to 1.04 passengers/second. This number represents the average exit flow rate of this 
type of exit during 90-second certification trials (see Table 38). Equation 13 using 
Figure 51 as an example produces an estimated time of 9.4 seconds for exit LI and 13.5 
seconds for exit L2. In this example it is estimated that there is an imbalance of 
passengers between the LI and L2 exits that amounts to 4.2 seconds.
[ I
Figure 52: Hypothetical cabin section showing how a cabin crewmember may visually ascertain the 
number of passengers likely to utilise each exit using the visual accessibility method
Within the prototype model, functionality has been included so that the amount of 
visual information that is available to cabin crew when performing bypass is restricted. 
Figure 52 shows the same cabin section as Figure 51, however in Figure 52 the visible 
region has been defined for the crew direction station. Once defined, the cabin crew 
can only see passengers that are located within the visible region for their redirection 
station.
The visible regions approach essentially imposes a stencil onto the geometry that 
prohibits vision of areas that not contained within the stencil, i.e. those areas that are not 
visible (see Figure 53).
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Figure 53: The use of a hypothetical stencil to limit visual access during the evacuation
The impact that this would have is seen through revisiting the hypothetical scenario 
defined in Figure 51. It can be seen that using the visible regions defined in Figure 52, 
the crew member's vision is somewhat hampered by the location of partitions, 
monuments and seats. Using the visible regions, the cabin crewmember would 
determine that 1 passenger was likely to use the LI exit and that 7 passengers were 
likely to use the L2 exit. Recalculating Equation 13 using the visible regions indicates 
that L2 would likely finish evacuating passengers in 7.28 seconds, however the LI exit 
would likely finish evacuating passengers in 1.04 seconds. Using the visible regions 
method (see Figure 52) the imbalance cause simulated crew to form different 
conclusions.
The mathematical method of determining the imbalance in the time required to evacuate 
passengers through exits for which the crewmember is responsible can now be 
formalised. An imbalance of passengers (T1), is calculated by the crew member at 
every second via subtracting the best finish time of the exits ( Tbest ) from the worst 
finish time of all exits ( Tworst ), see Equation 14. If an imbalance is sufficiently large 
then the cabin crewmember is alerted to the fact that redirecting some passengers away 
from the exit with the longest time to clear (Tworst) may be needed.
T an estimate of the imbalance between exits
Tbest= min {TLi,TRi.. .Tn } i.e. the best clearance time of the cabin crewmember's exits
Tworst = max {TLi,TRi...Tn } i.e. the worst clearance time of the cabin crewmember's
exits
n = the total number of exits
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Just what constitutes a sufficiently large difference would vary according to the ability 
of the crew to judge when an imbalance exists. This is modelled via the use of a new 
parameter called 'judgement' and represents crewmembers' perception abilities. The 
actual value used is not important so long as it prohibits the crew having the ability to 
determine tiny differences in exit finishing times, i.e. differences in the finishing times 
of 1 second, 0.2 seconds or 0.01 seconds, and smaller. Within the experimental 
prototype the value is arbitrarily fixed at 5 seconds. Within the model the judgement 
attribute is used to determine whether any difference is perceptible thus,
T best - T worst ] < judgement NO recognisable difference 
Should a cabin crewmember have determined an imbalance between the likely finish
times of their exits then the next stage for the cabin crewmember is to consider some 
form of passenger bypass.
This section describes a model of how the crew may redirect a passenger to another exit 
in order to alleviate an imbalance in the likely finish times of exits. Within the 
prototype model the cabin crewmember will only consider the redirection of those 
passengers that are currently positioned within communication range and a visible 
region. More complex situations in which a cabin crewmember has to move in order 
fetch passengers or communicate with other cabin crew are the subject of future work.
When considering passengers that are within communication range, the cabin 
crewmember is primarily concerned with moving passengers from the exit that is going 
to finish evacuating passengers last, i.e. the exit that is responsible for Tworst towards the 
exit that is going to finishing evacuation passengers first, i.e. the exit that is responsible
Furthermore the crew would exclude some passengers who are perceived to be unable 
to react to her command within a reasonable amount of time. Passengers that are 
unbuckling seat belts or waiting in seat row congestion are not appropriate candidates 
for redirection as they are not in a position to respond to any crew command. This is 
realised within the experimental prototype by limiting passengers that are considered 
for redirection to those that have: a) responded to the call to evacuate and b) are located 
within open terrain, i.e. aisles, cross aisles or vestibules.
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Presuming that there are appropriate candidate passengers for redirection within their 
area of influence, a cabin crewmember would select passengers who are best placed for 
redirection to the new exit, i.e. the exit that will finish evacuating passengers the 
soonest (the exit responsible for Tbest )  Primarily their assessment would be limited to 
those who they can communicate with, i.e. those that are within their range of 
communication and are visible. The crew further considers the flow pattern within the 
cabin and the length of time that it will take the passenger to reach the alternative exit, 
this is dealt with in a later section of this chapter.
Firstly methods of calculating the time for a passenger to reach each exit that takes into 
account the flow pattern within the cabin are developed. These methods are used to 
determine passengers that are best placed for redirection through ranking the candidate 
passengers in order of the length of time it will take them to reach the exit. This 
provides the crew with a mechanism for choosing which passenger to redirect. To do 
this, the cabin crewmember first estimates how long it is likely to take the passenger to 
reach the alternate exit if the passenger were redirected. This is calculated from 
knowledge of the passenger's movement velocity (vj), adjusted according to the terrain 
that the passenger will traverse and the distance that the passenger is located from the 
exit (di). Further adjustments for environmental conditions are considered in a later 
section.
# _ 1A
ti = the passenger under consideration
tbest = the exit responsible for generating Tbest
v = the velocity of the passenger i
d = distance for passenger t to the alternative exit best
t = time for passenger i to exit best
As with the estimate of the clearance time this approach bestows the crew with 
exceptional abilities when determining how long it will take the passenger to reach an 
alternative exit. Again this represents an unrealistic situation, as the crew would not be 
able to exactly know the movement speeds of the passengers or the exact length of the 
evacuate route. This is addressed through the introduction of errors or 'fuzziness' into
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their assessments. In this way the crew can only approximate the movement speeds of 
the passengers and the length of the evacuation route. This is discussed in more detail 
later.
A key assumption of this approach is that the route that the passenger has to travel is 
free from other passengers. Obviously this is not always the case. Therefore, the 
model should have the cabin crewmember scan the path that the redirected passenger 
has to traverse to reach the alternative exit to assess the flow pattern within the cabin.
Figure 54: Examples of indirect and direct confluence
If the cabin crewmember suspects confluence then an appropriate penalty, determined 
according to the severity of the confluence, is added to the time required for the 
passenger to reach the exit, this is shown as Equation 17. A direct confluence is 
defined as one in which another passenger blocks the route and is moving directly 
opposite to the route of the passenger, i.e. Passenger C from passenger 'A's perspective 
in Figure 54. An indirect passenger is one that is not moving in direct opposition to the 
planned route but may still act as a hindrance, i.e. Passenger B from passenger 'A's 
perspective in Figure 54. Within the prototype every passenger on the proposed route 
(the route to Tworst) that is not using the alternative exit (Tworst) is assumed to be an 
indirect confluence. Direct confluences are determined via the direction of their 
movement. Finally, should the crew be unable to see the path to an exit then an amount 
of confluence is assumed for this portion of the route. The assumed level of confluence 
is determined using the ratio of confluence/space within the visible area for the route.
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17
t° = the confluence penalty for passenger en route to the alternative exit best 
t' = the revised travel time for passenger i en route to exit best
A hypothetical evacuation 
scenario is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 55. In 
this example the TDIS 
scheme is used. If the 
cabin crew were to 
determine whether there is 
merit in switching
situation passenger A from the over 
utilised Exit 1 to the under utilised Exit 2, the likely confluence for the proposed route 
to Exit 2 would be factored into her decision making via an adjustment to the travel 
time assessment in Equation 17. In this example, the cabin crewmember would 
determine that there are five passengers on the route, two of whom (B and C) are 
moving in an opposite direction to the proposed route of passenger A. Given this the 
travel time to the exit is increased and thus the cabin crewmember would likely decide 
against redirecting passenger A. Whilst, it has not explicitly been stated within the 
model that crew should avoid redirecting passengers into an flow of passengers moving 
in the opposite direction, however this behaviour emerges from providing the crew with 
a mechanism of understanding the implications of flow patterns within the aircraft.
Figure 55: Hypothetical cabin section demonstrating a confluence
This example is extremely artificial as the order that the crew assesses passengers for 
redirection is determined by the time that it would take them to reach the alternative 
exit, thus presuming that they are visible and within effective communication range, the 
crew would consider redirecting passengers C and B before finally considering 
passenger A. The example is provided merely to illustrate how the simulated crew 
would factor confluence effects into egress route calculations.
The calculation of the time that it takes the passenger to reach the exit (Equation 4) 
utilises both dynamic and static information. The distance of the entire route to each of 
the exits is static information and should be known by the crew. However, the potential
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number of confluences en route must be obtained during the evacuation, this is dynamic 
information that must be collected. The two previously proposed methods, i.e. TDIS 
and LOSIS, are appropriate for crew redirection. An assumption of the model is that 
when using the LOSIS scheme the crewmember estimates the level of confluence in 
non-visible areas using a ratio of confluences/metre in the visible area.
Using this method an ordered list of eligible passengers for redirection is calculated. 
However, redirecting them may not yield any benefit as it may take them a long time to 
reach the alternative exit (Tworst)- The crew must then assess their travel times against 
the size of the exit imbalance.
To do this a revised estimate of the flow time of the alternative estimate is first 
calculated adding one to the number of users (i.e. pbest + 1 in Equation 13). In addition 
it is necessary to calculate a revised clearance time for the exit from which the 
passenger has been donated. This involves subtracting one from the total number of 
users for the exit responsible for pWOTst (i.e. pworst -1 in Equation 13
If the alternative exit is relatively free from passengers then it could be that the revised 
estimate of the finish time of the alternative exit is merely the time required for the 
redirected passenger to reach the exit. However, if the alternative exit is being utilised 
by numerous other passengers then the revised finish time may be a function of the 
number of passengers using the exit. It is necessary to determine which of these two 
factors is greatest. A simple estimate for the finish time of an alternative is calculated 
as the greater of either the time required for the total number of passengers to flow 
through the exits, i.e. Equation 13, or the time required for the redirected passenger to 
travel to the exit taking into account any confluence, i.e. Equation 17. Thus, the revised 
estimate of the finishing time of an alternative exit evacuating, presuming that the 
passenger is redirected, is calculated as Equation 18.
is 
T'' = the revised estimated finish time for the exit best
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If the revised estimate of the finish time for the alternative exit (T") is less than the 
revised finish time of the donating exit, i.e. T' Worst, then there is merit in redirecting the 
passenger, see Equation 19.
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It may be that the cabin crewmember determines that there is no advantage to be gained 
from redirecting the passenger best placed for redirection to Tworst, i.e. the first 
passenger in the crew's ordered list of eligible passengers. Should the nearest 
passenger be found unsuitable then the cabin crewmember would not redirect anyone, 
but would continue to assess the situation in the hope that one passenger will offer a 
benefit in future. Presuming that a passenger is found that will alleviate the imbalance 
in the likely finish times of the exits, the cabin crewmember then performs a final check 
to make sure that bypassing the passenger would not lead to a period of exit inactivity 
at a local exit. It would be a waste of time to redirect the passenger if the path to the 
closest exit is free. In other words the cabin crewmember must ensure that a flow of 
passengers is maintained to closest exits, including the exit from which passengers are 
being taken and redirected. This is a logical necessity, as cabin crew would surely not 
redirect a passenger who is adjacent to an idle exit to another exit in the cabin section.
Thus the model should contain a final assessment of local conditions before issuing the 
command to a passenger. It could be argued that this assessment is made before any 
redirection is considered, i.e. the crew only consider redirection if local conditions are 
appropriate. Indeed this may well be the case. However, within a sequentially 
structured program, such as airEXODUS, an order has to be specified. From the 
perspective of computational load, it was better to have the crew assess local conditions 
only when a redirection was likely to be required. In terms of the development of this 
model, the argument is irrelevant as long as both checks are made prior to redirection 
being performed. Thus, the 'final' assessment has the crew assess conditions at the 
local exit prior to redirecting passengers. The judgment of local conditions is complex 
and varies according to the geometry of the structure and the exits that the crew is 
managing.
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This check involves the cabin crewmember scanning the paths of passengers within 
their redirection zone (as determined via the visual and later communication 
algorithms) to the nearest exit from the crewmembers location. A general check that 
passengers' paths are relatively free from others, i.e. has a 1 passenger/metre density 
across the route, is first performed. If the density is below 1 passenger/metre the 
crewmember deems that the flow to their local exit is thinning and chooses to redirect 
the passenger to the closest exit instead. In addition, two specific flow patterns within 
the model also alert the crew that redirection away from the nearest exits is ill advised. 
The first is only used when the crew is adjacent to an active Type-Hi exit, i.e. within 2 
metres of the exit. In this situation the crew will only redirect a passenger away from 
the exit if the through seating passageway that leads to the exit is completely full of 
other passengers. In other words if the seating is not completely full then the crew will 
reject redirection and determine that the flow to the local exit is thinning (see Figure 
61 (a)). The second flow pattern is used when redirecting passengers away from floor 
level exits only. Within the prototype this is achieved by having the crew notice when a 
sizable gap develops between the passengers and the queue to the local exit (see Figure 
61(b)). The size of the gap is arbitrarily set to approximately 1.5 metres.
Figure 56: Two examples of conditions that would trigger a local exit override within the model, (a) 
denoates a break in the flow to the local exit (marked as area A) whereas b) demonstrates a break in
flow at a type three exit.
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In this manner a period of 
inactive flow the crew's 
local exit overrides any 
redirection to more distant 
exits. Thus, a flow of 
passengers is achieved
Figure57: A hypothetical cabin section which would require bypass , ,,  , 
.1 v   j ,   Detween tne exit tnat (a), and an example or the cabin section during an evacuation -
passenger A would not be bypassed as a closer exit is free requires additional
passengers and the exit from which passengers are being taken.
Figure 57, represents a hypothetical cabin section in which 42 passengers seats are 
located. The cabin section contains two pairs of Type-in over-wing exits, of which 
only the right side are active. Figure 57 (b) shows the cabin section during an 
evacuation. It can be seen that 13 passengers are located forward of the Rl exit and 22 
are located rear of R2. A cabin crewmember is positioned adjacent to the Type-in exit 
and is attempting to balance the number of passengers using each exit.
From Figure 57 (b) it is apparent that there is a need for some of the passengers that are 
likely to use the R2 exit to be bypassed towards the Rl exit. However, bypassing 
passenger A in Figure 57(b) would be counter productive, as the passenger has an 
unobstructed route to a closer exit (R2). Whilst bypass is necessary, choosing to bypass 
passenger A would not be advisable, as this would increase the period of inactivity at 
the R2 exit. In such an event the cabin crewmember would redirect passenger A 
towards the relatively inactive exit R2. Indeed the rules of the model would allow the 
crew to bypass a passenger only when the seats that lead to the Type-HI exit are 
completely full of passengers.
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Figure 58: Flow chart of the airEXODUS implementation of cabin crew directed bypass or redirection 
Finally, the decision was taken that passengers may be redirected multiple times as this 
type of behaviour has been observed in several actual accidents (see the Manchester 
evacuation in 1998 and Dallas Fort-worth in 1993, Section 5.4.6.4 and Section 5.4.5.1). 
Indeed, similar situations could arise within the model when using the LOSIS visibility 
method as crew with different levels of visibility may each determine different 'best 
options' for the aircraft as a whole. In this event the most recent adopted command is 
followed by the passenger.
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This completes the portion of the prototype model that detects the need for redirection 
and selects an appropriate passenger. A complete sequence of events described in this 
section are summarised as a flow chart in Figure 58. Presuming that the cabin 
crewmember wishes to redirect a passenger the next stage is for the crewmember to 
communicate the command to the passenger.
Once a cabin crewmember has decided to redirect a particular passenger they must 
communicate an instruction/command to the passenger. As mentioned previously cabin 
crewmembers have the ability to communicate their instructions to passengers through 
a number of different methods. Typically they are through gestures, verbal commands, 
or physical encouragement. In reality methods of communication would be numerous 
perhaps involving shouting and/or waving of arms. Within the prototype model 
communication is categorized as being either or Within the prototype 
model two concentric circles are defined around the crewmember that represent the 
range of effectiveness for each type of communication. One represents the range 
within which a cabin crewmember may physically handle or touch passengers. The 
second radius represents the range within which a cabin crewmember is able to 
communicate to passengers through voice and/or gestures. Within the model touch 
range is uniformly applied to all crew and is fixed at 1 metre, i.e. arms length, whereas 
the voice/gesture range varies according to the abilities of the crew and the conditions 
within the cabin. Situations in which the crewmember leaves the duty station to 
redirect passengers is the subject of future work.
Within the prototype model only passengers that are located within the cabin 
crewmember's touch range, such as passenger A in Figure 59, may be physically 
handled by the cabin crewmember. Those passengers outside the touch range cannot be 
physically communicated with. However these passengers may be communicated with 
through verbal communication or gestures. In other words, those passengers that are 
located outside of touch range, such as passenger B in Figure 59 but are located within 
the voice/gesture range may be communicated with through verbal communication or 
gestures. Passengers that are located outside of both touch and voice/gesture range, 
such as passenger C in Figure 59, may not be able to receive any communications.
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Figure 59: Example of communication ranges. Passenger A is within passenger B is 
within and passenger C is beyond the range of this communication for this cabin
crewmember.
Figure 60: Two different cabin crewmembers with different levels of communication effectiveness, (a)
a cabin crewmember with a relatively low level of voice/gesture effectiveness and (b) a cabin
crewmember with a relatively high level of voice/gesture effectiveness
In reality when considering redirecting passengers the crew may only consider 
passengers that they consider susceptible to their influence. Whilst in some 
circumstances it may be beneficial for them to redirect passengers that are 10, 20 or 30 
metres away from them, they may not always choose to do so. For example in very 
densely packed noisy conditions the crew may choose not to communicate with
235
_____________________Chapter 6_____________________
passengers that are relatively distant. In essence the crew have some mechanism for 
determining whether or not communication attempt is worth attempting.
Setting values for these attributes for use within the model is extremely difficult. 
Indeed a multitude of factors that would which prove extremely difficult to quantify 
from current research make a mathematical calculation of the effective vocal range for 
cabin crew extremely problematic.
In reality absorption effects from boundaries, i.e. walls and furnishings, impact upon 
such a range and are dependant upon the properties of the boundaries and types of 
furnishings. This is compounded further by atmospheric factors that serve to scatter 
sound. These factors vary according to air temperature, density, the presence of smoke 
particulates, etc. In addition, sound reverberation and reflection effects would need to 
be considered: within the enclosed environment of an aircraft cabin, the location of 
other passengers, seating, stowage bins, etc, would influence these factors. Add to this, 
the existence of differences in power and frequencies of the human voice and variations 
in the hearing capabilities of individuals and the problem quickly exceeds the level of 
detail required by the model at this stage of its development. Within this prototype 
model a method that approximates the physical properties of sound attenuation, 
observaations from 90-second certification trials and descriptions of communication 
from accident reports is developed.
To determine an overall trend for sound attenuation, we assume that shouting has an
Intensity (I) of 1 watts/metre when 20cms from the source and that background noise,
Oi.e. conversation, has a constant Intensity (I) of 6*10" watts/metre at every distance 
from the source [165]. We also assume no reflection, absorption or boundary effects. 
The sound waves propagate spherically (see Figure 61 (a)) from the source. With these 
assumptions, the power of the signal is determined according to:
20
where 
236
Chapter 6
14 16
Figure 61: an example of (a) spherical propogation without boundaries, and (b) a simplistic example
of sound attenuation as a function of distance
Using Equation 20 [165], a sound level of 120dBs is calculated for shouting when 
20cms from the source (see Figure 61(b)) while background noise from conversation 
has a uniform sound level of 68dBs. The power of the shout diminishes from 120dBs 
to approximately 97dBs at 4 metres. Indeed, the general physical trend for sound 
attenuation is a quick initial decay followed by a slow decline over greater distances.
Qualitatively, video footage from 90-second certification trials shows crew 
communicating with passengers some distance away. However, in most circumstances 
communication from crew to passengers at the other end of cabin sections are rare. In 
most instances the crewmember would have to move some distance into the cabin 
section in order for the communication to become effective. A further observation from 
90-second certification trials is that crew communications over large distances are less 
frequent during the early portion of evacuations when the cabin is densely populated. 
During the early portion of evacuations the crew tend to communicate with passengers 
within close proximity to themselves. This may result from the high number of 
passengers that are present within the cabin making communication over large 
distances extremely difficult. As the cabin begins to empty crew typically attempt to 
communicate to more distant passengers. During the final 10-20 seconds of 
certification trials crew are frequently witnessed shouting at individual passengers over 
relatively large distances (approximately 10 metres).
Using the trends of sound attenuation (see Figure 61(b)) as a guide, a functional 
relationship is proposed for use within the prototype model. The functional relationship 
links the probability of crew communicative effectiveness within the passenger density
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in the cabin (see Figure 62). Whilst there is insufficient data to perform quantitative 
verification of the proposed relations, qualitative aspects of the relation is supported 
through video footage of 90-second certification trials and the general properties of 
sound attenuation (see Figure 61(b)). For example, from the sound attenuation curve in 
Figure 61(b) it can be seen that the difference between the intensities (dB) of the shout 
and background communication reduces by 50% within the first 6 metres. The low 
density effectiveness curve constructed for use within the model shares this trend (see 
Figure 62).
However, after 6 metres the reduction in the mathematical curve (see Figure 61(b)) is 
less pronounced and decreases slowly with the two intensities converging at a distance 
of 100 metres. This trend is unsupported from analysis of video footage of 90-second 
certification trials, in which instances of crew communicating effectively beyond cabin 
partitions usually spaced at intervals of approximately 20 metres (60-feet) have not 
been witnessed. Consequently within the model and in low density conditions, 
communication effectiveness beyond 6 metres decreases at a more quick rate than the 
mathematical curve (see Figure 62), reaching a near zero value at 20 metres (60-feet).
As mentioned previously, qualitatively evidence from 90-second trials suggests that 
communication is less effective during medium and high passenger densities. Within 
the prototype model two more hypothetical curves (see Figure 62) are provided to 
represent reduced communication effectiveness in medium and high density conditions. 
These curves share the general trends of the low density curves however serve to reduce 
communication effectiveness in medium and high density conditions.
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Figure 62: Hypothetical functions to represent cabin crew communication effectiveness 
Within the prototype model the density will be sampled within a 10 metre radius of the 
crew, i.e. the immediate vicinity of the crew. Low density is arbitrarily set as being
<0.1 passengers/metre , high density as greater than 0.4 passengers/metre and medium 
density any where in-between high and low. Reflecting the features of sound 
attenuation the hypothetical curves have long tails that represent very low probabilities 
of communication being effective. Based on these two composite linear functions were 
defined for each density (see Figure 63) and provide a reasonable fit to the hypothetical 
curve (see Figure 62).
Within the prototype model the communication range is set to the distance at which 
communication is effective which is randomly determined using the curves previously 
described (see Figure 63). As the density within the cabin is subject to change a new 
calculation is made each time a crewmember attempts a communication.
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Figure 63: Linear function to represent cabin crew communication effectiveness
20
A finding of the investigation into human behaviour in real emergency evacuations in 
Chapter 5 was that communication is likely to be more difficult in smoke environments 
(see Section 5.4.1). This is due primarily to the effects of irritant gas on the throat and 
lungs, although other factors such as increased scatter from smoke particulate and/or 
increased background noise from fire fighting activities may also impact upon the 
effective range of the cabin crew. When considering communication in smoke filled 
environments it is apparent that another set of complex interacting factors exist.
Again there is insufficient data to quantitatively define a relationship between 
communication effectiveness in smoke as compared with clear air. Thus some 
simplistic approximations are made and used within the prototype model. Again these 
are based on the analysis of past aircraft accidents in which it was apparent that 
communication was more difficult in smoke filled environments. This investigation 
indicated that some reduction is clearly necessary for the model to be realistic. The 
value of such a reduction is likely a function of the factors mentioned above and is 
extremely difficult to define and generalise. It is therefore suggested that to model an 
'effect' the effectiveness threshold probabilities are reduced by approximately half 
whilst maintaining the general trends of those in clear air.
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It is recognised that the adopted approach to communication is somewhat crude. 
However, the models are based on understanding of the physical processes involved 
and qualitative understanding of the resulting behaviours. The models that have been 
proposed allow a broad approximation to the observations of communication in from 
90-second certification trials. Whilst the values generated by the model would 
undoubtedly vary in reality, the broad trends captured within the model (i.e. smoke 
reductions, attenuation over distance, etc.) are considered a reasonable correlation to 
reality being based to some degree on observation and the physical properties of sound 
attenuation. Finally, the inclusion of this representation of communication will allow 
additional scenarios involving communication to be modelled, which as mentioned 
previously broadly represent the trends found in aircraft evacuations and the physical 
properties of the process.
3
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Figure 64: Hypothetical functions to represent cabin crew communication effectiveness in smoke
Within the prototype model the crew will make judgements on whether it is worth 
attempting to communicate over certain distances. Where the probability of their being 
successful is too low, they will disregard the option and instead focus on closer and 
more viable communication options. This reflects the observed behaviour from 90- 
second certification trials in which the crew are unlikely to attempt to communicate 
with very distant passengers during the early stages of the evacuation when the cabin is 
densely populated. Furthermore, as the cabin begins to empty the crew will perceive
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communication becoming easier and more effective and thus attempt to communicate 
over larger distances. As the cabin completely empties the crew may attempt to 
communicate over relatively large distances.
Another aspect of the crew communication process involves whether the passenger will 
obey or disregard the command of the crew. In reality factors such as whether the 
passenger agrees with the crew, whether other passengers have obeyed the crew, 
whether the crew is redirecting you towards what you precieve to be a dangerous route, 
whether you have the stamina to undertake their instructions, etc., would all influence 
decision of the passenger to accept or reject the command of the crew. Given the lack 
of research in this area it is extremely difficult to model this behaviour taking into 
account all of these factors. However a representation is required within the prototype 
model.
Within this prototype a simplistic functional relationship between the passengers Drive 
and the Assertiveness of the crew is adopted. In essence this approach models a 
fundamental level of agreeability by the passenger to the commands of the crew which 
is affected by the assertiveness of the cabin crew. In a later section of this work a 
method for having passengers' agreeability affected by severity of the scenario is 
proposed.
Within the prototype model an assertiveness attribute is used to represent the 
forcefulness of the crew when communicating. The attribute is assigned values 
between 0-15, in which 2 would represents low and 15 high assertiveness. Video 
footage of 90-second certification trials demonstrates individual variations in the 
assertiveness levels of cabin crew. From example, some crew are averse to forcefully 
pushing passengers towards a desired location and choose to communicate verbally 
through the evacuation, whereas others forcefully grab passengers and hurl them in the 
desired directions. Thus, within the prototype model an assertiveness level can be 
assigned to each crew member that will influence their ability to enforce their 
redirection commands onto passengers.
From video evidence of 90-second certification trials it was apparent that when a cabin 
crewmember can actually physically handle a passenger their instructions tend to carry
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greater force than a verbal instruction or a wave of an arm. In other words, pushing a 
passenger towards a desired location delivers the instruction with greater power and 
force than merely asking them to move or gesturing. In other words the verbal 
command conveys less urgency than physically handling passengers.
To represent this within the model when communicating with passengers via verbal or 
gesture communication an (arbitrary 2 point) penalty is applied to represent the relative 
difficulty of communicating via this method. No such penalty is applied when 
communicating with passengers that are within touch range. The values can be 
changed should data indicate more appropriate settings. The effect of the penalty is that 
passengers are less likely to do as instructed when communicated with verbally than 
when communicated with by physical means.
As mentioned previously passengers' response is simplistically represented using the 
Drive attribute which is assigned to all passengers within the model. The Drive 
attribute is thought to be appropriate as it characterises the passengers' competitiveness. 
Within the model the Drive attribute is assigned values from 1 (low drive) to 15 (high 
drive) according to the age and gender of the passengers. There is some evidence to 
support the belief that young males generally have the highest drive while older females 
tend to have the lowest drive. This is suggested from competitive evacuation trials 
involving financial payments to evacuees who are amongst the first few to successfully 
evacuate [127,122]. A similar relationship may exist with respect to passenger 
subservience to crew commands. For example, a frail elderly female may be less able 
to resist a forceful push from a cabin crewmember than a young fit male.
Within the prototype model the probability of the passenger doing as instructed is 
represented via a linear function of the assertiveness of the cabin crew and the 
receptiveness of the passenger to their commands (see Figure 40). The outcome of the 
command is determined by the person with the highest value, i.e. passenger Drive 
versus crew Assertiveness. For instance, a passive and unassertive cabin crew 
(Assertiveness = 3) may not be able to dissuade an elderly but stubborn passenger from 
disobeying their wishes (Drive = 5). Thus, within the prototype model passengers with 
high Drive will be more likely to ignore the commands of cabin crewmembers than 
those passengers that have low Drive. Likewise a relatively timid cabin crewmember
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(Assertiveness = 3) may be able to influence those passengers that are subservient 
(Drive = 2). However, the same cabin crewmember may have difficulty in influencing 
the behaviour of insubordinate passenger (i.e. Drive > 3).
Table 39: The look-up table for passengers obeying the command
of cabin crew
A finding of Chapter 4 was that in 90-second certification trials the crew are highly 
effective at controlling passengers. Indeed it is relatively uncommon to observe 
disobedience when examining certification trial video footage. Thus it is recommended 
that the communication assertiveness of crew is set to maximum levels for 90-second 
certification trials. In this behavioural regime ALL passengers would be totally 
subservient to the commands of crew.
The final element of the prototype 90-second certification trial redirection model 
concerns the temporal component to communication. When a crewmember issues a 
verbal command, the act of issuing the command requires an amount of time - some 
time is utilised in forming the words, waving arms or handling the passenger. To 
represent this within the model the act of communicating a command to an individual 
passenger requires an amount of time. At present the time penalty attached to 
communication is arbitrarily set to half a second. Whilst the actual value of the number 
is completely arbitrary, it is clearly necessary to have some representation of what is 
clearly an important physical aspect to communication.
At this stage the simulated crew redirection model would lead the crew to always make 
a near perfect assessment of redirection based on the information available to them. 
However in reality, humans are fallible and are capable of making poor decisions. 
Thus, at present this model simulates a somewhat artificial situation. In order to better 
reflect reality the model requires a mechanism of representing the fallibility of crew 
when making rapid and complex decisions.
244
^^___________________Chapter 6_____________________
In reality numerous fallibilities are witnessed in evacuations. For example, crew may 
redirect passengers to exits that are not useable (see Section 5.4) and/or may determine 
that no available exits exist for redirection. Whilst important, at this stage of the model 
development fallibility is limited to the confines of the proposed model. The proposed 
method of crew fallibility introduces inaccuracy into the crewmember assessment of the 
clearance time of the exits (Equation 13) and the movement speeds of passengers in 
reaching alternative exits (Equation 16). This is randomly generated within a user 
specified range and serves to increase or decrease to the estimated flow rate of the exits 
(fi), the movement speeds of the passengers (vO and the distance that the passengers has 
to travel to the exits (dj). This scheme represents a slight misjudgement of the time 
required to evacuate passengers through the exit and would affect the crewmember's 
ability to determine whether redirection is beneficial.
The level of error should vary according to the proximity of the exit to the crew. For 
simplicity exits have been categorised as being either local, i.e. closest to the crew, or 
distant, i.e. all other exits. The user is able to specify different percentage errors to 
local and more distant exits. If supplied, these error bounds affect the entire crew 
complement.
The model proposed thus far encompasses the main aspects of the bypass procedure, 
namely the crew's movement to the redirection station, their dynamic assessments of 
the optimality of exit usage, a method of determining if redirecting a passenger would 
improve evacuation optimality and finally a method of communicating a redirection 
instruction to the passenger. However, the model that has been described has been 
developed thus far is appropriate ONLY to 90-second certification trials. The next 
sections extend the model to more realistic emergency evacuation situations.
In 90-second certification trials the general mode of behaviour is that passengers do as 
instructed by cabin crew. However, from the analysis of real emergency evacuations it 
was apparent that two forms of redirection operate in tandem as in real emergency 
evacuations passengers are actively seeking their own solution to the evacuation 
problem. Their solution involves an attempt to minimise their personal evacuation
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time. Thus, when modelling real emergency evacuations an additional model has been 
developed to represent passenger exit decision-making. Furthermore, some additional 
features are required to augment the crew redirection models. This section addresses 
these issues and describes the development of a model for representing passenger exit 
choice and crew redirection in actual emergency evacuation scenarios.
Before continuing it is necessary to reiterate the key findings of the data analysis. From 
a behaviour perspective evacuation scenarios can be broadly grouped as being those 
that involve some form of either, non-fire or external fire (referred to as non-fire 
scenarios), or burn-through scenarios or internal fire (referred to as fire scenarios).
Firstly, a model for simulating passenger exit choice during non-fire and external fires 
is presented and adaptations to the 90-second crew redirection model made. Building 
on this the model is further extended to encompass passenger and crew exit choice 
decision-making in burn through scenarios.
In order to represent crew and passenger exit choice, it was necessary to construct a 
model that was able to simulate passenger exit choice based on the analysis of the 
AASK database [6,7,102,103]. Having developed a passenger exit choice model, the 
90-second certification trial cabin crew redirection model is extended. Finally, a 
scheme in which both of these models can operate in tandem is proposed.
Based on the analysis of the AASK database, it was apparent that the rationale for the 
passenger exit choice model should be that each passenger attempts to choose an exit 
that offers the fastest evacuation time for them as individuals rather than for the 
evacuation of the aircraft as a whole. When considering their options passenger would 
use their own knowledge of the exit locations onboard the aircraft and the nature of the 
evolving evacuation scenario to calculate which exit is the best for them personally. In 
essence the passenger is performing their own flow rate calculation based on their 
understanding of their environment and the number of potential competitors for each of 
the exits. However, unlike the crew, the passengers' calculation is based on only 
tentative knowledge of the characteristics of the aircrafts' exits and involves them 
minimising their personal evacuation time.
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This can be modelled via having each passenger estimate their own personal evacuation 
time if they were to use each exit. This calculation is presented as Equation 21 .
21
i = the exits that are considered to redirect towards, i.e. Rl, LI, R2. . ..
p = the passenger under consideration
Tp,i = Time estimate for passenger p using exit i
Pap>i = the number of passengers likely to reach the exit ahead of passenger p when
using exit i
fp,i = an estimate of passenger p for amount of time required to evacuate a single
passenger through an the exit i
In reality when determining a finishing time for an exit a passenger would only be 
interested in other passengers that could potentially reach the exit before them. Thus 
within the model the number of passengers ahead of passenger when considering 
exit is simply the number of passengers that are closer to the exit being considered. 
Within the model this calculation can be achieved via having the passenger use his 
distance from the exit as a radius within which other passengers are considered. Of 
interest to the passenger are only other 'viable' passengers who may use the exit 
under consideration. Within this prototype 'viable passengers' are defined as those 
that are located within aisles, vestibules and in the case of through seating exit 
passage ways, i.e. seating adjacent to Type-Ill exits. Passengers that are unbuckling 
seat belts are excluded from this judgement.
As an example Figure 65(a) shows a passenger who is considering the number of 
users of both exit 1 and exit 2 (seats, aisles, etc. have been excluded for simplicity). 
In determining this, the simulated passenger notes his distance from each exit (see 
Figure 65(b)) and extends a hypothetical catchment area using the distance from each 
exit as the radius. The simulated passenger then counts the number of passengers that 
are using each exit within each catchment area (see Figure 65(c)). The number of 
passengers for each exit forms estimate used in Equation 21. A scheme for
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limiting his information according to the visual accessibility of the structure and 
environmental conditions is presented in later sections.
\
(c) 
Figure 65: A hypothetical situation demonstrating how the pai,* estimate is derived
A flow rate estimate / is used within the model as a mechanism for passengers to 
estimate the length of time they are likely to wait given the number of passengers 
ahead of them. Determining a value for this estimate to use within the model is a 
difficult task and is likely to be unique to each passenger.
Recall that as part of the cabin crew redirection model the crew were given an
Table 40: Static passenger estimate (fi)of estimate of the len§th °f time re(luired to
evacuate a single passenger through an exit. The
value used represented average flow rates for 
each exit type derived from past 90- second 
certification trials [158,159]. In reality 
passengers would not have the same level of 
knowledge of exit performance characteristics as
the time required to evacuate a single 
passenger through each exit type
members of the crew. Indeed passengers may only have a tentative knowledge that 
different exits sizes exist let alone their different flow characteristics. This was 
apparent from the discussion of emergency evacuations in which passengers tended to
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overrate the evacuation capability of Type-Ill exits. This topic would certainly 
benefit from some data collection in future.
As such, it is suggested that within the model passengers do not recognise that 
different exit types have different flow rate capabilities. However, given the present 
the lack of data on this area it seems reasonable to assign each passenger a similar 
flow estimate that can be configured by the user (see Table 40). The flow rate 
estimate for passengers (/) defaults to a flow rate of 1 seconds per passenger for floor 
level exits (e.g. Type-A, Type-I, Type-B and Type-C). In reality passengers may 
have some intuitive ranking for a walkthrough (floor-level) exit as compared with an 
over wing exit. To represent this within the model passengers' estimate of the time 
taken to pass through these types of exits is doubled, i.e. 2 seconds per passenger.
Ascertaining the exits that the passenger would consider as options during an 
evacuation is complex and likely based on numerous factors, such as knowledge of 
the aircraft layout, visual access, etc. Recall that in the crew redirection model the 
user defines visual regions to reflect line of sight for cabin crew at redirection 
stations. This was possible as the crew perform bypass from a few set stations 
onboard the aircraft. Passengers will be making exit choice decisions at any location 
within the aircraft. Therefore visual regions would need to be defined for every 
passenger at every stage of the evacuation. This would prove a time consuming task 
for a user and extremely computationally expensive if calculated automatically. For 
this reason, a less computational expensive and somewhat simplified representation of 
visual access has been developed for use in the passenger model. This will be 
discussed in more detail in a later section.
Firstly, the construction of a passenger's estimate of the likely travel time when using 
each exit is presented. This estimate is calculated using an adaptation of Equation 17 
and is shown in Equation 22. Using the same method outlined in the cabin crew 
redirection section, a feature of this model is that the passenger analyses the flow 
pattern within the cabin so as to avoid confluence with other passengers. This 
assessment operates in a similar manner to that of the crew checking for direct and 
indirect confluence and adjusting their estimates according to visibility. Thus,
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unrealistic situations in which passengers redirect into a flow of passengers moving in 
an opposite direction are avoided.
the exit
the optimal time required for passenger p to travel to exit j assuming there is no
congestion
the confluence penalty for passenger p en route to the exit i
the revised travel time for passenger p en route to exit i
23
the revised estimated finish time of passenger p for exit i
Similar to the crew redirection model, an estimate of the time to evacuate is calculated 
as the larger of either, the time required for those passengers in front of the passenger to 
evacuate, i.e. T, or the travel time required for the passenger to reach the exit, i.e. IT. 
This is shown in Equation 23.
Equation 23 offers a mechanism by which a passenger assesses the merit of using each 
exit. By contrasting the estimate for each exit, the passenger can determine the exit that 
offers the lowest personal evacuation time, i.e. the exit that generates the smallest 
see Equation 24.
24 
the exit i that the passenger p determines will yield the fastest evacuation time
In reality passengers would be unable to detect very small differences in the time for 
evacuation routes, i.e. 0.1 seconds, 0.002 seconds, 2 seconds etc. Thus, within the 
model a threshold for their judgement has been imposed. Within the model passengers 
will only recognise the need to change route where the difference is between their 
current route and the new route is greater than 5 seconds.
To summarise, a method has been developed for passengers to determine the best exit to 
use for their evacuation. A flow diagram of this model is shown in Table 41.
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The scheme involves each passenger estimating the time required for their evacuation 
through each of the available exits. Information gathering at this stage is totally 
effective - the next section details a method of limiting dynamic information using a 
simplistic visual scheme.
Table 41: Flow chart of a passenger exit choice model
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In reality passengers would not have total knowledge of dynamic events within the 
aircraft cabin. Indeed their visual access would be dependant upon numerous factors 
such as, the ambient lighting within the aircraft, environmental conditions (smoke/fire), 
visual capabilities of the individual, height of the individual, the height and location of 
fellow passengers and the geometric configuration of the aircraft, i.e. seat heights, 
overhead stowage bins and partitions, to name but a few. The complexity of the real 
world assessment needs to be reduced to a level that is amenable to computer 
simulation. Line of sight calculations for each passenger are clearly not realistic for this 
model given the current limitations of computer resources. Furthermore modelling all 
of these factors would introduce numerous additional parameters into the model, over 
complicating its use and provide a level of detail that would likely be in excess of the 
model's sensitivity. A simplified method is therefore developed in this work.
Within the prototype passenger redirection model dynamic information is only used 
when considering the number of potential competitors for an exit and the flow pattern 
within the cabin (e.g. confluences). A simplistic method of limiting passenger vision 
within the model could be achieved through the use of a coarse network representation 
of the spatial components within the aircraft (see Appendix B). Using a coarse 
network, passengers could be assigned knowledge of specific spatial components 
appropriate to their location and the structural configuration of the aircraft. Whilst 
offering only an approximation of visual access, the approach would be 
computationally inexpensive and thus capable of running in near to real-time. 
Furthermore, whilst the method is only an approximation it facilitates the required 
functionality. Using the coarse network, a rudimentary representation of line of sight 
can be attained through a few simple rules. Indeed this approach is employed within 
the prototype model.
Within the model it is assumed that passengers that are considering alternative exits 
assess the number of other passengers that are closer and likely to use the exit before 
them. An approach for determining this has previously been developed based on the 
time it would take them to reach each exit. However, in performing this calculation 
their overall visibility needs to be limited according to the visual accessibility of the 
structure. Assuming the passenger is of average height and possesses average visual
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capabilities, it is reasonable to assume that in clear air the average passenger would be 
able to see along a series of straight aisles. In addition seating and opposite aisles 
within the same cabin zone would also likely be visible. Opposite aisles and seating 
beyond the current cabin zone is typically obscured by the presence of monuments 
between cabin zones. At a basic level, these three assumptions determine visual 
accessibility for a 'typical' aircraft. Issues relating to passenger heights are not 
considered at this stage as they would provide an excessive level of functionality for 
this portion of the model and an associated increase in required computational 
resources. Environmental influences, such as smoke, are dealt with in a later section.
Within the prototype model passengers are only concerned with those other passengers 
that could possibly hinder their access to the exit. In this portion of the model the term 
visibility refers to visibility of potential exit competitors and not total structural 
visibility. As such, passengers that have yet to respond, i.e. unbuckle seat belts, are 
excluded as it is debatable as to whether passengers would not perceive them as viable 
competitors.
It is proposed that passengers are allowed to have complete access to information within 
their current spatial component. However, when a passenger attempts to look beyond 
their spatial component their information is limited. In the prototype model it is limited 
according to the following rules:
A) Vision is limited to all of the aisles along the shortest route to the exit with the 
exclusion of the vestibule adjacent to the exit under consideration. Where two aisles 
are broken by an exit vestibule, the aisles are projected onto the vestibule (see Rule B).
B) Access to information from vestibules other than that which the passenger occupies 
is limited to nodes that connect the two aisles, i.e. those vestibule nodes that lie on the 
path through the vestibule.
C) Adjacent aisles and seating sections that are contained within the same cabin zone 
are considered visible.
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In the case of exit passageways through seating, i.e. Type-Hi exit passageways, the 
further rule is required that,
These simple rules allow quite complex representations of visual access to be utilised 
within the model.
Figure 66: A hypothetical narrow-bodied aircraft cabin layout (top) that has been divided in coarse
labelled components (bottom)
Figure 67: The maximum visibility is the white regions for passenger A (top) and passenger B (bottom) 
Note - this may be reduced according to the rules depending upon the exit currently being examined
The application of the rules within the model is best demonstrated with examples. 
Consider the example in Figure 66. Passenger A and B are considering the merit of 
using exits Rl, R2 and R3. In making their decisions information is limited according 
to the three rules. Thus, when considering the Rl exit passenger A would have his 
information limited to {A1,S1,S2} only (Rule B includes Al and SI, Rule C include 
S2), whereas for R2 his information would be limited to {A1,S1,S2} (Rule B includes 
Al and Rule C includes SI and S2) and for exit R3 his information would be limited to 
{Al, SI, S2} only (Rule B includes Al, Rule C includes S2 and SI). When 
considering exits R1-R3 passenger A would only ever be allowed visual access to 
components Al, SI and S2 (see Figure 67(b)).
In the same example passenger B is also considering exits R1-R3. When considering 
Rl and R2 his information would be limited to {Al} only, whereas when considering
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R3 his information is limited to {V2} only. Thus, when considering exits R1-R3 
passenger B would only ever be allowed visual access to components Al and V2 (see 
Figure 67(b)).
Consider the more complex wide-bodied example in Figure 68, passengers A and B are 
considering the merit of using exits Rl, R2, R3 and R4. Using the proposed rules 
passenger A's information is limited to only the vestibule and the nearest aisle to the 
passenger, i.e. {VI} when considering redirection to Rl, {V1,A1} when considering 
R2, {V1,A1,V2,A3} when considering R3 and finally {V1,A1,V2,A3,V3,A5} when 
considering redirection to R4. By contrast passenger B would have access to 
information from {A5,A6,S7,S8,S9,V3,A4,V2,A2} when considering exit Rl, 
{A5,A6,S7,S8,S9,V3,A4} when considering exit R2, and only {A5,A6,S7,S8,S9} 
when consider the R3 and R4 exits. Thus, when considering exits R1-R4 passenger A 
would only ever be allowed visual access to components 
{V1,A1,A2,V2,A3,A4,V3,A5,A6 } (see Figure 69(a)). Whereas passenger B would 
only ever be allowed visual access to components {A5,A6,S7,S8,S9,V3,A4,V2,A2} 
(see Figure 69 (b)).
Based on the location of passengers in Figure 68(c), passenger A would conclude that 
one passenger is ahead of him when using exit Rl, i.e. paA,Ri = 1. The remaining 
determinations of the number of passengers based on passenger A in are paA,R2 = 4,
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Figure 68: A hypothetical wide-bodied aircraft cabin layout (top) that has been divided in coarse
labelled components (middle and bottom)
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Figure 69: The maximum visibility is the white regions for passenger A (a) and passenger B (b) Note - 
this may be reduced according to the rules depending upon the exit currently being examined
In addition to the development of a passenger exit choice model some minor 
modifications based on the analysis of the AASK database to the 90-second
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certification trial crew redirection model are considered important for the model to 
simulate non-fire/external fire emergency evacuations. In the analysis of data within 
AASK (Chapter 5) it was suggested that passengers were slightly less subservient to the 
instructions of crew in real emergencies that did not involve fire penetrating the cabin. 
In these types of scenarios instances of passenger disobedience were present although 
relatively rare. Within the prototype model this can be accomplished via temporarily 
increasing the Drive attribute of every passenger in these scenarios and only affects the 
passengers' response to crew commands. Within the prototype model it is 
recommended that the Drive of passengers is only marginally increased albeit by a 
small margin, arbitrarily 1 Drive point, in non-fire/external fire evacuations.
Finally, it is necessary for the cabin crew model and the passenger redirection models to 
operate together. From the analysis of the AASK database, it was apparent that 
passengers initially formed their own exit choice decisions. However, once instructed 
by a cabin crewmember most people typically abandoned their exit choice and obeyed 
the instruction of the crewmember.
This could be simulated through allowing the passengers to form their own decisions, 
however once instructed by a crew member the Drive/Subservience look-up table can 
be interrogated to determine whether the passenger obeys the crew command. If the 
passenger does then the passenger ceases to assess exit choice for him/herself and 
follows the instructions of the crew. If the passenger refuses then they continue to 
assess exit choice for themselves. In this manner the two models can operate in 
tandem.
As mentioned previously, behaviour is very different in emergencies that involve fire. 
This section details the extension of the non-fire/external fire passenger and crew and 
passenger decision-making model to cover burn through scenarios. As part of this both 
the passenger exit choice models are extended to include judgements based on the 
presence of smoke and to limit dynamic information according to smoke visibility.
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Finally, an automatic method of moving between non-fire/external fire behaviour and 
burn-through behaviour is proposed leading to a unified model of crew and passenger 
redirection in emergency evacuations.
The main differences in passenger exit choice during burn through fire scenarios 
originate from the hostile environmental conditions affecting the physiology, 
psychology and toxicology of passengers and crew. These effects have been described 
previously (see Section 5.4.1) and so will not be discussed again in this section. 
However, the model is extended to include some of the physical and psychological 
affects that originate from the presence of a thermo-toxic atmosphere.
An important conclusion from the analysis of burn-through evacuations was that the 
psychology of passengers is different to those evacuations without internal fire 
penetration. In burn-through scenarios it was concluded that passengers are less likely 
to obey the commands of crew. It is therefore recommended that passenger motivation 
be increased further in emergency evacuations that involve fire penetrating the cabin. 
Within airEXODUS this could be achieved via increasing the Drive attribute by a large 
amount in order to reflect the increased urgency of the evacuation. The actual amount 
of the increase is arbitrarily recommended to be 9 additional Drive points within the 
model on top of the 1 additional Drive points from the non-fire and external fire model. 
Thus, the total Drive increase for passengers in burn through scenarios when compared 
against 90-second certification trials is 10 Drive points.
Another important environmental effect on the passenger exit choice model - and 
indeed the crew redirection procedure - is that smoke and acidic toxic gases would limit 
visual abilities. Thus, in order to represent passenger exit choice in burn through 
scenarios it is necessary to limit visual access according to the atmospheric conditions 
within the aircraft cabin. Smoke and fire completely blocking a route is the subject of 
future work and is already partially considered within standard airEXODUS V3. 
Reductions to passenger movement velocities is also already included in the standard 
airEXODUS V3 software [40].
This section details the development of a new method to simulate passenger vision in
smoke environments. This will further limit the vision of passengers as determined via
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the spatial access rules in the previous section. In this section models are developed to 
represent passenger and crew visibility of exit signs and people in smoke environments.
Limited experiments have been performed using human test subjects in various smoke 
environments [146]. These have established some understanding of human visibility in 
various irritant/non-irritant smoke atmospheres (see Section 2.4.3.3). These 
experiments suggest that passenger vision in smoke environments is person specific 
[146] and dependant upon on the physical characteristics of the smoke [146].
A commonly used measure of the properties and concentration of smoke is known as 
the extinction coefficient. The extinction coefficient represents the sum of the 
scattering and absorption coefficients. The scattering coefficient is a measure of the 
loss of light per unit distance by scattering and the absorption coefficient is a measure 
of the loss of light per unit distance by absorption. Thus, an extinction coefficient can 
be used to represent the different properties of smoke with respect to light transmission 
and, as it will be shown, to some degree visibility in different smoke environments. 
The higher the extinction coefficient the denser the smoke and the more difficult 
visibility would become (see Figure 70).
10
Figure 70: Relationship between visibility and extinction coefficient. Jin [ 146]
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In 1978, Jin presented the results of studies into visibility through fire and smoke. This 
research involved testing volunteers' ability to see light reflecting and self-illuminating 
signs whilst being subjected to irritant and non-irritant white and black smoke. Jin 
concluded that in non-irritant smoke visibility had a constant inverse proportional 
relationship to the extinction coefficient. Jin concluded that visibility at the obscuration 
threshold - the maximum visible range that reflecting signs could be seen in non-irritant 
smoke - could be calculated as:
25
Where C = the extinction coefficient
Where2< a<4
Whilst this data was appropriate for reflecting signs, Jin stated that,
The lower bounds may therefore be appropriate for people in aircraft and provides a 
method for calculating a visible range in non-irritant smoke conditions. With respect to 
irritant smoke conditions; his results are less useful. Only data relating to the 
obscuration threshold of self illuminating signs were provided. However his general 
conclusions were that visibility was more difficult in irritant conditions whilst showing 
a similar relationship. For self illuminating signs the obscuration threshold was 
decreased by 56% from 8/C metres in non-irritant smoke to 4.5/C in irritant conditions. 
However, at high smoke concentrations volunteers were unable to accomplish the 
experiment, as Jin stated,
Thus, no data was available beyond extinction coefficients of 0.5.
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Whilst Tin's conclusions on the obscuration threshold of reflecting signs in non-irritant 
smoke conditions is used within a model to define the maximum visible range of exit 
signs and doors for both passengers and crew, the data on non-reflecting signs (lower 
values are suitable for walls, doors, i.e. people) in irritant smoke was not provided. 
Given the lack of data, the decision was taken to limit the model to visibility in non- 
irritant conditions at this stage.
Using Tin's data visibility can be calculated for an individual within airEXODUS via 
calculating the obscuration threshold, hereafter referred to as the visible range, for each 
passenger. This requires knowledge of the extinction coefficients within the 
environment. Presuming that coefficients are the same, then a visible range in non- 
irritant smoke can be calculated as:
Where C = the extinction coefficient
26
However, a fire does not generate uniform extinction coefficients at every space within 
an enclosure. A crude method of calculating the overall extinction coefficient between 
two points is to average the coefficients that lie between the two points. This method, 
assumes that the affects of varied extinction coefficients can be averaged over space. 
With a nodal model, such as airEXODUS, extinction coefficients are recorded at every 
node. These values are labelled as Xi, Xi... Xx (see Figure 71). In nodal models the 
distances between these points are typically represented by arcs Xi, X2 ... A* of specific 
lengths. From these an average extinction coefficient (x) can be calculated between any
two adjacent nodes.
Similarly the average extinction coefficient 
can be calculated between a series of nodes 
via weighting the coefficients according to the 
length of the arc Xi that connects the two nodes 
(see Equation 27). Given Equation 27 the 
visible range for a passenger can be calculated
Figure 71: Extinction coefficient notation yja equation 2g. Using this an algorithm 
for calculating the visible range ° °
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appropriate to calculating visibility in nodal models is developed (e.g. Equation 28 
describes one method). The method has been designed so that it limits computational 
expense and is explained via the use of a hypothetical scenario shown in Figure 72.
7=7. 27
I
Where x,- = Extinction coefficient x of node i 
Xi = (Xi+Xi+1 )/2
X,- = the distance between each node i and node i+1
I
28
13
Figure 72: Hypothetical cabin section with extinction 
coefficients (X) shown at each node
The procedure involves 
calculating an average extinction 
coefficient between the person and 
each node within the aircraft (see 
Figure 73 (b)). Within the model 
the calculations begin at the node 
occupied by the person and 
propagate outwards. This allows 
previously calculated values to be
used to calculate the each successive node thus limiting computational expense. A 
determination can be made as to whether a node is either visible or not (see Figure 
73(d)) by contrasting the distance that each node is from the person (see Figure 73(a)) 
against the visible range across the distance between the person and each node (see 
Figure 73(c)). The prototype method further limits the number of calculations by
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contrasting the distance of each node from the person against the visible range at every 
stage of the calculation. Those nodes that are within visual range are stored in a list and 
those that are not are stored in a list of frontier nodes. The calculation never progresses 
beyond the frontier (see Figure 74).
Es
Figure 73: Method for calculating visible nodes for EVERY node
Door 2
(a) (b) 
Figure 74: Example of the frontier (gray) node when using method two - a frontier node is a node where (b) < (a)
The smoke visibility algorithm is calculated at every step of the simulation. Dynamic 
information gained through sight is further limited to those nodes that are included
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within the list of visible nodes of the passenger. This operates in conjunction with the 
spatial access visibility methods outlined in the previous sections.
Since airEXODUS stores two extinction coefficients - one for the upper layer and one 
for the lower layer, visibility is calculated using the smoke value appropriate to their 
posture, i.e. whether they are crawling or standing. Finally, the smoke visibility 
algorithm is also used to determine whether exits are visible to passengers and to limit 
those that they consider during their evacuation. This requires a minor modification to 
the visible range (Equation 26). Jin provided a function for calculating the visible range 
of light emitting signs (see Figure 70). A visible range for exits can be calculated via 
using Equation 29 in Equation 28.
Only exits that are within the exit visible range of passenger are considered during exit 
choice assessments. Situations could occur in which a passenger cannot consider any 
redirection decisions as they cannot see any exits. In these circumstances the passenger 
are forced to continue with their original exit choice.
Whilst smoke currently affects the movement rate of people it is also necessary to have 
people recognise that smoke is present and may present an obstacle to movement [40]. 
Within the model this is achieved by the adjustment of both passenger and crew 
estimates of movement velocities to those generated when moving through smoke. 
Using this approach, passengers and crew would perceive a nearby exit in smoke to be 
equivalent to a distant exit in clear air. An immediately apparent result of this is that 
reducing the travel distance to exits becomes of great importance during thick smoke in 
which movement is slow.
As with passengers, the crew may also suffer psychological, physiological and 
toxicological effects during an evacuation with a thermo-toxic environment. Thus, 
additional modifications and extensions to the crew redirection model are also required.
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An important chemical and biological effect of real emergency evacuations that involve 
fire penetrating the aircraft fuselage is that the ability of the crew to communicate 
would be reduced. This is due to the chemical effects of irritant acid gases upon the 
throat and pulmonary systems in addition to smoke particulate in the atmosphere 
blanketing sound (see Section 5.4.1). Therefore, the first modification to the cabin crew 
redirection model in fire scenarios is that the range of crew communication should be 
reduced. The actual level of the reduction is a matter for further research, however 
evidence from AASK and accident reports suggest that communication range should be 
severely reduced. Ideally, experimental research would determine values for these 
parameters. In a previous section an approximation of the cabin crew effective 
communication range was discussed and the effective communication ranges were 
reduced by approximately half in smoke conditions. In addition smoke would also 
affect the vision of crew in a similar manner to passengers. Thus, crew should also 
have their dynamic information collection curtailed using the smoke visibility 
algorithms previously developed. This should operate in conjunction with the crew 
visible regions approach outlined earlier (see Section 6.1.1.1). Conceptually this can 
be thought of as applying two different stencils to the geometry (see Figure 75), the 
structural and smoke visibility stencils. The visible region stencil limits the nodes 
according to the spatial access within the cabin. The smoke visibility stencil is applied 
to possibly further limit the available information according to environmental 
conditions. A key assumption of this model is that the effects of visual accessibility 
and smoke vision are additive.
Recall that user defined visual access was specified for the crew at every redirection 
location. The visual access represented vision for a standing crewmember. Should the 
crewmember be forced to adopt a crouching posture then the visual access afforded by 
the structure would be altered. Two levels of visual accessibility should therefore be 
defined within the model - one for a standing crewmember and another for a crawling 
crewmember. Visual access for crew when crouching has not been implemented 
within this version and is the subject of further work. The effect of this omission is 
considered minimal, as in order for a crew to adopt a crouched posture smoke 
conditions must be severe. Consequently, vision would be extremely limited by the 
smoke visibility algorithms and the visibility level afforded by the structure is
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essentially irrelevant. Extending the model to include this feature should not prove 
difficult.
Figure 75: The application of the hypothetical visible region stencil followed by the hypothetical smoke visibility
stencil
The result of limiting information according to smoke and structurally visibility is that 
the number of passengers that are thought to be using particular exits can be highly 
inaccurate (see Figure 75). This reflects the problems encountered by crew during 
REAL emergency evacuations involving fire and smoke.
Within the prototype cabin crew model the smoke visibility algorithm is also used to 
determine the exits that the crewmember is able to see. When considering redirection 
the crew exclude exits that are outside of their smoke adjusted visual range. Thus, a 
crewmember may attempt to redirect all passengers towards a single exit. Furthermore, 
situations could arise where crew cannot see any exits. In this event crew redirect 
passengers towards the nearest exit.
A further effect of smoke is that the crew should consider the smoke as presenting an 
obstacle to passenger movement. For example if passengers are being forced to crawl 
or feel their way through the cabin then the crew should recognise this and factor it into 
the any redirection decisions. This can be accomplished via using the standard 
airEXODUS smoke adjusted movement velocities [40] within the time calculations of 
the redirection models. This would have the effect of making the time required to 
travel relatively short distances in smoke equivalent to long distances in clear air. This 
has the affect of changing the emphasis of the model somewhat. For example, as the 
movement velocity of passengers is decreased reducing the distance that passengers 
have to travel to the exit becomes a greater priority than balancing the number of 
passengers using each exit. This emphasis shift is not specifically programmed but 
emerges from the model as a result of the smoke environment.
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As mentioned previously, the psychological impact of fire upon passenger motivation 
has been represented by increased passenger Drive. This has the affect of making any 
redirection commands less likely to be obeyed.
Many evacuation scenarios undergo change during the evacuation period - for example, 
most bum through scenarios start out as external fire scenarios. As the scenario 
develops, the behaviour of the passengers and crew alters reacting to the changing 
evacuation scenario. Thus, a dynamic method of passengers and crew reacting to the 
developing scenario in which the model selects appropriate behavioural models to 
activate is developed.
This can be accomplished via having airEXODUS automatically sense the 
environmental conditions at every step of the simulation. A simple method is for the 
environmental conditions at every node to be checked at every second of the 
simulation. The current conditions are then used to determine the behaviour rules that 
are used. Should non-ambient conditions be detected, then a fire is assumed to be 
present within the cabin and the scenario and behavioural options are adjusted 
automatically by the model to those appropriate to burn-through scenarios. If all of the 
nodes within the aircraft have ambient conditions then the behavioural switches are 
configured for non-fire or external fire responses. Conditions during 90-second 
certification scenarios do not undergo change during the evacuation, as such the 
behaviour rules during these scenarios would remain static throughout.
To summarise, this section has developed a model capable of simulating crew 
redirection during 90-second certification trials and real evacuations both with and 
without fire. The model is adaptive and contains features such as simulated vision, 
based on the visual accessibility of the structure, and smoke conditions within the cabin. 
Furthermore the model contains a representation of crew to passenger communication.
In addition, a model of passenger exit choice has been integrated for use in real 
emergency scenarios. Again this model is adaptive representing passenger vision in
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both clear air and smoke conditions. Both models have been integrated to provide a 
unified model of passenger and crew exit decision-making. Using these models 
passengers and crew are constantly making decisions during the evacuation. Finally, a 
method has been developed that allows the behavioural responses of crew and 
passengers to respond to the developing evacuation scenario.
Previously in evacuation modelling passenger movement was largely governed by local 
considerations only. These models have given simulated crew and passengers long 
term planning capabilities with respect to their evacuation. Using these models, both 
passengers and crew are able to form decisions about the best strategy for evacuation. 
Their behaviour has been enhanced so that the reactions of the passengers and crew are 
not entirely determined by local conditions but are also influenced by global/long-term 
considerations which contribute to the development of escape strategies.
This section investigates the application of the prototype model to a wide-bodied
aircraft evacuation. The aircraft is configured exactly the same as validation Case 4 
which held 440 passengers, however in this design a reduced passenger capacity of 400 
passengers was tested. During the certification trial this was achieved via leaving 
alternate seats empty in the first class cabin section at the front of the aircraft. The 
forward Type-A exit were therefore likely to finish evacuating passengers before the 
remaining three exits - even if all of the passengers in the forward zone use the front 
exit. Some form of bypass is beneficial to optimise the certification evacuation for this 
aircraft.
The set of scenarios that are presented in this section are designed to demonstrate the 
crew redirection models that have been developed. As such, relatively simple scenarios 
are used so that the effects of the prototype models can be distinguished and discussed. 
The final chapter of this thesis describes the application of the prototype models being 
used in a more comprehensive and realistic safety analysis context.
In total 4 sets of evacuation scenarios are simulated (see Table 42) with each set 
incrementally increasing the complexity of the prototype models that are used.
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Table 42: Summary of demonstration scenarios
The first scenario simulates a standard 90-second certification trial for this aircraft 
configuration without using the models developed in this work. This establishes a base- 
case against which the results of the later simulations that use the prototype models are 
contrasted. Scenario 2 investigates the same model configuration as Scenario 1, except 
that a single crew is modelled in the L2 exit area and is assigned redirection duties.
Scenarios 3 and 4 demonstrate real accident scenario. Four sub-variations of non-fire 
real emergency evacuations are modelled to demonstrate the sensitivity of the model to 
cabin crew numbers and their efficiency. Scenario 3(a) establishes a base-case for this 
scenario via repeating Scenario 2 however this time under non-fire emergency 
conditions without any cabin crew and using the passenger exit choice model. Scenario 
3(b) re-evaluates scenario 3(a) however with a single cabin crew member defined 
similar to Scenario 2. Scenario 3(c) demonstrates the sensitivity of the model to the 
number of cabin crew members via adding an additional crew member into the model. 
Finally, Scenario 3(d) demonstrates its sensitivity of the model to the efficiency of the 
crew.
The scenario demonstrates the functionality of the models in severe fire conditions. For 
simplicity the model configuration used in Scenario 3(d) is used. The first scenario 
(Scenario 4(a)) simulates severe emergency conditions without smoke whilst Scenario 
4(b) simulates severe emergency conditions with smoke.
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This aircraft seats 400 passengers (40 seats were empty during the trial) in three seating 
zones with 70 passengers in the forward zone, 204 in the central zone and 127 in the aft 
zone (see Figure 76). In total the aircraft has 4 pairs of Type-A exits with the central 
pairs being canted. In these scenarios only the right side exits are active (see Figure 
76). The exits are made ready using generalised times taken from 90-second 
certification trials. Finally, the cabin is populated in accordance with FAR 25.807 
requirements. Assertive cabin crew are implicitly modelled at the active exits through 
the application of the appropriate Exit Delay Distribution.
 i i i 
Figure 76: Wide-boided aircraft cabin layout (Alternate seats within the cirlced area were kept empty to
simulate a first class-cabin section)
This scenario provides a basis for later analysis. The model is configured in an optimal 
manner using 'standard' airEXODUS version 3.0 features. This configuration 
represents the functionality of the model prior to this thesis (see Table 43).
Table 43: Model settings for Scenario 1
Version 3.0 of airEXODUS
Crew features: 
  Implied crew behaviour; new features not 
implemented
Passenger Objective: 
  Follow potential map
In an attempt to attain optimality all of the passengers in the forward seating zone will 
be directed to the forward Rl exit, a balance between the R2 and R3 exit is attained in 
the mid-section and nearly all of those in the aft cabin section will be directed to the R4 
exit (see Figure 77).
In this scenario all of the passengers used the exits that they were assigned through the 
potential map and no bypass redirection occurred at any exits. Whilst the aircraft was 
evacuated in under 90 seconds a high OPS score (OPS > 0.1) indicates that this 
evacuation could be optimised through better exit utilisation (see
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Table 44). This is apparent from examination of the number of evacuees (67 
passengers) that used the forward exits as compared to the mid-section (121 and 113 
passengers) and the aft exits (99 passengers).
Figure 77: Enforced movement pattern configured within the model through implied crew behaviour
Table 44: Results for scenarios 1 and 2
In scenario 2 a single crew has been placed at the L2 exit area and given the 
responsibility of balancing the Rl and R2 exits (see Figure 78). This will involve 
bypassing some of the passengers attempting to use the R2 exit forwards to the Rl exit.
During the simulations on average 21 passenger and as many as 26 are directed by the 
crew from the R2 to the Rl exit. In these simulations, the crew ascertains that the R2 
exit will soon finish evacuating passengers and so redirects fast moving passengers 
towards the Rl exit. Whilst doing so the crew was careful not to redirect too many 
passengers at once but to maintain a flow of passengers to the more local exit (see Table 
44).
A more detailed example of a redirection decision within the model is explored through 
the use of Figure 79. In Figure 78 the crew has already redirected the three left most 
passengers within the ringed area but is considering redirecting more. In this example 
the crew has total visual access and as such would determine that 13 passengers are
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